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ABSTRACT

ROOTS OF MODALITY
SEPTEMBER 2012
AYNAT RUBINSTEIN
B.Sc., TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
M.A., TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Angelika Kratzer

This dissertation explores the interplay of grammar and context in the interpretation
of modal words like ought, necessary, and need. The empirical foci of the discussion are
patterns in the use of strong and weak necessity modals in conversation, and the interpretation of syntactically and semantically versatile modals like need in the various grammatical
configurations they appear in across languages.
It is argued that a sensitivity to collective commitments in a conversation is necessary
for understanding certain aspects of modal strength, in particular the traditional distinction
between strong and weak necessity modals (exhibited by must and ought to in English). It is
proposed that strong necessity modals can only reference priorities that are presupposed to
be collectively committed to, whereas weak necessity modals are evaluated with respect to a
mixed bag of priorities, crucially including ones that are presupposed not to be collectively
committed to. A domain restriction approach to weak necessity is adopted, following a
demonstration that it is superior to a number of probabilistic alternatives.

viii

Modal verbs and adjectives that take both infinitival and nominal complements are
shown to pattern alike across languages in requiring a teleological, or goal-oriented interpretation when their complements are not infinitives (but rather noun phrases or certain
Complementizer Phrases). This limitation is lifted with infinitival complements, showing
that transitive configurations of certain intensional verbs are not semantically equivalent to
the infinitival configurations of the same verbs.
A result of this research is a fine grained analysis of the differences between closely
related necessity modals and attitude verbs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about modality, that signature property of human language that
allows us to speak not about the here and now, but about the realm of mere possibilities.1
There are many words that allow us to engage in modal talk: must and have to, should
and ought, necessary, want, need, and many others. How are the meanings of these modal
words similar? How are they different? What are all the factors that influence how they are
used in conversation?
This dissertation takes on these questions in the domain of necessity modals: weak
and strong, performative, desiderative, and syntactically versatile. It offers an in-depth
analysis of weak necessity and a novel criterion to explain how weak and strong necessity
modals differ. The sum of these investigations is not only a more accurate description of the
differences between individual modal words, but a deeper understanding of the semantic
and pragmatic building blocks that language makes available for the construction of modal
meaning.

1.1

What it means for a necessity modal to be weak

The entry point to the dissertation is the question of what makes necessity modals like
ought weaker semantically than necessity modals like have to. It can be true, for instance,
that You ought to rent a car, but simultaneously true that You don’t have to rent a car.
If we replace ought to with must, the conjunction of these two sentences amounts to a
1

Hockett (1966).

1

contradiction. Ought is therefore said to be “weak.” This weakness has proven difficult to
formally pin down.
A leading intuition in the literature has been that ought is weak because it makes a necessity claim that characterizes a subset of the possibilities that have to does. For example,
if we are talking about your upcoming road-trip and identify that renting a car is one option
among several you can pursue, it is not true that you have to rent a car. But it is true that you
ought to, if for example an additional consideration of independence is taken into account.
A smaller domain of quantification results in a weaker statement, assuming that both ought
and have to effect universal quantification over possibilities.
This approach requires the considerations that necessity modals are sensitive to to come
in two types. Some considerations should be relevant for both have to and ought, and there
should be certain considerations that are only relevant for ought. Above, the additional
consideration of independence that is behind the claim that you ought to rent a car should
not be a consideration that have to is sensitive to (otherwise the claim that you have to
rent a car would be true). So we have a question: what defines which considerations the
different modals are sensitive to?
In my discussion, I argue that a satisfactory answer to this question has not yet been
given in the literature. In particular, it doesn’t seem to be possible to make the split between
considerations on conceptual grounds, and neither is it possible to rely on the linguistic signal to provide one type of consideration to the exclusion of the other. Often, considerations
that form the background for the modal claim are entirely implicit and contextually determined, so as a rule it won’t do to look to the linguistic signal for clues. A new dimension
for distinguishing between modal backgrounds is needed.
My goal in the second part of Chapter 2 is to propose a new dimension for characterizing the contextually determined considerations that weak and strong necessity modals are
sensitive to. I propose that the relevant dimension concerns the presupposed commitment
of the participants in the conversation toward a given consideration, or priority. Strong
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necessity modals are strong because they take into account considerations that all the conversational participants are presupposed to be committed to, and weak modals are weak
because they rely on additional considerations that not all the conversational participants
are presupposed to be “on board with.”
As initial motivation for sensitivity to collective commitment as a way of distinguishing between priorities, consider the different necessity claims supported by each of the
following two scenarios.
(1)

[Rachel is coming to the United States next summer. It is now illegal not to have
health insurance in the US.]
a. [Rachel will be a graduate student in a respectable university.]
She has to (/? should) get health insurance.
b. [Rachel will be employed illegally, selling cheap jewelry at a shopping mall.]
She should (/False has to) get health insurance.

In both scenarios, the consideration of following the law is salient and relevant. In (1a),
it licenses a strong necessity claim. In (1b), it only licenses a weak one. Why is this the
case? When we probe the judgment that a strong necessity claim is false in the scenario
in (1b), the reason seems to be that it is not taken for granted that considerations of lawful
conduct apply in the case of illegally employed workers. In contrast, such considerations
are presupposed to guide the actions of those affiliated with a respectable university. We
see that moving to a conversation in which there is no commitment to the crucial priority
appears to affect the choice of necessity modal.
A number of independent probes of commitment status are argued to support the proposed split between priorities.
An intuitive way to think about the split is in terms of what is and is not negotiable
in a conversation. The considerations that a strong necessity modal are sensitive to are
presupposed to be collectively committed to, and thus not-negotiable. The weakness of an
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ought claim, on the other hand, is due to the modal’s reliance on an additional consideration
that is not committed to across the board in the conversation, hence still negotiable.
What are the consequences of this proposal for the way modal quantification domains
are constructed? In the seminal theory of modality proposed by Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012),
there are two kinds of modal backgrounds that are used to construct these domains: a
“modal base” and an “ordering source.” With the proposal that priorities come in two varieties, there are now three kinds of modal backgrounds to work with: the relevant circumstances, the relevant non-negotiable priorities, and the relevant negotiable priorities. The
study of weak necessity thus offers a new perspective on the role of priorities in building
modal quantification domains. This perspective may prove useful for the analysis of other
modal expressions that are similarly sensitive to negotiable and non-negotiable priorities.

1.2

Microvariation among necessity modals

The family of necessity modals in English consists of additional members beyond the
exemplary weak and strong necessity modals I opened the discussion with. In Chapter 3,
I turn to examine the semantics of a third necessity modal, necessary, and an attitude verb
of desire, want. The subtle differences between ought, have to, necessary, and want paint
an intricate picture of how expressions of modal necessity may vary.
Necessary is a modal that is often thought of as a general purpose necessity modal,
on a par with have to. This belief, which may be due to the specialized use of the modal
in philosophical texts, is nevertheless incorrect as a characterization of how necessary is
used in everyday language. Necessary seems instead to be primarily a teleological, or goaloriented, modal; it demands a goal-oriented interpretation even when one is not readily
supplied by context.
(2)

a. I have to sneeze.
b. It is necessary for me to sneeze.

4

Thus it appears that necessary bears greater family resemblance to a bouletic attitude
verb like want, or even a weak necessity modal like ought, than it does to a general purpose
modal like have to, although both necessary and have to are strong (in the sense that they
only take into account priorities that enjoy collective commitment in the conversation).
It is difficult to account for these similarities and differences with a toolbox that contains just “force” and “flavor” as parameters of variation between modals. The addition of
“strength” as a third parameter of variation, understood in terms of sensitivity to collective commitment, may allow for a better understanding of the meaning of a larger class of
necessity modals.
An informal summary of the microvariation in the domain of necessity modals that is
discussed in Chapter 3 is shown in the Table below. Need, which is listed twice, presents a
further challenge for classification. It is grouped here once with necessary and once with
have to, for reasons that have to do with the type of modality it expresses in two different
syntactic configurations it appears in.

Modal

Presupposition

Truth conditional contribution

have to, needIP

(no presupposition)

∀w0 : w0 ∈ maxg(w) ( f (w)).q(w0 )

necessary∗ , needDP ∗

new primary priority restricts the domain

∀w0 : w0 ∈ maxg(w) ( f (w)).q(w0 )

ought to

secondary priority restricts the domain

∀w0 : w0 ∈ maxg(w) ( f (w)) ∩ b.q(w0 )

want

attitude holder’s desires restrict the domain ∀w0 : w0 ∈ maxDES ( f (w)).q(w0 )

∗ Obligatory

1.3

teleological interpretation.

Grammatical restrictions on the expression of priority modality

The empirical focus of Chapter 4 is the expression of priority modality by necessity
modals like need, in English and in other languages. In terms of the strength of necessity it
expresses, need groups with strong necessity modals like have to and necessary. In other
words, it is sensitive to priorities that are presupposed in the conversation to be collectively
5

committed to, or ones that are forced into collective commitment following acceptance of
the modal claim. What makes it unique in comparison to other necessity modals is that
its interpretation seems to vary depending on the syntactic configuration it appears in, or
alternatively, the type of complement it takes.
The following scenario brings out the variable interpretation of need.
(3)

[City regulations mandate that home owners put up fences between their properties.
You and your neighbor get along very well without a fence. In fact, both of you
object to a fence because it would have to go right on top of the beautiful flower
beds that have been flourishing between your two properties. You say to your
neighbor:]
a.

False We

need a fence.

b.

False We

need (for) there to be a fence.

c.

True We

need to put up a fence. (according to city regulations)

When its complement is a to-infinitive, the modal can express a wider range of necessities. In particular, it can express a necessity that is based on the content of a salient law.
This is why (3c) is true in the scenario below. In the very same conversational context, the
modal does not have access to this interpretation when its complement is a noun phrase,
as in (3a), or a (for)-to-infinitive, as in (3b). The sentences in (3a)-(3b) cannot receive the
interpretation that (3c) can, and are false in this scenario. Moreover, while adding a phrase
like according to city regulations helps to bring out the deontic interpretation of (3c), this
addition is somewhat awkward when need’s complement is a nominal, as in (4). Intuitively,
the modal in (4) describes necessities that follow from our priorities, not necessities that
follow from the what the law provides.
(4)

? According

to city regulations, we need a fence here.

We thus say that need has a greater modal potential when its complement is an infinitival. Traces of this variability are characteristic of necessary as well.
6

The pattern in (3) is especially interesting because it uncovers a difference between two
types of modal meaning that are conceptually very close: the deontic modality of what is
possible or necessary given regulations or laws, and the teleological modality of what is
possible or necessary given goals, priorities, or preferences. Both of these are traditionally
grouped together as belonging to the class of priority modalities within the larger class of
root, or non-epistemic modalities.2
It should not be set aside as a case of idiosyncratic ambiguity. The English pattern
recurs in other languages (Hebrew and Hindi-Urdu are the main additional sources of data
I present): necessity modals that are flexible in the types of complements they take in these
languages are obligatorily teleological with nominal (as well as certain CP) complements,
and exhibit a wider range of interpretations when their complement is an infinitival.
These data raise important questions about the synatx-semantics mapping in the domain
of priority modals. How is the line between priority modalities drawn, and what makes
deontic modality unavailable in certain grammatical configurations?

2

Representative works that relate the split between epistemics and roots include Kratzer (1981), Coates
(1983), van der Auwera and Plungian (1998), Brennan (1993), Palmer (2001), Hacquard (2006), Portner
(2009, §4.1).
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CHAPTER 2
WEAK NECESSITY MODALS AND MODAL DISCOURSE

We both know how this money should . . . nay,
must be spent.
Bart, The Simpsons (1993)

This chapter proposes that differences traditionally labeled as differences
in strength among necessity modals (exhibited by must and ought to in English)
reflect a pragmatic distinction among the priorities these modals are sensitive
to. Strong modals are argued to be sensitive to all and only the priorities that are
presupposed to be collectively committed to in a conversation, whereas weak
modals take into account additional priorities, ones that do not enjoy this status.
The analysis builds on and improves on previous proposals, shedding light on
the performativity of strong necessity modals and on the conceptual division
of modal backgrounds representing negotiable and non-negotiable priorities.

2.1

Grades of necessity

Common among descriptions of modal systems of natural languages is the characterization of some modals as “weaker” than others in terms of the necessity or possibility they
describe. In English, must and have to are called “strong” necessity modals. They are
distinguished from their “weak” counterparts ought to and should.1
The relationship between must and should is usually described as one of
‘degree’: both are said to express ‘obligation’, but this obligation is said to be
weaker in the case of should than in the case of must (and weaker still in the
case of need; cf. e.g. Leech 1971: 95).
(Wierzbicka, 1987, p. 35)
1

There is some inconsistency regarding the classification of certain modals into these categories (compare, for instance, the contradictory claims regarding need in the two quotes in the text). It is necessary
to explicate the notion of strength involved before any attempt at classification is made.
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The expression of necessity may be one of a variety: beside must and have
(to), need, necessary, ought, should, etc. Some, like ought and should, express
a necessity that may seem weaker than must.
(Sæbø, 2001, p. 433)
The comparative strength metaphor for modals is rooted in scalar-like implications
these modals give rise to. When entities are ordered along a dimension, the resulting scale
supports certain well-known entailments and implicatures (Horn 1972, Levinson 2000).
Higher elements on the scale are “informationally stronger” than lower elements on the
same scale, so a higher element logically implies lower elements, and the negation of a
lower element entails the negation of a higher element. A lower element is compatible with
the negation of a higher and informationally stronger element. (5a) demonstrates this pattern with weak and strong necessity modals (and compare the contradiction resulting from
substituting a strong modal in place of the weak one in (5b)).
(5)

a. You ought to do the dishes, but you don’t have to.
b.

# You

must do the dishes, but you don’t have to.

(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 117(3-4))
A lower, or weaker, element in fact implicates the negation of higher elements. This is
an implicature derived via Gricean reasoning, given the assumption that a cooperative and
knowledgeable speaker would commit to the strongest possible entity on the scale if they
could. As a conversational implicature, this inference is defeasible (6a).
(6)

a. You ought to wash your hands – in fact, you have to.
b.

? You

have to wash your hands – in fact, you ought to.

(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 117(5))
Robust and widely assumed as it is, the perceived weakness of weak necessity modals
has proven difficult to formally pin down. When the strength difference between them
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is not at issue, weak necessity modals are simply analyzed as standard, strong, necessity
modals.2

2.2

Theoretical approaches to weak necessity

A fruitful intuition about the special meaning contribution of weak necessity modals
originates in Aaron Sloman’s paper ‘Ought’ and ‘better’. Sloman (1970) made a connection between weak necessity and comparison, proposing that for a possibility p to be
something that ought to be the case, p must be better than every alternative in a set of
contextually determined possibilities. On the basis for comparing these alternatives, he
wrote:
In the simplest cases, the basis B will specify some condition, such as
‘promoting happiness’, or ‘getting to London within 2 hours’, and to say that
something is better, or best, in relation to B will then be (roughly speaking) to
say that it is more, or most, conducive to satisfaction of that condition. In more
complex cases of comparison, ‘more conducive’ may be qualified by reference
to other factors, e.g. ‘more conducive in respect R, in circumstances S’.
(Sloman, 1970, 389)
Discussions of weak necessity in the recent literature are couched within this comparative approach. They can be described as investigating the nature of the comparison invoked
by weak necessity modals and, in particular, addressing the question of what makes one alternative “better” than another. In one line of work, von Fintel and Iatridou (2005b, 2008)
capitalize on the idea that there is some condition (to use Sloman’s terms above) that separates the best alternative from the rest of the alternatives. On their approach, an alternative
is better than another if and only if the first satisfies the relevant condition, and the second
does not. We might call this a qualitative approach to comparison. In contrast, Finlay
(2009, 2010) takes a quantitative approach. He explores the idea that alternatives are compared, roughly, based on how likely they are to lead to satisfaction of the relevant condition.
2

See, among many others, Arregui (2010, 243) on should (and references cited therein) and Cariani et al.
(2011) on ought.
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Figure 2.1: Four ways of getting from Cambridge to Amherst, Mass.

I will refer to this second approach as the probabilistic comparison approach. A variant of
this approach assumes a quantitative representation of preferences in terms of utilities, in
addition to a quantitative representation of likelihood (Goble 1996, Lassiter 2011b).
To clarify these two perspectives on weak necessity, consider the following example.
(7)

Driving to Amherst. You are in Massachusetts, in Cambridge, and your goal is
to get to Amherst. There are four ways to get from Cambridge to Amherst, all of
which get you there in about 2 hours (the list is not ordered, route colors refer to
Figure 2.1):
•

Take the turnpike (I-90) all the way to I-91. (Green route)

•

Take Route 9, through Worcester. Get to Route 9 via the turnpike. (Blue route)

•

Take Route 9, through Worcester. Get to Route 9 without first driving on the
turnpike. (Red route)

•

Take Route 2, passing near the town of Concord. (Magenta route)

There is no teleological necessity in the scenario to take any one route in particular,
thus it is false that you have to or must do so. What about a weak necessity to take one of
the four routes?
11

(8)

To go to Amherst, you ought to take Route 9.

Following Sloman (1970), taking Route 9 could be a weak necessity if it is more conducive than the other options for going to Amherst. Under a qualitative interpretation of
“more conducive,” the ought claim would be true if there is a further condition that is
relevant for the choice of route, and Route 9 satisfies that further condition. Under a quantitative interpretation, the ought claim would be true if taking Route 9 has a greater chance
of getting you to Amherst than any of the other routes. Suppose it happens to be the case
that Route 2 is not available on the relevant day (perhaps the road is closed for construction). Two out of the three remaining options involve taking Route 9, and presumably there
is a probabilistic advantage for this option under these circumstances. On the other hand,
Route 9 and the turnpike (the live options under the circumstances) have equal likelihood
of getting you to Amherst, which means that there is no probabilistic advantage for any of
them. The predictions depend on how precisely the probabilistic comparison is carried out.
The first part of this chapter is devoted to a detailed evaluation of the quantitative and
qualitative approaches to weak necessity. In Section 2.2.1, I discuss the comparative probabilistic approach. I take as a starting point the motivating discussions in Finlay (2009,
2010), and present two implementations of his general approach. The two implementations result in two different lexical entries for ought, but both fall short of accounting for
true preference-based weakness that is a hallmark of how the modal is used in conversation.
In Section 2.2.1.3, I demonstrate that the empirical problems facing probabilistic comparison also pose a challenge for a decision theoretic approach to weak necessity of the kind
proposed by Goble (1996) and developed recently by Lassiter (2011b).
I then present the qualitative approach and raise a conceptual challenge it faces regarding individuation of modal parameters (Section 2.2.2). The challenge can be stated
succinctly as follows. If a weak necessity modal is evaluated with respect to a primary
condition or priority c1 and a secondary condition c2 , why is a strong necessity modal evaluated with respect only to c1 and prevented from accessing both c1 and c2 ? In order to
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account for scalar inferences relating strong and weak necessity modals, there needs to be
a motivated split of contextually salient priorities into those that are “primary” and those
that are “secondary.” The basis for the division has not yet been explained in the literature.
My contribution in the second part of the chapter is to offer a way of overcoming this
conceptual challenge. I argue that presuppositions about collective commitment towards a
priority determine which strength of necessity the priority can support. Primary priorities
are those that are presupposed to be collectively committed to; secondary priorities, in
contrast, are presupposed not to be collectively committed to. Commitment itself is a modal
notion, as it applies not just to the propositions representing priorities that an individual has
actually endorsed in a conversation, but also to the propositions representing priorities he
or she would endorse at that point, given a chance to do so.3 The proposal is then that
weak necessity modals are sensitive to priorities for which lack of collective commitment
is presupposed. More precisely, the secondary considerations that a weak modal is sensitive
to are presupposed to be considerations that at least one conversational participant is not
committed to at that point in the conversation.
Let me use an example to briefly illustrate the idea behind this proposal. In the conversation about driving to Amherst, (7), both you and I accept that your going to Amherst is
a relevant priority. But other than getting to Amherst, no additional priorities that are relevant for deciding which road to take can be presupposed to be collectively committed to.
Do you prefer nice scenery? Do you prefer to stop for lunch at a particular location on the
way? Before such questions are answered, the scenario does not support strong necessity
claims that single out any particular route choice. Intuitively, this is because the priority
of going to Amherst can be achieved in multiple ways. The scenario nevertheless supports
weak necessity claim, e.g., (8), that rely on exactly such priorities. Since I presuppose that
3

I believe that the locution “the priority is committed to” captures the modality in this description better
than alternative locutions like “the priority is accepted” or “assumed” (which I have used in previous
work; Rubinstein 2011, 2012). These latter phrases seem to imply actual acceptance, but actual acceptance is not necessary for commitment.
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you are not committed to any priority that singles out Route 9 as your route choice, I use
a weak necessity modal to convey that Route 9 is a necessary choice under some further
assumption.
In Section 2.3, I present three arguments to support the hypothesis that collective commitment to priorities is implicated in the distinction between weak and strong necessity.
I use constructions that have been argued in the literature to be sensitive to the presupposed commitments of participants in a discourse, independently of any discussion of
modal strength. These include directives (self-directed ones and imperatives; Portner 2004,
2007), rising declaratives (following Gunlogson 2001, 2008), and conversational backoff
with conditional questions (following Rawlins 2011).
In a qualitative framework, commitment toward priorities can be used directly to define
the cutoff point between primary and secondary priorities (and thus also the cutoff point
between primary and secondary ordering sources in a Kratzerian framework). I present
a formalization of this kind in Section 2.4 for concreteness, although it is clear that the
relevant distinction among priorities can be incorporated into analyses of necessity modals
in other theoretical frameworks as well.

2.2.1

The comparative probabilistic approach and its limitations

Probability theory has entered into the semantics of modality through analyses of words
like likely and probable (Frank and Kamp 1997, Swanson 2006, Yalcin 2007, 2010, Portner
2009, Lassiter 2011a,b, Kratzer 2012). These modal words have epistemic uses, in which
they describe potentially non-actual possibilities that are compatible with some agent’s
knowledge or beliefs, and evidential uses in which the relevant space of possibilities is
determined by certain pieces of evidence.4 Probabilities provide the quantitative backbone
4

For descriptions of modality types, see von Wright (1951), Palmer (2001), and Portner (2009, §4.1)
(which includes a comparison of classification systems in the literature). See Kratzer (2012, 21-22) for
the characterization of epistemic modals as allowing evidence-based interpretations.
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needed to interpret epistemic/evidential statements, such as (9), in which the reference to
probabilities is explicit.
(9)

There is a 60% probability that it’s raining.
(Portner, 2009, 73)

Complex expressions of probability and possibility, such as the numerical comparative
statement in (10), also receive a straightforward analysis once probabilities are introduced
into the semantics.
(10)

If teaching assistants monitor exams, it is 31 percent more likely that students will
cheat than if a professor is in the room[.]5

A probabilistic analysis of the modal expressions in these sentences relativizes their
interpretation to a probability space. A probability space is defined as a pair < B, Pr >
of a set of possible worlds B and a probability distribution Pr defined over B.6 Pr is a
probability distribution over B if it maps all subsets of B to a number in the interval [0, 1]
such that: Pr(B) = 1, and Pr(p ∪ q) = Pr(p) + Pr(q) for any disjoint subsets p and q.
Following Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012), we can think of B as the set of accessible worlds
determined by a modal base. An epistemic/evidential modal base f is a function from
worlds to sets of propositions (where propositions are modeled as sets of possible worlds).
It maps a world w to the set of propositions representing relevant bits of knowledge, belief,
or evidence in w. The worlds in the intersection of the propositions in f (w) are the worlds
that are accessible from w in the relevant way. All the “probability mass” is distributed
between these accessible worlds (Yalcin, 2010).
5

From a university wire of the University of Texas at Austin, Survey: Professors can stop academic
cheating, by Markla Austin, August 10, 1998, http://web81.cc.utexas.edu/wp/wp-content/
uploads/Survey_Professors_can_stop_academic_cheatin.pdf. Last accessed June 19, 2012.

6

The set of worlds B is assumed to be countable (see, e.g., Benz et al. 2006), and sometimes, for simplicity, finite (see, e.g., Yalcin 2010).
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Even when probabilities are not overtly specified, the probability space comes in handy
for describing the meaning of probably, probable and their kin. Yalcin (2010) proposes
the following probabilistic analysis for probably, based on the familiar idea that ‘probably’
means ‘more likely than not’:7
(11)

p is probable iff Pr(p) > Pr(¬p) (equivalently: Pr(p) > .5).
(Yalcin, 2010, 927)

In recent work, Finlay (2009, 2010) has proposed that weak necessity modals like ought
are inherently – regardless of the type of modality they express in a given context – operators that effect probabilistic comparison. He has thereby extended the probabilistic analysis
to encompass normative modalities (or priority modalities; Portner 2009) as well as epistemic modalities.8
Two options for analyzing priority modality within a comparative probabilistic theory
are raised in Finlay’s work. The first option is to compare actions with respect to how likely
they are to bring about a particular end (e below).9
Intuitively, I instrumentally ought to ϕ just in case it is better, with respect
to bringing it about that e, that I ϕ than that I do any of the actions I could
perform instead: ‘ought’ is essentially comparative. [. . . ] An action ϕ is an
instrumentally ‘better’ means to an end than another, ψ, just in case ϕ is more
likely to lead to that end than is ψ — or so I shall argue.
(Finlay, 2009, 322)
In a later paper, Finlay argues that the means that is most likely to lead to the eventuation
of an end can be identified with the means that is most likely chosen, under the assumption
7

For an alternative probabilistic proposal and comparison with Yalcin’s proposal cited in the text, the
reader is referred to Lassiter (2011b).

8

This attempt goes against the belief that only epistemic reasoning is based on probability and likelihood.
For instance, Portner (2009) holds that “[w]hile it makes sense to understand epistemic modals in terms
of probability, deontic, dynamic, and other modals cannot be analyzed in this way.” (pp. 76-77). Finlay
provides the clearest and most compelling formulation I have encountered of the idea that non-epistemic
modalities are amenable to a probabilistic analysis.

9

Finlay uses the term end-relational to refer to the analysis of priority modalities (including goal-oriented
and desire-based modalities, also called instrumental, as well as rule-based, deontic modalities; see, e.g.,
Finlay 2010, pp. 78-79).
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that any dispositions an agent might have to pursue or neglect any of the alternative means
are disregarded.
Therefore the base should involve an assignation of equal initial probability to the choice of every relevant potential means, by the principle of indifference. I will call this assumption of equal initial probability symmetry of choice.
Given the subsequent base, i.e. that we have symmetry of choice and the end
eventuates, the means most likely chosen is the means on which the end has
the greatest likelihood of eventuating.
(Finlay, 2010, 80-81)
In both of these descriptions, alternatives are invoked. Intuitively, alternatives to a
prejacent p are “propositions (states of affairs, events, actions) such that they could obtain
(occur, be performed) in place of p” (Finlay, 2009, 323). But what kinds of objects are
the prejacent and its alternatives, formally? In the intensional typed lambda calculus I will
be assuming, it is possible to characterize alternative actions as event particulars (objects
of type ev), or as properties: either properties of events or properties of possible worlds
(types <ev,t> or <s,t>, respectively). When Finlay (2010) presents his formal analysis,
he does not commit to any one of these interpretations in particular. It does seem clear
that he treats alternatives on a par with (so, having the same type as) the prejacent, but a
complete formalization of the proposal is not filled in.
In the following two sections, I discuss two such formalizations. One takes the prejacent
and its alternatives to be of a property type (both of type <s,t> or <ev,t>) and is more
faithful to Finlay’s (2010) implementation. The other takes the prejacent to be a property
of events (type <ev,t>) and the alternatives to be particulars (type ev) and is more in line
with Sloman’s motivating discussion of ought as a comparative operator, and to the earlier
discussion by Finlay (2009). The two implementations give rise to different predictions
and highlight the importance of formalization in testing hypotheses about the meaning of
natural language expressions.
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2.2.1.1

Comparing propositional alternatives

For the first implementation, we will assume that the prejacent and its alternatives are
propositions, modeled as sets of possible worlds. The idea to be explored is that weak
necessity modals compare the likelihood of a set of alternatives in an appropriately defined
probability space, requiring that the likelihood of the prejacent top the likelihood of any
other alternative. In a teleological context, ought will single out the action that is most
highly represented among the set of accessible possible worlds in which a relevant end
eventuates. This implementation of the comparative probabilistic analysis is fleshed out in
(12), following Finlay’s (2010) formulation (ibid., pp. 80-81).
(12) (Following Finlay 2010)
(to p) ought to q is true in a world w with respect to a modal base f and a salient
set of alternatives R iff PrB (q) > PrB (r) for all r ∈ R,
where
B=

T

f (w) (or B = ( f (w) ∪ {p})).
T

The set of worlds B is a subset of

T

f (w), the latter being the set of accessible worlds

determined by a modal base f in an evaluation world w. B may be narrowed down in a
teleological context to include just those worlds in
(The ultimate subset of

T

T

f (w) in which the goal p obtains.

f (w) identified in this way is the “subsequent base” in Finlay’s

terms; I refer to it also as the set of accessible goal worlds.) The analysis assigns rationale
clauses (phrases of the form (in order) to . . . ) the role standardly assumed for if -clauses
by Kratzer (1981), namely that of “mak[ing] sure that a hypothesis is added to the modal
base required by the modal expression to follow” (Kratzer, 1981, 317). The idea is that,
semantically, goal-setting expressions conditionalize modal claims.
For purposes of exposition, Finlay (2010) defines probability as a proportion of a finite,
non-empty possibility space. The probability of a proposition p relative to a base B, written
PrB (p), is thus defined “to be the proportion of B-worlds that are worlds in which p obtains”
(ibid., p. 80):
18

PrB (p) =

|B ∩ p|
|B|

The following example illustrates the theory at work.
Imagine that in the morning before school I know that Jorja hopes to skip
school, and I also know that there are only two means to doing so: feigning
illness, to which I assign a probability of success of 0.9, and feigning tiredness,
to which I assign a probability of success of 0.1. I have no idea which she
will choose, so (by the principle of indifference) relative to what I know, each
choice has a probability of 0.5. Now imagine that in the evening I discover that
Jorja somehow managed to skip school. It would be very natural for me to say,
‘She probably feigned illness, then’ (or: ‘She ought to have feigned illness,
then’).
(Finlay, 2010, 81)
This example is problematic as an illustration of priority modality because it emphasizes the similarity between epistemic probably and ought, making it difficult to hold on
to a goal-oriented interpretation of the weak necessity modal in the target sentence. The
presence of a particle of inference (then) at the end of the sentence strengthens the bias
toward an epistemic interpretation of ought. Presenting these two modal expressions side
by side obscures the fact that only ought admits of the priority interpretation Finlay is after
in this example. (13a) brings out the priority interpretation which probably and must have
lack in (13b).
(13)

a. She ought to have feigned illness (and that’s exactly what she did).
b. She {probably, must have} feigned illness (? and that’s exactly what she did).

Setting aside these differences between probably, must have, and ought to have,10 let
us focus on the details of the proposed probabilistic comparison semantics for ought itself.
A notable merit of the proposal is that it seamlessly incorporates goals into the semantics
of probabilistic comparison priority modals. Comparative probability is simply conditionalized in the relevant cases on the attainment of a priority.
10

See Condoravdi (2002) and Stowell (2004) for relevant discussion.
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In case no one alternative outweighs the others among the accessible goal worlds, any
weak necessity claim that singles out one of them is correctly predicted to be false. An
example of this kind is provided in (14). The target sentence is false in this scenario, if
we assume that equal probabilities are assigned initially to eating at each one of the four
restaurants (so the scenario satisfies symmetry of choice).
(14) A decent cheap lunch. We are thinking where to send a student visitor for lunch
in the area. Four restaurants in town serve decent lunches for under six dollars. All
four are located in close proximity to each other. Three are owned by the Spageto
company. The fourth one is called Green Side.
To eat a decent lunch here for under $6, the visitor ought to go to Green Side.
However, counterexamples for the implementation in (12) arise when contextually salient
alternatives are “lumped” together such that the prejacent does outweigh the alternative(s)
it is compared to in terms of probability. Still in the context of the lunch scenario, consider
the target sentence (15).
(15)

To eat a decent lunch here for under $6, the visitor ought to go to a Spageto restaurant.

According to (12), this sentence is true in the evaluation world with respect to a set of
accessible goal worlds B if and only if PrB (the visitor go to a Spageto restaurant) > PrB (r)
for all r ∈ R. Given the ownership of the restaurants, PrB (the visitor go to a Spageto restaurant)
equals 0.75. Any alternative to eating at Spageto thus has a probability of at most 0.25
among the accessible goal worlds. This sentence is predicted to be true, although it is false
and can be challenged by pointing out the lunch option at Green Side.
When the alternative to the prejacent is just its negation, this version of the probabilistic
comparison analysis predicts a sentence ought q to be true just in case the probability
of q among the set of accessible (goal) worlds is greater than 0.5. These are the truth
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conditions often assigned to the modal adverb probably in probabilistic frameworks (recall
(11) above). In many uses of ought, however, the modal does not have a ‘more than half’
or ‘most’ semantics. Copley (2006) and von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) argue explicitly
against analyzing goal-oriented weak necessity claims on analogy to most quantification
over possible worlds.11
Lumping, demonstrated by (15) above, is one challenge facing the implementation of
the probabilistic comparison theory in (12). Another challenge is introduced by cases in
which there is more than one alternative to the prejacent, and the alternatives are not equally
represented among the accessible goal worlds. Consider the scenario in (16).
(16) Raised rent. Our friend’s landlord has raised the rent on him significantly with very
short notice. As his friends, we identify four things he can do that are guaranteed
to get him out of the tough situation: move back in with his parents, stay in the
apartment and take a loan, stay and find another job, or stay and get a roommate.
Suppose we have a discussion about how the friend ought to act, and instead of assuming that the four alternatives are equally represented among the accessible goal worlds,
suppose that moving back in with his parents is in fact twice as likely to take place than
any of the other three alternatives. Thus, PrB (he moves in with his parents) = 0.4, and that
PrB (r) = 0.2 for each of the other three alternatives (where B is the set of accessible worlds
in which the friend succeeds in making his upcoming payments). Together, the four alternatives exhaust the space of relevant possibilities. The implementation of the probabilistic
comparison account in (12) predicts the teleological ought-claims in (17a) and (17b) to
11

Copley (2006) calls the ‘most’-analysis of weak necessity the “traditional view,” following a parallel
drawn in Horn’s early work between modal quantification and quantification over individuals (Horn,
1972, 1989). Copley (2006, §2) and von Fintel and Iatridou (2008, 118) argue against this view. They
allude to the technical obstacle of coherently defining quantifiers like most or more than half over infinite
domains (von Fintel and Iatridou) and show that giving ought to/should less-than-universal quantificational force incorrectly predicts these modals to trigger versions of Moore’s paradox (Copley).
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differ in truth value in this scenario. (17b) is predicted to be true, while any weak necessity
claim that focuses on a different alternative, e.g., (17a), is predicted to be false.
(17)

One friend says, “In order not to default on his upcoming payments, he can do one
of the four things we talked about.”
a. Someone remarks, “(In order . . . ) he ought to get a roommate.”
b. Another says, “(In order . . . ) he ought to move back in with his parents.”

Native speakers presented with these examples are inclined to accept them both as
being potentially true. When they accept them as being potentially true, however, speakers
provide explanations that show that they have to move beyond the priority stated in the
rationale clause. They accept (17a) and say, “Well, yes, if he wants to save the legwork
and the begging . . . ,” for example. They accept (17b) and say, “Sure, if he doesn’t mind
not having a love life . . . .” The point is that the comparative likelihood of the different
possibilities doesn’t affect the truth values of these sentences in the way predicted by (12).
Either both sentences are true (with shifts to different sub-goals), or they are both false
under a pedantic evaluation of the context, since there are multiple ways of achieving the
relevant priority. The propositional probabilistic comparison analysis predicts an unattested
split in truth values. It predicts (17b) to be true without a shift to any sub-goal, simply
because the prejacent in this sentence describes more accessible goal worlds than any of
the other three alternatives (and (17a) to be false for the same reason).
2.2.1.2

Comparing alternatives as particulars

A different interpretation of the probabilistic comparison analysis is not vulnerable to
the problems raised in the previous section. This implementation is based on the assumption that alternatives are event particulars (type ev) and are not, in fact, “alternatives to the
prejacent.”12 On this interpretation, the probabilistic comparison mechanism is sensitive to
12

In Finlay (2009, 323), this interpretation seems to be assumed. Thanks to Angelika Kratzer for clarifying
this possibility.

22

whether or not a given alternative has the property described by the prejacent (the prejacent is assumed to be of type <ev,t>). It requires every alternative that is a member of the
prejacent to have a better chance of leading to a goal event than any alternative that isn’t a
member of the prejacent. Rationale clauses do not function as conditionalizing the modal
claim here, unlike in the previous implementation we considered. Formally, we entertain
the analysis of ought in (18).
(18) (Another implementation of Finlay 2009, 2010)
to p ought to q is true in a world w with respect to a modal base f and a salient
set of alternatives R iff for every r ∈ R such that q(r) and for every r̄ ∈ R such that
¬q(r̄), it is the case that PrBr (pw ) > PrBr̄ (pw ),
where
B=

T

f (w),

Br = λ w.B(w) & ∃r0 ∈ [r].occur(r0 )(w),
pw = λ w∃e.occur(e)(w) & p(e).
In this implementation, B is the set of accessible worlds: those worlds in which all the
modal base propositions are true. For any event r, let [r] be the set of worlds in R that are
of the same event type as r. For example, the set of events [r] for an event r of eating at the
first Spageto restaurant is the set of all eating-at-the-first-Spageto-restaurant events in R.
Let Br be the subset of the accessible worlds in which an r-type event occurs. Finally, let
pw be the set of worlds in which the priority expressed in the rationale clause eventuates,
i.e., the set of worlds in which a p-event occurs.
The problem of lumping does not arise in this implementation of the comparative probabilistic analysis. In the lunch scenario, for example, events described by the prejacent are
events of the visitor going to any Spageto restaurant. These events do not have a probabilistic advantage of satisfying the relevant priority over alternative events of eating elsewhere:
wherever the visitor chooses to eat, she will enjoy a decent cheap lunch with a probability
of 1. Consequently, (18) correctly predicts the sentence in (15) to be false.
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However, it is not immediately clear that this interpretation of the probabilistic comparison approach can yield a unified analysis of ought on all its modal interpretations. One
concern is that it is unclear what would replace the priority p in a weak necessity claim with
an epistemic interpretation. I set this question aside for now, and argue that concentrating
just on goal-oriented modality already unearths a difficulty for the approach.
Consider what happens if no event in a salient set of alternatives R is guaranteed to
lead to the eventuation of the priority p. It could be that the most reliable means is itself
relatively risky. But if this risky alternative is more reliable than all other contextually
salient alternatives, (18) predicts the corresponding ought sentence to be true. This seems
incorrect, as the following scenario is designed to show.
(19) Random muffins. Two bakeries in town make muffins. Their selection is limited
and varies by the day: the first bakery makes only chia or banana muffins; the
second one makes only chia, banana, or anise muffins. The pastry chef of each
bakery decides the unique flavor of the day each morning by rolling a fair die. My
friend wants a banana muffin for breakfast.
In order to get a banana muffin today, you ought to go to the first bakery.
The event particulars that are compared in this scenario are events of my friend going
to the first bakery (bakery1 events) and events of her going to the second bakery (bakery2
events). The probability that the first bakery will have banana muffins on any given day is
greater than the probability that the second bakery will have them. More precisely, where
bw is the set of worlds in which my friend gets a banana muffin for breakfast today:

PrBbakery1 (bw ) = 1/2

PrBbakery2 (bw ) = 1/3
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Since going to the first bakery is more likely to lead my friend to a banana muffin, the
analysis in (18) predicts the target sentence in (19) to be true. Crucially, the truth of the
sentence follows from two things only: the relevant circumstances of the scenario, and the
likelihood of a single priority (my friend’s getting the desired muffin) to materialize given
those circumstances.
If these were the only ingredients that determined the truth of the modal statement, there
would be no disagreement about what ought to be done. This is obviously not the case,
however, as arguments are a very natural kind of discourse in which weak necessity modals
are used (e.g., (20)). In such examples, there is a sense that the discourse participants agree
about a primary preference (in this case, getting a banana muffin), yet they disagree about a
secondary preference: conflicting secondary preferences are expressed in (20a) and (20b).
Put another way, when someone says that such-and-such ought to be the case, it is not
always clear what the basis for their claim is. What disagreements tell us is that there is
more that ought is sensitive to than just the circumstances and the likelihood of the primary
preference to materialize.
(20)

a. A to C: In order to get a banana muffin today, you ought to go to the first bakery.
The odds are higher that you’ll get one there, so maximize your chances.
b. B to C: That’s not true. In order to get a banana muffin today, you ought to go
to the second bakery. Your horoscope says that unexpected things will happen
today, so follow that prediction.

The probabilistic analysis espouses a preference for greater likelihood as the sole secondary preference possible. To see this more clearly, consider the contrast between the two
weak necessity claims in (21). (21a) is felicitous and true in the random muffins scenario;
it expresses precisely the meaning that the probabilistic comparison analysis sets out to
model. This meaning is not readily available for ought in (21b), however, in contrast to
the predictions of (18). This sentence can be challenged by pointing out the possibility that
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events that are not of the type described by the prejacent will lead to satisfaction of the
primary priority.
(21)

Both bakeries might have the muffins you want.
a. In order to improve the odds of getting them, you ought to go to the first bakery.
b. In order to get the muffins, you ought to go to the first bakery.

To summarize, chances are better that events described by the prejacent will lead to
eventuation of the relevant prioirty, and a preference for improving the odds can make
the use of ought felicitous and true if explicitly expressed, as in (20a) and (21a). The
contrast in judgments between (21a) and (21b) shows that a probability-related preference
for improving the odds is not contributed by the meaning of ought automatically, in every
example. Therefore, sensitivity to greater likelihood should not be made an integral part of
the semantics of weak necessity modals.
It it worthwhile to note that increasing the numerical value of the odds does not change
the pattern of judgments reported in (21). Suppose that the odds of there being banana
muffins for sale at one bakery are much higher than we first considered. Perhaps the first
bakery uses a die that is biased towards this flavor: 9 out of 10 faces of the die say ‘Banana’ and only one says ‘Chia.’ Still, the target sentence in (19) is false under the relevant
interpretation if there is a chance that the second bakery will have the same kind of muffin
today (in addition to, or in place of, the first bakery).

2.2.1.3

A decision theoretic analysis

The random muffins scenario also serves to challenge a decision theoretic account of
the weakness of ought. Before presenting a specific proposal of this kind – due to Goble
(1996) and developed further recently by Lassiter (2011b) – let me briefly introduce some
of the basic concepts of decision theory and the main ingredients of decision problems.
Decision theory provides a formal framework for describing how rational agents go
about, or should go about, deciding between actions that are open to them. Its roots stretch
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back at least three hundred years, with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) mathematical formalization of the connection between expectations and rational behavior leading to a
flurry of research on the economic, psychological, and social aspects of decision making.13
In choosing between actions that might lead to multiple possible outcomes (such cases
are called decisions under risk), the relative desirability of the actions and the probabilities associated with the outcomes are assumed to guide the decision making process. The
“winning” action, namely the one that would be chosen by a rational agent, is the action
that strikes the optimal balance between what the agent prefers and the likelihood of her
preferences to materialize. In technical terms, each action is paired with its expected utility, and the rule for solving the decision problem is to choose the action with the highest
expected utility among the actions under consideration.
Formally, a decision problem is a tuple < W, A, Pr,U >, containing a space of possible worlds W , a probability distribution Pr over W , a set of propositions A (the actions
to choose from), and a utility function U whose domain is W and whose range is the real
numbers. The utility value U(w) of a world w is an abstract measure of the “goodness”
of w. It can be thought of in subjective terms, as modeling the particular preferences an
agent has among possible ways the world could be. It can also be given a more objective
interpretation which is not tied to the preferences of any particular individual. The properties of logics based on probabilities and utilities and the semantics of natural language
expressions that are interpreted using these logics can be safely investigated while setting
aside questions about the source of U and Pr in actual conversation (Goble 1996, 353-354,
Lassiter 2011b, 159-160).
Decision problems can be represented graphically as in Table 2.1.14 The rows of the
matrix list the actions in A, and the columns represent individual possible worlds in W
13

I follow Resnik (1987) and Goble (1996) in this exposition. Luce and Raiffa (1957) is a classic general
introduction to games and decision theory, and see Lewis (1969), Merin (1999), van Rooy (2003), and
Benz et al. (2006) for linguistic applications.

14

This representation is inspired by Resnik (1987, 45ff.).
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w1

w2

U(w1 )

a1

U(w2 )
Pr({w1 }|a1 )

U(w1 )

a2

Pr({w2 }|a1 )
U(w2 )

Pr({w1 }|a2 )

Pr({w2 }|a2 )

...
...
...

wn
U(wn )
Pr({wn }|a1 )
U(wn )
Pr({wn }|a2 )

Table 2.1: A decision problem with two actions and n relevant possible worlds.

(potentially infinitely many of them). Two bits of information are written in each cell: the
utility value of the column world w, and the conditional probability of w given the row
action a. The conditional probability of a proposition p given a proposition q is defined as
usual by:

Pr(p|q) = Pr(p ∩ q)/Pr(q) for Pr(q) 6= 0
Based on the utility values associated with individual worlds in the decision problem,
the expected utility of any proposition, or set of worlds, can be calculated. The expected
utility of a proposition p is defined as the weighted sum of the utilities of the worlds in W ,
where the weights are the conditional probabilities of each world given p (Goble, 1996,
329):

EU(p) =

∑

Pr({w}|p) ×U(w)

w∈W

Table 2.2 is the decision problem (unique up to linear transformations of the utility
function) that models the deliberation in the random muffins scenario. For simplicity, I
assume a finite set W of relevant possible worlds that differ according to two parameters:
which flavors are served at the two bakeries on a particular day, and which bakery my
friend goes to. (We can think of W as determined by a modal base function, such that
W=

T

f (w).) The leftmost two columns represent worlds in which banana muffins are

served at the first bakery and anise muffins are served at the second bakery. In w1 these
circumstances hold and my friend goes to the first bakery; in w2 she goes to the second
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bakery1
bakery2

Banana,
Anise
w1
w2
10
−1
1/6
0
10
−1
0
1/6

Banana,
Banana
w3
w4
10
10
1/6
0
10
10
0
1/6

Banana,
Chia
w5
w6
10
−1
1/6
0
10
−1
0
1/6

Chia, Chia,
Anise Banana
...
...
...
...

...
...

Chia,
Chia
w11
-1

w12
−1

1/6

0
−1

-1
0

1/6

Table 2.2: Decision problems and weak necessity. The random muffins scenario as a decision problem.

bakery. The rightmost two columns represent worlds in which both bakeries serve chia
muffins (in w11 my friend goes to the first bakery and in w12 she goes to the second bakery),
and so on for the other possible combinations of flavors.
Utility values in the decision problem reflect my friend’s desire to have a banana muffin
for breakfast today. There is a positive payoff for going to a bakery that serves the preferred
flavor, and a negative payoff for going to one that doesn’t. Note that the payoff values for
satisfying the relevant desire are the same regardless of the action that leads to them. This
property of the decision problem represents the assumption that the bakeries are equal on
every other potentially relevant consideration: they cannot be distinguished based on their
distance to the house, their accessibility, their pricing, or any other criterion that would lead
my friend to prefer one over the other.
Following the blueprint of Table 2.1, in the top leftmost cell we enter two numbers: the
utility of going to the first bakery on a day in which the flavor line up at the bakeries is
banana-anise (a positive utility of 10), and the conditional probability of that flavor lineup
given that my friend goes to the first bakery. Since there is equal likelihood for each one of
the six possible combinations of muffin flavors, this conditional probability is 1/6.
At this point, we can calculate the expected utilities of the actions under consideration
in the scenario. We find that the expected utility of going to the first bakery is higher than
the expected utility of going to the second bakery (EU(bakery1 ) = 4.5, EU(bakery2 ) =
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2.67).15 This is so because it is more likely that the first bakery will have the desired flavor,
and there are no additional desires or priorities that factor into the decision. According
to Goble (1996), the action with the highest expected utility is the action that ought to be
carried out.16
What seems to be at work here is some good old-fashioned decision theory.
What counts in determining what the player ought to do is not just the intrinsic values of the possible outcomes of the play, but rather the expected value
attached to each play, and that takes probability into consideration.
(Goble, 1996, 322)
The claim that both utilities and probabilities are essential for capturing the meaning of
non-epistemic ought has recently been taken up by Lassiter (2011b).17 Lassiter proposes a
variant of Goble’s “utilitarian” semantics that requires the expected utility associated with
ought’s prejacent to be significantly greater than the expected utility of all the contextually
available alternatives (ALT in the definition below) taken together.18 The lexical entry he
proposes is given below.
(22) should/ought q is true iff EU(q) ≥ θshould/ought , where θshould/ought is a value significantly greater than EU(∪ALT (q)).
(Lassiter, 2011b, 187)
The precise compositional contribution of rationale clauses like In order to get a banana
muffin today is left implicit in the analysis, but we may assume that their utterance influ15

A sample calculation: EU(bakery2 ) = 4 × (−1 × 1/6) + 2 × (10 × 1/6) + 6 × (0 × 10) = 16/6 = 2.67.

16

If multiple actions tie in having the highest expected utility in a set of alternatives, their union defines
the proposition that is a weak necessity. See Goble (1996, 343).

17

Cariani et al. (2011) have also incorporated decision problems into the semantics of necessity modals
to account for their use in practical deliberations. Their use of the term “decision problem” is different,
however, as it crucially does not involve a representation of utilities in the theory (ibid. §3.1). I do not
discuss their proposal in detail here as it is not designed to account for the relative weakness of ought as
compared to a strong necessity modal like must.

18

Lassiter (2011b) refrains from using the term “expected utility” and refers instead to “expectation” (E)
or “probability-weighted preference.” I use EU here for consistency with the terminology introduced
above.
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ences, or at least matches, the preferences captured by the utility function in the relevant
decision problem.
It seems plausible to assume that the utility function U that is described in Table 2.2
faithfully represents the sole preference of getting a banana muffin in the random muffins
scenario. The analysis in (22) thus predicts the truth of (19), repeated below, if the probability of there being a banana muffin at the first bakery is high enough for EU(bakery1 ) to
count as “significantly greater than” EU(bakery2 ).
(19)

In order to get a banana muffin today, you ought to go to the first bakery.

As argued in the previous section, this is an incorrect prediction. The decision theoretic
analysis ties the meaning of weak necessity tightly to probabilistic reasoning, and as such
falls short of accounting for cases like (17) and (19) in which what (arguably) ought to be
done is not necessarily determined by the preference for maximizing expected utility.
In response to this argument, one might contend that my choice of the utility function
was misguided (and thus, that these test cases are not true counterexamples to the decision
theoretic approach). Indeed, if it is the case that additional preferences contribute to the
evaluation of a weak necessity claim, above and beyond the primary preference modeled
by U in Table 2.2, a different utility function would be needed to represent them. In cases
of disagreement, there could be a number of relevant utility functions, each representing
distinct combinations of preferences.
This is a legitimate response, but it does not in fact support the decision theoretic approach to weak necessity. Recall that the idea behind introducing probabilities and utilities
into the semantics of ought was that maximization of expected utilities – this mechanism
itself – is responsible for the weakness of the modal. The associated calculations provided
the explanation for why it is that ought expresses a weaker necessity than must or have
to do. Indeed, keeping the parameters of the decision problem fixed (the utility function
U, the probability distribution Pr, and so forth) is crucial for predicting the entailment
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relation between strong and weak necessity modals in this framework.19 Thus, while it
may be necessary to accept that ought uses a different utility function than have to does
in order to uphold the decision theoretic analysis of these modals, it is important to realize
that making this move without describing how such U 0 would be different from the original U begs the question of how the modals differ and thus provides little insight as to the
semantic-pragmatic underpinnings of weak necessity.
If the burden of explanation is shifted from expectation maximization to properties of
the utility function, it may well be the case that a (potentially complex) qualitative representation of preferences would be sufficient for analyzing weak necessity. Utility functions
are, after all, nothing more than a quantitative representation of preferences.

2.2.1.4

Summary and conclusions

I evaluated two implementations of the probabilistic comparison approach to weak necessity in this section, following proposals by Finlay (2009, 2010). A related decision
theoretic approach, pioneered by Goble (1996), was examined as well.
The two implementations of the probabilistic comparison approach embodied the idea
that ought’s prejacent somehow describes states of affairs that have a greater likelihood of
occurring, given relevant circumstances and the eventuation of a goal, than any relevant
alternative. This differs from strong necessity, which essentially requires the prejacent to
have a probability of 1 in a probability space containing the worlds that are compatible with
the relevant circumstances and goals. Indeed, Finlay assigns strong necessity modals like
must or have to a standard analysis as universal quantifiers over possible worlds (23a) (and
possibility modals, e.g., may, are analyzed as existential quantifiers).

19

See Lassiter (2011b, 193). Similar remarks apply mutatis mutandis to the probabilistic comparison
approach. The denotations proposed by Finlay (2009) for strong and weak necessity modals are shown
side-by-side in (23) and discussed below.
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(23)

a. must: (In order that e) it must be the case that p = Every possible world in
which circumstances/laws C obtain (including its being the case that e), is such
that p.
b. ought: (In order that e) it ought to be the case that p = It is more likely, given
circumstances C (including its being the case that e), that p than that any other
member of R obtains.
(Finlay, 2009, 319-323)

To test the predictions of the approach, I discussed the interpretation of ought statements in contexts in which the modal’s prejacent had a probabilistic advantage over other
alternatives in bringing about a relevant priority, but, crucially, there was no indication that
any of the alternatives were preferred over the others. These contexts turned out to be problematic for the approach. Despite the probabilistic advantage associated with some of the
alternatives, native speakers’ intuitions were that ought-claims drawing attention to these
alternatives were false unless additional preferences were taken into consideration. One
contrast in judgments was particularly revealing. We saw that ought can be made sensitive
to probabilities, as in (24a), but this is not what it does by default, hence the falsity of (24b)
(see (21) above).
(24)

[The muffin selection of the day hasn’t been decided. No one bakery is guaranteed
to make the flavor you want today, but the odds are higher that the first one will.]
a. In order to improve the odds of getting the muffin you want today, you ought
to go to the first bakery.
b. In order to get the muffin you want today, you ought to go to the first bakery.

A preference for greater certainty is just one unprivileged preference that ought can
be made sensitive to. There might be contexts which favor this interpretation, but there are
many others which do not. This is part of the context dependency of weak necessity modals
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and therefore not something that should be hard-wired in their lexical entries. Finlay raises
this point in his discussion.
It is plausible that the best means relative to a particular end is the most
reliable means. Admittedly, we often evaluate means on other grounds, such
as cost, pleasantness, moral permissibility, safety, etc. However these are plausibly evaluations of means relative to ends other than the ends to which they
are means.[. . . ] In ordinary conversation speakers are concerned with a variety of ends; this introduces complexities into our use of ‘ought’ that I will not
attempt to address in this paper, but that would need to be accommodated for
this account to be fully successful.
(Finlay, 2010, 81)
Indeed, evaluating means on grounds of reliability is precisely an example of evaluating means relative to ends other than the (primary) ends to which they are means. The
challenge, if we want a truly unified semantics for weak necessity modals, is not to treat
the cases in which increased likelihood matters (and similarly, greater expected utility) as
a special case. While probabilistic reasoning is suitable for accounting for certain types of
modal reasoning, our discussion indicates that it does not – at least not in ways discussed so
far – give a satisfactory account of the full range of preference-based weakness that ought
is used to express in conversation.
A central challenge in explaining the distinction between necessity modals of different
“strengths” is to characterize the preferences (end, priorities) that these modals are sensitive
to. It is a challenge facing not only the two quantitative approaches to weak necessity
discussed in this section, but also the qualitative approach which we turn to next.
A final issue I would like to raise concerns the relationship between weak and strong
necessity modals, and the question of whether or not there is such a thing as a basic concept
of modal necessity (in English, and in natural language more generally). From eyeballing
the denotations in (23), one would likely come away with the impression that weak and
strong necessity modals express very different modal concepts: must is a universal quantifier, ought is not; ought makes reference to alternatives and involves comparisons, must
does not. The fact that the two types of modals are paired with unrelated denotations does
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not square well with what we know about their grammatical expression across languages.
A recurring pattern discovered by von Fintel and Iatridou (2008), albeit mostly in languages
that belong to the Indo-European language family, is that the expression of weak necessity
is parasitic on, or derived from, the expression of strong necessity. Weak necessity modals
in these languages are realized morphologically by applying counterfactual marking to a
strong necessity modal (sometimes in addition to the availability of a dedicated lexical
item that means ‘ought’). This is the case in Greek, Romance languages (French, Spanish),
Slavic languages (Russian, Croatian), Germanic languages (Dutch, Icelandic, Swedish),
and Hungarian. The following examples from Spanish illustrate this phenomenon. The
conditional mood morphology that is found in consequents of counterfactual conditionals
(as seen in (25)), also turns strong necessity modals to weak ones, as in (26).
(25)

No esta borracho. Si estuviera borracho, gritaria

mas

Not is drunk
if was.Sbjn drunk
yell.Cond more
‘He is not drunk. If he were drunk he would yell more.’
(26)

Deberia

(/Tendria

que) limpiar los platos, pero no estoy obligado

Must.Cond (/have.Cond that) clean the dishes but not am
‘I ought to do the dishes but I am not obliged to.’

obliged

(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 122, simplified)
Why it is that counterfactual morphology has the power to make strong necessity modals
weaker in some languages, and why this happens in some languages but not in others, is
still an open question. Nevertheless, viewed through the prism of morphosyntax, weak and
strong necessity modals have more in common than the probabilistic comparison analysis
of ought seems to suggest.
The assumption that the two types of necessity modals share a semantic core is one of
the basic tenets of the domain restriction approach to weak necessity, advocated by von
Fintel and Iatridou (2005b, 2008).

35

2.2.2

The domain restriction approach

Here is an elegant summary of the domain restriction approach to weak necessity.
Our conception of weak necessity then makes [weak necessity modals]
universal/necessity modals just as much as strong necessity modals are. What
makes them weaker semantically is that they have a smaller domain of quantification: strong necessity modals say that the prejacent is true in all of the
favored worlds, while weak necessity modals say that the prejacent is true in
all of the very best (by some additional measure) among the favored worlds.
(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 119)
In a context which determines a modal base f and an ordering source g, the favored
worlds are the worlds compatible with the modal base that are most highly ranked by the
ordering source (i.e., for an evaluation world w, these are the g(w)-best worlds in

T

f (w);

ibid., p. 117). According to von Fintel and Iatridou (2008), a strong necessity modal makes
a claim about all of these worlds, whereas a weak necessity modal only makes a claim
about a subset of these worlds.20 The result of shrinking the domain of a universal quantifier is weakening, since the universal quantifier is left downward monotone, or downward
entailing in its restrictor argument. This analysis accounts directly for the scalar inferences
that are observed to relate ‘have to’ and ‘ought.’
Favored worlds

have to

By some
additional
measure

ought to

Figure 2.2: The contextual domain restriction approach to weak necessity. Schematic representation following von Fintel and Iatridou (2005b, 2008).

20

Kratzer (1981, 312) analyzes the weakened necessity expressed by German soll in terms of domain
restriction when she proposes that it requires a non-empty ordering source, unlike the stronger muß.
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It should be intuitively clear which “additional measures” would be invoked by the
analysis in the examples we have discussed so far. In the driving-to-Amherst scenario in
(7), for instance, any consideration above and beyond reaching Amherst could count as
an additional measure in interpreting the weak necessity claim You ought to take Route 9.
Possible considerations would be avoiding toll roads, visiting Worcester on the way to
Amherst, a superstition that nine is an auspicious number, and so forth. All of these additional measures characterize the subset of accessible Amherst-going worlds in which one
takes Route 9. In the muffins scenario in (19), interpreting ought in a sentence like You
ought to go to the first bakery could invoke the additional measure of avoiding risk, or
“playing it safe.”21 The accessible worlds in which one gets the desired muffin flavor split
in this case into two classes, according to which bakery the desired muffin was purchased
at. Among the set of accessible goal worlds, the subset in which one behaves so as to minimize risk are worlds in which one goes to the first bakery and purchases the muffin there.
The fact that any consideration – “chancy” or other – counts in principle as an additional
measure is a point in favor of the domain restriction approach.
The two basic tenets of the domain restriction approach are, to recap, that weak necessity modals denote universal quantifiers, just like strong necessity modals, and second,
that the domain of quantification of weak necessity modals is smaller than that of strong
necessity modals (von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 119). As a way of formalizing domain
restriction, von Fintel and Iatridou propose that there is a special ordering source that
weak necessity modals use, which contains the “additional measure” they are sensitive
to. This special ordering source is used to identify a subset of the favored worlds as the
weak modal’s quantification domain.
While the standard Kratzer framework parametrizes the semantics of modals
to two parameters (modal base and ordering source), we introduced a pair of
ordering sources: (i) the primary one that is the only one that strong necessity
modals are sensitive to and (ii) a secondary one which is the one that weak
21

See p. 33.
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necessity modals use to refine the ranking of the worlds favored by the primary
ordering source. We built that differential sensitivity into the lexical entries of
must/have to and ought.
(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 136-137)
The authors’ detailed proposal is more elaborate than this, as we will see in Section 2.2.2.2, but the gist of the analysis is the same: weak and strong necessity modals
differ in the number of ordering sources they are sensitive to. Strong necessity modals are
characterized as being sensitive to one primary ordering source (or more, see below), while
weak necessity modals are sensitive to at least one additional, secondary, ordering source.
Although my focus is on priority-type interpretations of weak (and strong) necessity
modals, it is important to note that von Fintel and Iatridou’s proposal is not framed exclusively in the context of this subtype of modality. As such, it extends in principle to
more epistemic uses of weak necessity modals, of the kind shown below. In explaining
the weakness of ought in (27), von Fintel and Iatridou suggest that the modal takes into
account not just the “hard and fast evidence” that is relevant, but also assumptions about
“what is normally the case” (p. 119).
Let’s say you are on your way to Morris’s office, which is down the hall
from mine, and ask me whether I think that Morris is in his office. Neither of
us knows whether he is, in fact, there. Under those circumstances, I can utter
[(27)].
(27)

It’s 3pm. Given what I know about Morris’s habits, he ought to be in
his office. Why don’t you go check?

(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 126, renumbered)
This example raises an important question (the first among a number discussed below)
about the proposed division between primary and secondary ordering sources. In order to
explain why a weak modal is used in the given context, we would have to stipulate that the
primary ordering source used cannot contain propositions describing what is normally the
case (in other words, that it cannot be stereotypical in Kratzer’s 1981 sense). Presumably,
we would assume that the primary ordering source is empty in the given scenario, and
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therefore that a strong necessity claim corresponding to (27) is false (since Morris’s being
out of the office is consistent with the evidence in the scenario). However, it is not the case
that the primary ordering source can never contain information about what is normally the
case. A variant of (27), in (28), shows that must can, in fact, take into account precisely
this kind of information given slightly different contextual assumptions.
(28)

[Let’s say you are on your way to Morris’s office, which is down the hall from
mine, and ask me whether I think that Morris is in his office. Neither of us knows
whether he is, in fact, there. I say to you:]
It’s 3pm. Since we can count on Morris sticking to his habits, he must be in his
office. Why don’t you go check?

Why can the stereotypes influence the set of favored worlds in this latter case, but
not in (27)? Providing an answer to this question (as it arises in corresponding prioritytype necessity claims) is the center of my concern here. In the next section, I lay out the
argument that in order to uphold the domain restriction approach to weak necessity, one
must elucidate the distinction between “primary” and “secondary” priorities.

2.2.2.1

The challenge of distinguishing between priorities

The success of the domain restriction approach to weak necessity depends on an ability
to make finer-grained distinctions than are standardly assumed between modal conversational backgrounds. Following Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012), it is standardly assumed that
conversational backgrounds are individuated based on the type of information they contain:
epistemic backgrounds represent the available evidence, deontic backgrounds represent
the relevant rules, bouletic backgrounds represent someone’s personal desires, teleological
backgrounds represent priorities that are relevant, and so forth. In the analysis of necessity
modals envisaged by von Fintel and Iatridou (2008), context is required to provide each
of these backgrounds in two varieties. For example, it is assumed that some teleological
backgrounds are primary (these a goal-oriented instance of have to is sensitive to, as well
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as goal-oriented ought), and others are secondary (only goal-oriented ought takes these into
account).
As mentioned in the discussion of the epistemic examples (27)-(28) above, without a
criterion for determining the division between primary and secondary backgrounds, the
meaning difference between ought and must cannot be captured by the analysis as it has
been presented.22 Let’s see why.
Let f (w) be a set of propositions given by a circumstantial/factual modal base f in a
world w, and g1 and g2 two teleological ordering sources, such that g1 is primary and g2 is
secondary. Suppose further that there are two propositions, p and r, that represent all the
salient priorities in w, and that neither is entailed by the propositions given by the modal
base. Moreover, suppose q is a necessity given these priorities (that is, in all accessible
worlds in which p and r are true, q is also true). If r is included in a secondary ordering
source, as in (i), the context supports a weak necessity claim ought q according to the
domain restriction analysis. If instead r is included in a primary ordering source, as in
(ii) or (iii), the context supports a stronger necessity claim, have to q.23 Which of these
contextual representations of the priorities (among others that are theoretically possible) is
to be assumed?
(i) Context provides f , g1 (w) = {p}, and g2 (w) = {r}, supporting a weak necessity.
(ii) Context provides f , g01 (w) = {p, r}, and g02 (w) = 0,
/ supporting a strong necessity.
(iii) Context provides f , g001 (w) = {p ∩ r, p}, and g002 (w) = 0,
/ supporting a strong necessity.
To make the dilemma a bit more concrete, consider the weak necessity claim You ought
to take the turnpike. This statement is true in the scenario of driving to Amherst, (7), if
22

Silk (to appear) also notes this weakness of von Fintel and Iatridou’s analysis. His proposal, which also
takes into account my previous work, is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.4.

23

In (ii), neither priority takes precedence over the other, whereas a representation like (iii) reflects a
cascading of the priorities such that the consideration represented by p is more important, or takes
precedence over, the consideration represented by r. See Appendix A for discussion.
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alongside the priority of getting to Amherst (p-worlds), a secondary priority is taken into
account that you drive 65 miles per hour the whole length of the way without breaking the
law (r-worlds). Once this secondary consideration has been raised in a conversation, as
in (29), ought can pick up on it very easily. The final sentence in the exchange is true if
I use a weak necessity modal, which suggests a contextual representation like (i) above.
The sentence is false if I use a strong modal, implying that (ii) or (iii) are not possible
representations of the context.
(29)

[You ask about ways to get to Amherst, driving.]
You: I’m driving to Amherst. Are the different roads there all equally quick?
Me: No, the turnpike is the fastest.
You: I see.
Me: You {? have to, ought to} take the turnpike.

Evidently, have to does not have access to both p and r in this scenario, and the question
is why not. What prevents the additional measure that ought has access to from entering and
being part of the primary teleological ordering source of the context? What is the criterion
for “membership” in a primary ordering source that rules p in and keeps r out? Obviously, freely associating the contextually salient priorities to either primary or secondary
backgrounds is problematic.
There has not been much discussion of this question in the literature, but two ideas,
one linguistic and one conceptual, have been raised that deserve our attention. The first
idea is that priorities that are expressed overtly in the linguistic signal are treated as primary priorities for purposes of interpreting teleological modal claims. The second idea is
that there is a conceptual difference between goals and sub-goals, and that this difference
determines the cutoff point between primary and secondary conversational backgrounds. I
discuss these two ideas in turn, concluding that neither one offers a viable basis for distin-
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guishing between priorities in the way that explains strength differences among necessity
modals.
Let’s consider the linguistic approach first. In the case of teleological backgrounds,
von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) make provisions for priorities expressed overtly, in rationale clauses or in antecedents of anankastic conditionals. They assume that the proposition
designated by an (in order) to adjunct or an if you want to conditional makes it into the
primary teleological ordering source, while propositions that describe ways of achieving
the designated priority are mapped into the secondary ordering source (ibid., p. 119). As
we saw in Section 2.2.1, rationale clauses play a similar role in Finlay’s (2009, 2010) comparative probabilistic analysis, where they are used to determine domains of quantification
for strong necessity modals, and probability spaces for the interpretation of weak ones.
The idea that goal-setting adjuncts determine the content of primary ordering sources is
at best a partial response to the problem of distinguishing between priorities, since it leaves
open how propositions are assigned to ordering sources in the absence of overt goal-setting
expressions. In ordinary conversation, where conversational backgrounds are typically implicit and are left for the conversational participants to infer, we have to worry about the
principles governing where one conversational background ends and another begins.
Before turning to focus on these cases in the following sections, I would like to argue
that even in the presence of a goal-setting adjunct, it is incorrect to assume that the proposition expressed by the adjunct determines the content of the primary teleological ordering
source. The first problem is that strong necessity modals can, in certain contexts, take into
account both the overtly expressed priority and a subsidiary consideration which relates
to how this priority can be achieved. And second, a weak necessity modal can, in certain
contexts, rely just on the overtly expressed priority, without taking any additional consideration into account (while a strong necessity modal is unable to pick up on the relevant
priorities in the same context).
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Examples of the first kind are ones in which an overtly specified priority provides “too
little information” for a strong necessity claim. The Chinese train example in (30), attributed to Wolfgang Klein,24 is one such case. In this context, taking the Chinese train is
not a necessary condition for reaching Vladivostok, because the Russian train goes there
too. However, it is a necessary condition for reaching Vladivostok comfortably. While the
overtly expressed priority is just that of getting to Vladivostok, von Stechow et al. (2006,
169) point out that speakers sometimes accept the sentence in (30) as true even if the modal
in the main clause is a strong necessity modal like have to. This means that a subsidiary priority (in this case, the priority of comfort) can affect the interpretation of a strong necessity
modal even when the modifying rationale clause does not express this priority.
(30) Reaching Vladivostok. Two trains serve the city of Vladivostok: a Russian train
and a Chinese train. The Chinese train is much more comfortable.
To go to Vladivostok, you {have to, ought to} take the Chinese train.
The discussion in the literature following von Stechow et al. (2006) has treated differences in intuitions about (30) as a point of variation between speakers of English. I think
it is more plausible that different contexts prompt speakers to reach different conclusions
about the conversational parameters the modals are based on.25 While the judgment that
the strong version of (30) can be heard as true is controversial, it is possible to increase the
acceptability of this sentence by manipulating the context in a particular way. Consider the
elaboration of the scenario in the following exchange:
(31)

You: I’m planning to take a train to Vladivostok.
Me: Listen, I took the Russian train last year and the conditions on board were

24

See von Stechow et al. (2006, 168-169).

25

Thus, even speakers that reject the strong have to in the Vladivostok scenario are likely to use it in other
contexts in which the facts themselves do not license a strong necessity claim, e.g. You have to see this
movie or You absolutely have to read this book! (Angelika Kratzer, p.c.).
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horrible.
You: Wow. And you, unlike me, usually don’t care about comfort.
Me: I didn’t mind it too much, but I know you will.
To go to Vladivostok, you have to take the Chinese train.
The fact that the addressee’s comfort is assumed by both interlocutors to play a role
in the deliberation seems to be relevant for licensing the strong necessity claim. This subsidiary priority is clearly in the background when the speaker insists that the Chinese train
is necessary, i.e., that it is the only option available given the two priorities that were raised.
Next, I turn to examples in which the overtly specified proposition provides “too much
information” for a strong necessity claim, because it specifies all the priorities that a following weak necessity modal picks up on. These examples are problematic for the idea
that weak necessity modals are sensitive to unspoken priorities, i.e., priorities that are not
expressed in rationale clauses and other goal-setting adjuncts. In the Vladivostok scenario,
for example, (32) can be used very naturally to single out the Chinese train as the necessary
mode of transportation, even if getting to Vladivostok and doing so comfortably are the
only considerations assumed to govern your choice of train. There is no implication that
additional preferences are at play.
(32)

To go to Vladivostok comfortably, you ought to take the Chinese train.

Similar examples in the muffins scenario and in the scenario of driving to Amherst are
given in (33) and (34), respectively. They are all examples of weak necessity claims in
which an overt rationale clause mixes the primary and secondary preferences that ought is
sensitive to.
(33)

[There is a greater chance of getting a banana muffin at the first bakery.]
To get those muffins without taking unnecessary risks, you ought to go to the first
bakery.

(34)

[There are four different ways to get from Cambridge to Amherst by car.]
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a. To get there going 65 mph all the way (legally!), you ought to take the turnpike.
b. To get there from the north, you ought to take Route 2.
c. To get there on a road with a lucky number, you ought to take Route 9.
These examples are problematic for the linguistic approach to individuating priorities.
If, in order to accommodate data like (32)-(34), secondary ordering sources are allowed to
be empty when ought is used, we lose the ability to distinguish between weak and strong
modals in any principled way: given this assumption, there should be no difference between a strong necessity claim and a corresponding weak necessity claim in which the
secondary source of preferences is empty. Yet the choice between ought and must in a
sentence like (32) is intuitively meaningful even if no additional priorities are relevant beyond those stated in the rationale clause. (I begin probing into the factors that influence
the choice of modal in (35)-(36) below.) Alternatively, under the assumption that ought
requires a non-empty secondary ordering source in order to be used felicitously, (32)-(34)
would be predicted to be true only if there is some other salient priority which can be retrieved from the context, above and beyond those expressed in the (in order) to adjuncts
in those sentences. This is too strong. My intuition is that one can truthfully utter (32)
even if only comfort is believed to govern your choice of train (and similarly in the other
examples; no considerations above and beyond minimizing risk, driving quickly, etc., are
relevant).
I conclude from this discussion that designated goals in construction with weak necessity modals are not always supplemented by additional unspoken preferences. From the
perspective of the modal, I conclude that goal-oriented ought is not always sensitive to
preferences above and beyond those stated in a modifying rationale clause.
What then determines the choice of modal when all the relevant priorities are stated
overtly in a rationale clause? I will argue below that what is relevant is the commitment of
the conversational participants to these priorities. The notion of commitment can be appreciated by observing the effects of contextual manipulations on the ability to use weak and
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strong necessity modals in a conversation. Consider, for example, the two different elaborations of the Vladivostok scenario below. In both scenarios, Babushka publicly commits
to wanting a comfortable train ride. But the identity of her interlocutor seems to have an
effect on whether or not this desire ends up being collectively committed to. Babushka’s
daughter can more easily accept her mother’s desire as a reason for ruling out the option of
the Russian train. Accordingly, it would be somewhat artificial of her to use a weak necessity modal in her response in (35); ought would be too weak in this case (and also in (31)).
The clerk, on the other hand, would be more hesitant to rule out options for Babushka, and
more comfortable letting her call the shots. A strong necessity claim from the clerk in (36)
would be too strong.
(35)

[Babushka is preparing to take the Trans-Siberian train from Moscow to visit her
daughter in Vladivostok.]
Babushka: I want the trip to be pleasant.
Daughter: To get here comfortably, you have to (/ought to) take the Chinese train.

(36)

[At the train station, Babushka asks the clerk about the trains to Vladivostok.]
Babushka: I want the trip to be pleasant.
Clerk: To get there comfortably, you ought to (/have to) take the Chinese train.

The idea that collective commitment is implicated in the semantics of necessity modals
of different strengths is motivated in Section 2.3 and formalized in Section 2.4.
In light of the problems facing the linguistic approach to the primary/secondary split
among priorities, one might take a more conceptual approach. In the deontic domain, for
example, there has been an intuition that weak necessity modals are sensitive to rules one
might call “soft”: rules that can be ignored without leading to severe consequences (Bybee
et al. 1994, 186). A corresponding distinction in the teleological domain could be made
between important and less important goals, or goals and different ways of achieving them.
This way of explaining the split among contextually determined priorities is suggested in
the following quote from von Fintel and Iatridou (2008).
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It should be noted that the choice of what is a primary ordering source and
what is a secondary ordering source is presumably not an accident. In the goaloriented case we have the designated goal and measures of ways of achieving
it, in the epistemic case we have hard and fast evidence and guesswork based
on unreliable assumptions about the normal course of events, and in the deontic
case we have strict laws and less sanctionable codes of behavior.
(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 119-120, footnote 11)
While there is most certainly a connection between how strict a rule is and how strong
the necessity is to follow it, the suggested conceptual classification of rules and other priorities cannot be the basis for identifying the content of secondary ordering sources. My
main argument against this approach is based on the observation that, in certain circumstances, even relatively “soft” or insignificant priorities can form the basis for strong necessity claims. (31) above is a relevant example, since added comfort is arguably not a
strong reason for ruling out what certain people would take to be a perfectly good way of
achieving the primary priority of reaching one’s destination. In (37), whatever it is that
makes purchasing new shoes a strong necessity is also only a secondary priority to what
is plausibly the speaker’s primary priority of being happy. Finally, we have already seen
that secondary priorities that describe ways of achieving a primary priority can be treated
as primary priorities themselves, in the sense that they provide the basis for the utterance
of strong necessity claims (as in (35)).
(37)

i have to get those shoes, i keep seeing them everywhere and they’re so tempting!!!26

Overall, we have seen in this section that the content of rationale clauses does not reliably correspond to the primary preferences in a discourse, i.e., those preferences that a
strong modal like have to picks up on. I have also argued that it is crucial for the success of
the domain restriction approach that the distinction between primary and secondary pref26

http://www.sterlingstyle.net/2010/08/earth-angel.html. Last accessed July 31, 2012.
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erences be well defined. In the next section, I state this challenge in terms of the second,
more detailed, implementation of the approach proposed by von Fintel and Iatridou (2008).

2.2.2.2

Cascades of priorities

Weak necessity is expressed in English by designated lexical items (ought and should),
but crosslinguistically, von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) show that a more compositional
method is found as well. In certain languages, the use of counterfactual morphology on
a strong necessity modal results in the expression of weak necessity. In developing their
analysis, the authors aim therefore for a compositional implementation that will be able to
turn a strong necessity modal into a weak one by marking the former with counterfactual
morphology. If strong necessity modals are normally sensitive only to one, primary, ordering source, how is it that they manage to “reach out” to a secondary ordering source in one
particular morphosyntactic context?
The main idea von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) pursue to account for this fact is that
modals are sensitive to a sequence of ordering sources, and that there is a bipartition – provided by the context – between the sequence that strong necessity modals are sensitive to
and the sequence that weak necessity modals are sensitive to. In this setup, if a grammatical operation “promotes” an ordering source from the secondary sequence to the primary
sequence, a strong necessity modal would appear to be interpreted in the same way that a
modal like ought is.27 A more formal statement of the proposal is given in (38). It is the
most detailed version of the proposal provided by von Fintel and Iatridou (2008), and thus
27

The alternative direction von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) mention is that of partial union of ordering
sources. The idea would be that counterfactual marking triggers the union of the primary and the
secondary ordering sources (presumably while keeping a copy of the former, in order to interpret noncounterfactual strong necessity modals correctly), but only propositions from the secondary ordering
source that do not conflict with propositions in the primary ordering source would be added (ibid.,
p. 138). As the authors mention, this kind of union operation may not be deterministic, and so it is
problematic. An operation of ordering source merger that seems more promising is investigated by Katz
et al. (to appear), and thus it may be possible to pursue this direction further. Importantly, however,
the representational issue of how to represent cascades of priorities, whether using multiple ordering
sources or a single ordering source that is concocted in just the right way, is separate from the conceptual
question I raise in these sections.
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the one I will refer to with respect to the problem of distinguishing between priorities in
what follows.
(38)

The context provides for each modal, a modal base f and a bipartitioned sequence
of ordering sources << g1 , . . . , gi >, < gi+1 , . . . , gk >>.
•

Strong necessity modals say that the prejacent is true in all worlds in
T

maxgi (w) (...(maxg1 (w) ([ ] f (w)))).
•

Weak necessity modals say that the prejacent is true in all worlds in
T

maxgk (w) (...(maxgi+1 (w) (maxgi (w) (...(maxg1 (w) ([ ] f (w))))))).
(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2008, 138, footnote 35)
There may be multiple ordering sources in the first section of the bipartitioned sequence,
and multiple ones in the second section as well. The function maxg(w) (for ‘maximally good
according to g(w)’) retrieves worlds either from the set provided by the modal base f (w)
or, recursively, from the set of worlds that were found to be best according to a previously
applied ordering source. Given a set of worlds and a set of propositions, the function
outputs the subset of the worlds that are best according to the ideal represented by those
propositions (the “better than” relation JA is based on the standard Kratzerian ordering
relation between worlds; see Appendix A). This is of course an analysis of weak necessity
in terms of domain restriction, since weak necessity modals have access to more ordering
sources than strong necessity modals do.
(39)

For any set of worlds X ⊆ W and set of propositions A:
maxA (X) = {w ∈ X : ¬∃w0 ∈ X.w0 JA w}.
(Following von Fintel and Heim 2009)

As I argued in the previous section, the domain restriction approach to weak necessity
is not complete without an explanation of how priorities are divided up between ordering
sources. This challenge is exacerbated in the setup in (38). If before we had to worry
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about just two ordering sources, now there are multiple ordering sources we would need
to distinguish between. How is g1 distinct from g2 and the other ordering sources in the
primary sequence? How are gi+1 and gi+2 to be distinguished in the secondary sequence?
The prospects of making these distinctions on conceptual grounds seem grim, since the
number of distinctions that need to be made is potentially very big, and worse still, it
would seem to vary from context to context.
The challenge for a theory of weak necessity concerns the cutoff point between gi and
gi+1 . For a given proposition r representing a salient priority in the context, we need a
criterion for determining if it belongs in an ordering source on the primary side of the
bipartition or in one on the secondary side. We need to know what defines the boundary
between the two sections of the bipartition.

2.2.2.3

Summary

The domain restriction approach to weak necessity views weak necessity modals as
universal quantifiers over possible worlds, with a domain of quantification that is restricted
in comparison to that of strong necessity modals. A smaller domain results from the application of more ordering sources in weak necessity claims. Ought to uses all the ordering
sources that have to does to retrieve relevant possibilities out of a modal base, plus at least
one more. von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) assume a bipartition on ordering sources that
determines a boundary between the first i ordering sources in the sequence, and all the rest.
Only necessity modals like ought to take into account ordering sources from the second
section of the bipartition.
My central concern in presenting the domain restriction approach was to highlight the
importance of understanding what determines the cutoff point between the first and second
sections of priorities. Using the choice of necessity modal as a guide, we saw that overt
rationale clauses do not reliably do this job. Sometimes they express both primary and
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secondary priorities; other times they express just a subset of the primary priorities. Most
of the time there are no direct linguistic cues to rely on at all.

2.3

Motivating sensitivity to collective commitment

My goal for the remainder of this chapter is to answer the following central question:
what property of the contextually determined conversational backgrounds is relevant for
the choice of necessity modal in a given context? Assuming that some kind of sensitivity to
this property is encoded in the lexical entries of weak and strong modals, the question can
also be stated from the perspective of the language user: what in the semantics of weak and
strong necessity modals guides a speaker to pick one over another in a given conversation?
An answer to this question has implications for any theoretical approach to weak necessity.
For the domain restriction approach discussed in Section 2.2.2, it amounts to a discovery
of the organizational principle behind the bipartition of ordering sources suggested by von
Fintel and Iatridou (2008).
In this section, I motivate an answer to this central question. I hypothesize that presuppositions about collective commitment toward a premise in a conversation determine which
kind of necessity modal, weak or strong, can be sensitive to it. I show that strong necessity
modals are only sensitive to prioritizing premises that the conversational participants are
presupposed to be collectively committed to. At any given point in the conversation, these
are the priorities (goals and sub-goals, norms, stereotypes, and so forth) that are assumed to
form the ground rules of the modal deliberation: if any participant in the conversation were
given the chance to defend these priorities, it is assumed in the context of the conversation
that they would do so. Weak necessity modals take into account all these premises plus
some more. For these additional premises, lack of collective commitment is presupposed.
A presupposition of lack of collective commitment boils down to an assumption that there
is a conversational participant who is not committed to the relevant premise, at that point
in the conversation. Put another way, a speaker uses a weak modal when he or she believes
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Collective commitment to q

A
{q}

B
{q}

Lack of collective commitment to q

A
{q}

B
{} or {¬q}

(Collective lack of commitment to q)

A
{} or {¬q}

B
{} or {¬q}

Table 2.3: Presuppositions about commitment to priorities. A proposition q is presupposed
to be collectively committed to if for every conversational participant (A, B), the set of
propositions that participant is presupposed to be committed to includes q.

(perhaps mistakenly) that the secondary priorities it depends on are still up for discussion.
Table 2.3 presents my usage of the key terms graphically.
As initial motivation for this hypothesis, consider the two scenarios below.28
(40) Health insurance. Rachel is coming to the United States next summer. It is now
illegal not to have health insurance in the US.
a. [Rachel will be a graduate student in a respectable university.]
She has to (/? should) get health insurance.
b. [Rachel will be employed illegally, selling cheap jewelry at a shopping mall.]
She should (/False has to) get health insurance.
The consideration of following the law, which necessitates Rachel’s getting health insurance, is salient and relevant in both of these scenarios. In (40a), it licenses a strong
necessity claim. In (40b), it only licenses a weak one. When we probe the judgment that
a strong necessity claim is false in the scenario in (40b), the reason seems to be that it is
28

I thank Angelika Kratzer and Paul Smolensky for discussion of these examples. For more teleologically
flavored examples, see the elaborations of the Vladivostok scenario in (35)-(36) above.
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not taken for granted that considerations of lawful conduct apply in the case of illegally
employed workers. In contrast, such considerations are presupposed to guide the actions of
those affiliated with a respectable university. Thus, moving to a conversation in which there
is no commitment to the crucial priority appears to affect the choice of necessity modal.
Note that the personal preferences of the individual whose actions are under deliberation,
Rachel in this case, are not directly relevant for the choice of modal. It could be that Rachel
herself would prefer to follow the law and get health insurance, and perhaps she even made
this preference of hers public. But this is not enough to make a strong deontic statement
with have to true in a conversation in which (40b) is uttered, where whoever makes this
claim and their addressee assume that Rachel will be illegally employed.
Converging evidence for the collective commitment hypothesis comes from the interaction of necessity modals with the expression of priorities in imperatives and self-oriented
directives, with rising declaratives, and with conditional questions. These three linguistic
phenomena have been linked to the representation of mutual presuppositions in discourse,
independently of any discussion about the strength of necessity modals.
The first piece of evidence comes from the interaction of necessity modals with directives (including imperatives and self-directive utterances) that introduce priorities into a
conversation. In the expression of priority type necessities,29 the choice of modal is seen
to vary in relation to how the priorities it is relativized to were introduced. While accepting
an imperative prepares the ground for a strong necessity claim based on the priority voiced
in the imperative, a weak necessity claim that is relativized just to this priority is infelicitous. On the other hand, if a speaker’s directive fails to be accepted due to a clash with
what another discourse participant is presupposed to prefer, only a weak necessity modal
can take the priority expressed by the directive into consideration. This interaction can be
29

The focus of my discussion will be on weak necessity claims with priority root interpretations, although
the analysis I present is intended to cover epistemic weak necessities as well. I will stick to ought and
have to as representatives of weak and strong modals, respectively, in order to make root interpretations
of the modals more easily available.
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explained with the assumption that (“successful”) imperatives update a repository of mutually presupposed priorities (Portner, 2004, 2007). While strong necessity modals can only
reference priorities that are presupposed to be collectively committed to, weak necessity
modals that are keyed just to such priorities are infelicitous (Section 2.3.1).
Second, necessity modals split with respect to whether or not they license rising declaratives stating the priorities they are relativized to (Section 2.3.2). Weak necessity modals
license certain rising declaratives, but strong necessity modals do not. Specifically, if p
denotes a priority that makes true a necessity statement ought/have to q, a subsequent utterance of p with rising intonation (notation: p?) is felicitous if the modal is weak, but
infelicitous if the modal is strong. Following Gunlogson (2001, 2008), if we assume that
rising declaratives signal a request for confirmation of the content of the declarative, the
felicity of uttering p? after an ought claim can be interpreted as evidence that the speaker
who uttered p is not sure about its status as a priority in her conversation with the addressee.
This means that at that point in the conversation it is not presupposed that the addressee
would defend this priority, and thus the priority is presupposed not to be collectively committed to.
Third, the discourse dynamic of conversational backoff (Rawlins, 2011) diagnoses the
modal backgrounds of weak necessity modals as a mixed bag in terms of collective commitment (Section 2.3.4). Only a proper subset of these assumptions can be raised by a
conditional question to challenge the weak necessity claim without resetting the conversation. Following Rawlins’s (2011) analysis of conversational backoff, this means that the
contextual assumptions in this subset are presupposed not to be collectively committed to
by the discourse participants. When a strong necessity claim is challenged by a conditional
question, and when certain other background assumption of a weak necessity claimed are
challenged, the conversation is reset.
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2.3.1

Necessity modals and the expression of priorities in directives

In searching for a criterion to distinguish between the priorities that different necessity
modals are relativized to, it is useful to look at how exactly these priorities are introduced
into a conversation. In this section, I focus on contrasts in the use of strong and weak
necessity modals that correlate with the manner in which their background priorities are
expressed. I observe a difference in the strength of necessity supported by self-oriented
directives on the one hand, and less committal expressions of personal preference on the
other hand. Of the two, only the first introduce priorities that support subsequent strong
necessity claims. A presupposition that the speaker and the addressee are both committed
to the priority is argued to be required for the use of a strong necessity modal, since selforiented directives fail to support strong necessity claims precisely when the addressee is
not committed to the priority, or is presupposed not to be committed to it. A similar interaction is observed with imperatives. The choice of necessity modal is argued to depend
on whether or not the individual to whom the imperative is directed is assumed to accept
the obligation placed on her. Only if the addressee is assumed to be committed to the priority voiced by the imperative is it possible to describe the necessities that follow from
this priority as strong necessities. These facts support the hypothesis that strength of necessity for unembedded modals is sensitive to (pragmatic) presuppositions about collective
commitments in the discourse context.30
There are many ways that speakers can put the preferences they have for themselves
into words. Two I will consider here are expressions like such-and-such would be nice
or it would be nice to such-and-such, exemplified in (41a), and self-oriented directives,
exemplified in (41b). Although the speaker expresses a preference for avoiding toll roads
and big cities in both cases, the strength of the bouletic/teleological necessities that follow
30

In this work I focus on the interpretation of unembedded necessity modals. Extending the hypothesis
to embedded instances of these modals would require careful investigation of which derived context, if
any, is relevant for checking collective commitment in those cases.
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from this preference are different in each case. Ought is felicitous and leads to a true
statement in (41a), but it is too weak following the directive in (41b). Have to, on the other
hand, is felicitous and leads to a true statement in (41b), but it is too strong and therefore
infelicitous in the first dialog.
(41)

[Driving to Amherst.]
a. You: Avoiding toll roads and big cities would be nice.
Me: OK then, you ought to (/? have to) take Route 2.
b. You: No toll roads and big cities please!
Me: OK then, you have to (/? ought to) take Route 2.

Intuitively, there is a difference in how “strong” the speaker’s preference is in these two
cases. We might say that the preference itself is “weak” in the first dialog, and “strong” in
the second. Another way to express this intuition is that in the first case the speaker comes
across as being less committed to the preference, in the sense that she would give it up if it
conflicts with another preference, or if it is directly argued against. In the second case, she
would not. One might wonder, therefore, whether the contrast in (41) is simply a reflection
of a qualitative difference between “strong” and “weak” preferences of the speaker.
By considering what happens when the priorities of the conversational participants
clash, we can see that the level of personal commitment to a priority is not the correct
characterization of the difference in modal strength that we are after. Consider the yoga
scenario in (42).
(42) Yoga or a play. A friend and I are deciding what to do together after a doctor’s
appointment that I have. We’ve narrowed down the options to yoga and a play. At
the doctor’s office, I get a physical.
Doctor (to me; friend is in the room, listening): You are not in good shape. Don’t
skip those yoga classes!
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a. Me (to friend): News flash... I have to go to yoga.
b. Me (to friend): I really should go to yoga.
The priority in this scenario is voiced forcefully, in an imperative, and the speaker (the
doctor) is clearly strongly committed to it. However, this alone is not enough to license
a strong necessity claim based on this priority. What matters for the choice of necessity
modals is the addressee’s response to the speaker’s forceful expression of preference, and
whether or not she is presupposed to be committed to the priority directed at her. Let’s
consider two relevant sub-cases. In case the addressee is a cooperative patient who is known
to take doctors’ orders seriously, there is successful uptake of the imperative. Consequently,
commitment of the addressee to the doctor’s order is presupposed in the conversation (as
well as commitment on the part of the friend, who is also in the room). In this case, a
strong necessity claim like (42a) is felicitous and true. However, if the patient is known
to be skeptical of doctors’ orders, the imperative seems to lose its force.31 The patient is
not presupposed to be committed to the order in this case (she might not defend it), and
concomitantly the intuition is that only should, a weak modal, can access the priority in
this case. In this situation, (42b) would be used to express the necessity that follows from
this priority, instead of (42a).
The choice of necessity modal is thus seen to correlate with what the conversational
participants are presupposed to be committed to. In the case of a cooperative addressee, the
priority the modal is sensitive to is presupposed to be committed to by all the conversational
participants, and a strong necessity modal is chosen. In the case of a resistant addressee,
the presupposition that at least one individual (namely, the addressee) is not committed
to the priority results in a presupposition of lack of collective commitment. Only a weak
necessity modal can access the relevant priority under such circumstances.
31

I thank an anonymous reviewer for this observation.
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It is possible to construct examples in which the successful uptake of an imperative is
not achieved directly, with the addressee willingly committing to the priority expressed by
the imperative, but indirectly, due to the influence of a third party. Suppose that with me
inside the doctor’s office is not just my friend, by also my mother. My mother is very much
committed to my wellbeing, so much so that I will never defend in front of her any priorities
of mine that conflict with my wellbeing. With my mother in the room, I am presupposed to
be committed to the doctor’s orders, and (42a) is the only felicitous necessity claim I could
make. If I utter the weak (42b) instead, I am in big trouble. This choice of modal on my
part would suggest that I am not committed to do what the doctor told me to do, i.e., that I
not committed to the priority of not skipping yoga.
Of course, weak necessity modals are not banned from following imperatives and being
relativized to the priorities they express. In such cases, the modal is relativized not just to
the priority contributed by the imperative (as argued by Portner 2004, 2007), but to some
additional priority as well. (43) is a relevant example. Let’s assume that B is committed to
following A’s order (he is a cooperative employee). If the 7 a.m. flight to New York were
the only way to get to the meeting with the bankers, B would use a strong modal in his
response; should would be too weak. B would also use a strong necessity modal if there
are multiple ways to get to the meeting with the bankers on time, but company policy – to
which both A and B are presupposed to be committed to – rules out all but the 7 a.m. flight.
Indeed, any defensible further premise would allow B to present taking that particular flight
as a strong necessity. Thus, intuitively, B makes a weak necessity claim when the further
premise he has in mind is one that might be contested. This intuitive judgment is supported
by the tests I present in the following two subsections.
(43)

A: Go present this proposal to our bankers today!
B: I should take the 7 a.m. flight to New York then.
(Portner, 2007, 353(2))
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The intuitive difference between “weak” and “strong” preferences of a speaker, which
was raised following (41) above, can also be explained in terms of how the speaker and her
conversational partners are presupposed to construe the preferences she expresses. When
the speaker uses a directive to express a self-directed priority, as in (41b), she commits
herself to this priority. Unless the addressee has grounds for challenging a priority that is
expressed this way, he or she will accept it and be committed to it too (in this particular
example, this is the priority that “the speaker avoids toll roads and big cities”). In this
kind of situation, the conversational partners are both presupposed to be committed to the
preference, and a strong necessity modal must be used. However, the addressee need not
accept the speaker’s self-oriented directive. When this is the case, as in (44), the addressee’s
lack of commitment, which clashes with the speaker’s explicit commitment, requires the
use of a weak necessity modal.32
(44)

You: No toll roads and big cities please!
Me: What? No, you OUGHT TO take toll roads. The toll helps the battered state
retirement fund.

Importantly, an addressee’s presupposed lack of commitment need not be real; it may
be incorrectly presupposed. If you utter the directive in (44)/(41b) to a group of fellow
travelers that includes officials from the state retirement fund, I could try and negotiate
the choice of route with them by uttering (45), with ought to. This acknowledges the
presupposed disagreement between the two of us on the one hand, and the rest of the
conversational participants on the other. I wouldn’t use a strong modal like have to in this
case. It doesn’t matter if I am mistaken about the actual commitments of the officials.
The necessity claim must be weak in (45), even if the officials are actually committed to
draining the retirement fund even more than it is, perhaps to secure some federal support
for the little money that is still there.

32

I thank Angelika Kratzer for this variant of (41b).
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(45)

[You, me, and a group of officials from the state retirement fund are going on a trip
to Amherst.]
You: No toll roads and big cities please!
Me (toward fund officials): We ought/? have to take Route 2, but the toll definitely
helps the battered state retirement fund.

Returning to less committal expression of personal preference, when the speaker in
(41a) describes a merely-nice-to-have preference, she herself is presupposed not to be committed to this preference. If the issue came up and she had to defend the preference in a
dialog like (41a), it is not presupposed that she would. In this case too, a weak necessity
modal is used in a conversation in which it is presupposed that not all the conversational
participants are committed to the priority the modal is relativized to (since at least the
speaker is presupposed not to be committed to it).
In all the examples above, I argued for a connection between the strength of necessity
a conversational context supports and what is presupposed in that context about the collective commitments of the conversational participants. More specifically, I argued for the
following points:
• Strong necessity modals are relativized only to priorities that are presupposed to be
collectively committed to.
• Weak necessity modals that are relativized just to such priorities are infelicitous.
• Weak necessity modals are relativized in part to priorities that are presupposed not to
be collectively committed to.
Support for the first point, namely the connection between strong necessity and a presupposition of collective commitment, can be found in the literature on imperatives following Portner (2004, 2007).33 Portner proposes that imperatives update a component of
33

See especially Ninan (2005), Charlow (2011).
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the context called the To-do List, which tracks commitments at the “mutually presupposed
discourse level” (Portner, 2007, 359). In the examples above, the successful uptake of an
imperative or a self-directive can thus be described as resulting in a presupposition that
all the participants in the relevant conversation are committed to the priority denoted by
the imperative. We saw that successful uptake is crucial for the felicitous use of strong
necessity modals.
In the following two subsections, I provide additional empirical support for these points,
focusing especially on the third one.

2.3.2

Necessity modals and rising declaratives

Weak and strong necessity modals split with respect to the licensing of subsequent rising declaratives, declarative sentences bearing rising intonation that function as questions.
The first part of the pattern of interest is exemplified in (46a-b). In both dialogs, A utters
a necessity claim and B and C follow by questioning the priorities that would make the
necessity claim true. The follow-up declaratives by B and C are to be spoken with rising
intonation, as indicated by the underlining and the sentence-final question mark.34 Following the weak necessity in (46a), B and C’s rising declaratives are felicitous. B’s utterance
highlights the priority of passing through Worcester, whereas C’s utterance highlights the
priority of taking a road with an auspicious number.35 Both priorities necessitate taking
Route 9, as in the driving-to-Amherst scenario (see (7)). The situation with the strong
modal is different. It is impossible to use a rising declarative to ask about the relevant priorities that have to in (46b) is relativized to, namely the priorities of driving to Amherst
and not asking the aunt to borrow her car.

34

To avoid testing sentences that could receive parses as elliptical polar questions (e.g., Do you want to
see Worcester?), the examples in this section all contain non-inverted auxiliaries (see Gunlogson 2008,
106-107).

35

I gloss over the complication that B’s utterance is not a direct statement of a priority, but a statement of
A’s preference toward a priority. C’s utterance is similarly complex.
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(46) Family trip. A family decides to take a road-trip to Amherst despite the fact that
the family car is in the shop. An aunt has a free car she could lend, but the mother
and her sister are not on speaking terms. On many previous occasions, the mother
has made it clear that does not wish to speak to her sister ever again. There are four
possible routes to Amherst.
a. A (mother): We should take Route 9.
B:

You’d like to pass through Worcester?

C:

An auspicious number for the road is important?

b. A (mother): We have to reserve a rental car.
B:

? You’d

C:

? Not

like to go to Amherst?

asking your sister is important?

In both exchanges, rising declaratives are used to raise a priority that would make the
necessity claim true. Why do the priorities of the strong modal resist this kind of presentation, while those of the weak modal cohere with it?
The explanation cannot be that weak modals are simply good in this kind of discourse
dynamic, because they are not always. Thus, alongside (46a), we have (47), where a priority that should is relativized to cannot be stated as a rising declarative following the modal.
The same priority that was infelicitous in a rising declarative following the strong modal is
infelicitous following the weak one.36
(47)

36

A (mother): We should take Route 9.

We see this also in (i), which is the weak necessity variant of (46b). The two necessity claims do not
form a “minimal pair,” however, since the contextual assumptions would have to change for a weak
necessity claim to be felicitous in the first place (instead of the strong one). Similarly, there is no strong
version of (46a) to consider; the strong necessity claim We have to take Route 9 is false in the trip
scenario.
(i) A (mother): We should reserve a rental car.
? You’d like to go to Amherst?
B:
? Not asking your sister is important?
C:
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B:

? You’d

C:

? Driving

like to go to Amherst?
to Amherst is important?

The modal discourses in (46)-(47) diagnose a split in the priorities that weak necessity modals are sensitive to: some of these priorities are felicitous as rising declaratives,
others are not. The ones that are not felicitous following should are also infelicitous as
rising declaratives following have to. This split has not been previously observed, and it
is difficult to explain if priorities are only divided according to “relevance” into those that
are relevant and those that are not. All the priorities that should is relativized to in these
examples are relevant, important, and contribute to its interpretation in context. The contrast between C’s utterances in (46a-b) is particularly puzzling. In both cases, C voices
a priority that is ultimately a personal preference of A’s (an auspicious road number, not
asking her sister). Why is there a contrast in C’s ability to raise these preferences in a rising
declarative?
A clear split emerges when we examine the presupposed commitments of the interlocutors to these priorities. The priorities that are good as rising declaratives, in (46a), are
priorities that have not been discussed previously in the conversation, and without special
manipulation of the context, it is not taken for granted that the speaker of the modal claim
is committed to them. Passing through Worcester is an example of such a priority. When
C asks about this priority in response to the speaker’s should claim, he is trying to understand if this is the reason she has singled out Route 9 as a weak necessity. In contrast, the
priorities that are bad in this construction, in (46b) and (47), are priorities that everyone
(including the speaker) is presupposed to be committed to. Going to Amherst is one such
priority, and not asking the aunt for a favor is another. The conversational participants are
all presupposed to be “on board” with these priorities (which is why a strong necessity
modal can be used when they are the only priorities that are relevant, as in (46b)).
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This characterization of the difference between the priorities in terms of contextual
commitments is supported by the analysis of rising declaratives in the semantic-pragmatic
literature, to which I now turn.
A core observation in the recent literature has been that the distribution of rising declaratives is constrained by contextual factors (Bartels 1997, Steedman 2000, Gunlogson 2001,
2008, Nilsenová 2006, Poschmann 2008).37 The relevant factors have been argued to relate
to the mutual beliefs of the participants in a conversation. Nilsenová (2006), for example,
proposes that rising declaratives are semantically comparable to expressions of epistemic
uncertainty. She analyzes the intonation of the final rise as contributing a meaning of epistemic possibility (comparable to that of it might be that), which is interpreted as a “test”
on the content of the conversational participants’ mutual beliefs. Gunlogson (2008) allows
a rising declarative to contribute to the mutual beliefs in the conversation like any declarative (i.e., no modalization is involved), but proposes that this contribution is not automatic.
She argues that the final rise imposes a general condition of contingency which allows the
update of mutual beliefs to go through only if the addressee ratifies the content of the declarative. I present the relevant components of Gunlogson’s proposal below and move on to
explain how it relates to my discussion of rising declaratives following necessity claims.38
First some background. Gunlogson (2008) assumes that when a declarative sentence
is uttered, any declarative, it contributes information about the position taken by a conversational participant (by default, the speaker) in the discourse. In more technical terms,
the utterance of the declarative updates the content of that participant’s commitment set: a
contextual construct representing anything that participant “publicly treats as true for the
37

These studies are concerned primarily with English rising declaratives, with some attention to corresponding phenomena in Dutch and in French (see Beun 1989 and subsequent work and Nilsenová 2006,
respectively).

38

Gunlogson (2008) concentrates on rising declaratives that are “not directly related to the content of a
preceding utterance” (p. 102). This is a property that the modal discourses I have been discussing do
not have. However, since Gunlogson’s formal proposals seem not to depend on this assumption, and
since I believe her analysis provides insights into the discourse dynamic in the cases of interest, I will
proceed under the assumption that it is does indeed apply to them.

64

purposes of the discourse” (ibid., p. 110).39 Note that this use of the term “commitment”
is different from the use which is assumed in this dissertation. In particular, I have spoken
about commitment to priorities, not just to beliefs, and have thus been able to describe
individuals as being committed to propositions they do not necessarily treat as true in the
context of a conversation, but merely desirable in that context. My application of the term
can be seen as a generalization of the use which applies just to beliefs about “what is actually the case in the conversation.”
With this background, we turn to the main components of Gunlogson’s analysis of rising declaratives. The first component is a criterion for interpreting declarative sentences
as questioning, the Contingent Commitment Criterion given in (48). The definition of contingency that is referred to in (48) is given in (49). Gunlogson proposes that, in general in
English, rising intonation marks contingency. On a declarative, it marks that the speaker’s
commitment to the content of the declarative is contingent upon the addressee’s ratification
of this content. In terms of the formal definition in (49), the discourse move µ is a move of
committing the speaker to the content of the declarative he uttered, and δ is the discourse
condition that the addressee be committed to that content as well, based on her own judgment. Finally, there is an inequality between speaker and addressee that is inherent to the
ratification process. The “context must cooperate in making evident the superiority of the
addressee” in being able to affirm the content of the declarative (ibid., pp. 128, 132).
(48) Contingent Commitment Criterion:
An utterance of a declarative with content ϕ is questioning to the extent that the
speaker’s commitment is understood as contingent on the addressee’s ratification
of ϕ.
(Gunlogson, 2008, 129(48))
39

Gunlogson (2008) notes that, “The commitment set is similar in many respects to Stalnaker’s (1978) notion of a context set, with the significant difference that commitment sets are relativized to individuals”
(p. 107). Importantly, the Stalnakarian notion characterizes the information that all the conversational
participants treat as true, and which they all believe they all treat as true, and so forth.

65

(49)

A discourse move µ by an agent α is contingent upon a discourse condition δ if:
a. δ does not obtain at the time of µ.
b. It is inferable in the discourse context that the update effected by µ is to be
retained only if δ obtains after the discourse move immediately succeeding µ.
(Gunlogson, 2008, 128(45))

Tying the process of ratification to the addressee’s superior ability to affirm the content
of the declarative allows Gunlogson to account for the observation that rising declaratives
are odd “out of the blue” (e.g., (50b)). Out of the blue, there is no indication in this scenario
that Harry has insights about the weather forecast for the weekend, and thus he is not in
a better position than Gina to affirm the statement that the weather will be good. Polar
interrogatives do not place similar preconditions on the context, and they may be felicitous
out of the blue (e.g., (50a)).
(50)

[Gina to her officemate Harry:]
a. Is the weather supposed to be good this weekend?
b.

? The

weather’s supposed to be good this weekend?

(Polar interrogative)
(Rising declarative)

(Gunlogson, 2008, 103(6))
The analysis also explains why (50b) improves if the context is manipulated in such
a way that puts the addressee in a superior position with respect to affirming the relevant
content. Below, Harry is said to be “implicitly authoritative” when it is inferable in the
context that he is able to judge whether the declarative is true or false without relying on
input from Gina.
Say, for instance, that Harry is reading the local newspaper when Gina
addresses him. Gina can see that he’s on the weather page, and although she is
at some distance, she sees what appear to be several sunny-day icons in a row.
In these circumstances Harry is implicitly authoritative; Gina’s imperfect view
of the page is enough to make her a plausible source. The rising declarative
[(50b)] is now fine and has the expected air of soliciting Harry’s ratification or
rejection of Gina’s hypothesis.
(Gunlogson, 2008, 126)
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In light of the first condition on contingency, (49a), the addressee must not be committed to the content of a rising declarative at the time the declarative is uttered. Indeed,
if I believe that you believe the weather is supposed to be good this weekend, and you
believe that I believe this, my asking you to ratify this information would be strange. In
other words, at the time the declarative is uttered, there is a pragmatic presupposition that
the addressee is not committed to the proposition denoted by the declarative. Thus, there
is a pragmatic presupposition that not all of the conversational participants are committed
to this proposition. (Upon the addressee’s subsequent ratification, however, both speaker
and addressee are committed to the priority.) Therein emerges a tight connection between
the analysis of rising declaratives proposed by Gunlogson (2008) and the distinction I have
been motivating between weak and strong necessity modals.
When a statement of priority is uttered felicitously as a rising declarative, it follows that
the conditions on questioning and contingency in (48)-(49) are met in the conversational
context. Specifically, it follows that the priority is presupposed not to be collectively committed to (since the addressee is presupposed not to be committed to it, as per (49a)). In the
modal discourses above, priorities of this kind were found only among the priorities that
weak necessity modals are relativized to, e.g., in (46a).
What does the analysis allow us to conclude about priorities that are infelicitous as rising declaratives in the modal discourses above? Here, since there are multiple components
to the analysis, there are multiple potential culprits. It could be that the infelicity results
from some precondition for ratification not being met in the conversational context. For
example, perhaps it is presupposed that the addressee is unable to commit to the priority
(e.g., if she has committed to a conflicting priority), or perhaps she happens not to be better
equipped than the speaker to commit to the priority (so she does not enjoy “superior authority”). It could also be that some precondition for contingency is not met. The obvious
suspects here are that the addressee is already presupposed to be committed to the prior-
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ity, or that there is no need for ratification, since the speaker and the addressee are both
presupposed to be committed to the priority.
We can rule out some of these reasons as potential explanations of the modal data. For
example, we can set aside the worry that the addressee is unable to commit to the priority,
or lacks superior authority to do so. She is, after all, the one who issued the necessity
claim which the rising declarative is a response to, and we assume that this claim – whether
strong or weak – was not judged false or seen to contradict her presupposed position in the
conversation (consisting of the beliefs and preferences she is presupposed to be committed
to). If the problem is not in the potential to ratify commitment to the priority, it must
be a problem of contingency. Assuming that infelicity reflects a failed precondition of
contingency, we can conclude that in these cases the addressee is already presupposed to
be committed to the priority stated in the declarative (that is, (49a) is not satisfied). A
related source of infelicity would be failure of the Contingent Commitment Criterion, as
when both the speaker and the addressee are presupposed to be committed to the content
of the declarative. There is no need for questioning then, and no contingency to delay the
commitment to the relevant content.
The infelicity observed in (46b)-(47), for example, is due to a colossal failure of the
Contingent Commitment Criterion. B and C’s declarative sentences express priorities that
are presupposed to be committed to by all the conversational participants. Only someone
who wasn’t part of the conversation could be unsure about the status of these priorities. In
contrast, the declaratives uttered by B and C in (46a) are genuinely presented to A for her
ratification, and they are perfectly felicitous as questions. Not only are these statements
perfectly felicitous following the weak necessity claim, the discourse as a whole imbues a
sense of coherence. The questioners use the rising declaratives in these examples to turn to
A and invite her to elaborate on the priorities she had in mind when uttering the necessity
claim, priorities they are not yet privy to.
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Before I conclude this discussion, I would like to provide a final example of the presuppositional restriction on the secondary priorities that weak necessity modals are relativized
to. The crucial feature of this example, (51) below, is that it contrasts two priorities that
are secondary to the main priority of the scenario (presumably, the priority of reaching a
given destination; this was the priority shown to be infelicitous after should in (47)). The
speaker says that finding a good map is a weak necessity in the context of a road-trip.
While there may be many reasons for wanting there to be map in the car on a road-trip, the
obvious reason, namely not wanting to get lost on the way, is not something that can be
presented as a question to A in a rising declarative. B’s first utterance in (51) is infelicitous
as a question; it implies that B is very seriously out of touch with priorities that are simply taken for granted in the conversation. On the other hand, the priority of shutting down
one’s smartphone is a perfectly good priority to be raised in a rising declarative (B’s second
utterance below). This priority, which would indeed necessitate bringing along a good old
fashioned map, represents a dramatic action that A is not presupposed to be committed to.
A may commit to this priority in a subsequent utterance, or she could reject it and present
the reason she actually had in mind when she made her weak necessity statement.
(51)

A: We should find a good map of the area.
B: ? You’d like not to get lost on the way?
You’d like to be able to turn off your smartphone and its GPS for the weekend?

In this section, I used the felicity of rising declaratives in modal discourse to argue for
a connection between strength of necessity and presuppositions about collective commitment to the conversational backgrounds of necessity modals. At the heart of the argument
was Gunlogson’s (2008) analysis of rising intonation on declarative sentences as a vehicle
for conveying contingent commitment. According to this analysis, rising declaratives contribute an inference that the speaker requests the addressee’s confirmation or rejection of
the content of the declarative. A precondition for contingent commitment is a pragmatic
presupposition that the addressee is not committed to the proposition denoted by the declar69

ative. Thus, priorities that can be raised felicitously as rising declaratives are priorities for
which lack of collective commitment is presupposed. Using rising declaratives as a probe
of the status of priorities in the discourse, I argued that:
• Secondary priorities that weak necessity modals are relativized to are presupposed
not to be collectively committed to.
Primary priorities that weak necessity modals are relativized to, and all the priorities
that strong necessity modals are relativized to, were argued to come with a presupposition
of collective commitment. In Section 2.3.4, I provide additional support for the above
characterization of secondary priorities. Before presenting this final piece of evidence,
however, I discuss a number of apparent counterexamples to the proposed characterization
of primary priorities. This discussion will also lead to a clarification of whose commitment
is at stake for characterizing priorities as primary or secondary.

2.3.3

What is the collective whose commitments matter?

When a mother tells her child that he has to eat his spinach, as in (52), the child is arguably not committed to the priority behind this strong necessity claim. He is a participant
in the conversation, however, so this use of have to looks like a counterexample to the characterization of strong necessity modals as relying on primary priorities, namely priorities
that are presupposed in the conversation to be collectively committed to.
(52)

Mother: You have to eat your spinach!
Child: I don’t want to!

An initial response I would like to argue against is that the relevant collective for determining commitment is “society at large,” or some group representing an idealized version
of society at large. Appealing to society at large provides an explanation of (52), if we
assume that the priority that children eat healthy vegetables is collectively committed to

70

among the leaders of the community the mother and her child are members of. Perhaps appealing to the authority of this group is what allows the mother to make a strong necessity
claim in (52).
While this explanation may work in the spinach example, it fails to provide a general
explanation of the nature of primary priorities. First, it is clear that norms of the idealized
community do not dictate what groups within the community take to form strong necessities. After all, radicalists utter perfectly felicitous necessity claims that are based on
priorities only they and a handful of followers are presupposed to be committed to. The
strong necessity claim in (53a) exemplifies this possibility in the context of a conversation
between environmentalist city dwellers. Second, relativization to the priorities of a collective representing society at large is not an option that is freely available to strong necessity
modals. (53b) is false when uttered in the conversation between the environmentalists, although the necessity it expresses follows from the presupposed commitments of society at
large (and would be true if uttered by the mayor in a conversation with members of the city
council, for example).
(53) Green city living. Environmentalists discuss plans for going green in the city.
a. We probably shouldn’t bring in cows or goats, but we have to start a chicken
coop behind the buildings.
b. We have to use the cheapest chemical solution to eradicate the rats in the alley.
How do speakers justify making strong necessity claims in conversations that include
participants that are not “on board” with the priorities they are assuming? The problem
raised by (52) is not limited to conversations in which the speaker retains authority over the
addressee, but arises more generally. (53a), for example, could be addressed to an outsider,
a neighbor who came to talk to the environmentalists although she does not share their
priorities. In such a conversation, one authoritative conversational participant addresses
another in an attempt to convince the latter to adopt the priorities the necessity claim is
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based on. This aspect of the use of strong necessity modals is the basis of my explanation of
why they are felicitous in (52) and similar examples, despite the conflicting commitments
of the conversational participants in these examples.
Strong necessity modals are rhetorical devices for persuasion, I propose, precisely because they come with a presupposition of collective commitment to the priorities they are
based on. This presupposition implies that the speaker of the necessity claim (who may
very well be aware of the actual “conflict of interests” with her interlocutor) is treating her
interlocutor as part of a collective that is committed to the priority. In cases of conflict, the
speaker conveys that she is operating under the assumption that her interlocutor will change
his commitments so that they align with the relevant commitments of the collective. The
result is an air of forced update of commitments which is related to the ability of strong necessity modals to place obligations on the addressee they are directed to. The latter ability
is referred to in the literature as the performativity of strong necessity modals (see Section
2.4.2 for further discussion).
The proposal above is inclusive of participants: it assumes that all the conversational
participants are included in the collective whose presupposed priorities matter. An alternative solution to the challenge presented by examples like (52) would be to allow for
exclusion of participants from the collective; the hypothesis would be that there is flexibility in the identification of the set of participants whose commitments matter for the purpose
of the necessity claim, such that one or two, or maybe a handful, can be ignored if their
priorities conflict with the priorities of the rest of the participants. After excluding those
participants, the presupposition of collective commitment would be satisfied and it would
be possible to make a strong necessity claim based on the relevant priorities presupposed
to be collectively committed to in that group. I believe that the explanation based on inclusion is superior to this alternative, first, because it offers insight into the performative
abilities of strong necessity modals. Moreover, it seems that exclusion runs the risk of incorrectly predicting “too many” strong necessities. For instance, if A, B, C, and D are all
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presupposed to be committed to taking a vacation in France, but A and B are committed
to preferring Bordeaux over Paris, while C and D are committed to Paris over Bordeaux,
an analysis of have to with a presupposition of collective commitment based on exclusion
would predict the truth of the conflicting claims: We have to go to Bordeaux (because A
and B are “collectively” committed to this priority) and We have to go to Paris (because
C and D are “collectively” committed to this priority). Intuitively, neither of these claims
is true in the scenario with conflict, although they can be used to persuade the dissenting
parties to change their priorities.
A final important clarification concerns necessity claims about third persons, or persons
that are not part of the conversation in the speech situation. These do not present a problem
for my proposed generalization about collective commitment. When mother tells father
that, “The boy has to eat his spinach!,” she uses a strong necessity modal because the
priority that the child eat healthy food is presupposed to be committed to by the two parents,
i.e., the conversational participants. Of course, these priorities may be relevant in situations
quite removed from the speech situation, as is the case in (54), for example.
(54)

Mother (to father): I don’t care if his friends are watching. He has to eat his spinach
at summer camp too!

2.3.4

Necessity modals and conversational backoff

The connection between weak necessities and priorities that are presupposed to lack
collective commitment is further supported by the pattern of responses to weak necessity
claims exemplified by (55). We see in this dialog a split between the what/even if -questions
that A can ask about priorities that are relevant for B’s weak necessity claim. The basic observation is that only a subset of questions with a conditional component constitute
felicitous responses to the ought claim.
(55)

[Driving from Cambridge to Amherst.]
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A: Which road will he take?
B: He ought to take Route 2.


What if he doesn’t care about scenery? 





Possible responses
A:
What if he cares more about speed?






Even if he wants to save time?
( ?
)
What if he doesn’t want to go to Amherst?
A:
Impossible responses
? Even if he’s not driving?
The addressee of the ought claim, A, cannot challenge the priority of going to Amherst
in her question, or the priority that the trip will be by car. She can, on the other hand, use a
question with a conditional component to raise priorities of scenery or speed.
Rawlins (2011) analyzes utterances like those in (55) as a type of non-agreeing response
that effectively allows addressees to ask for clarification of speakers’ assumptions.40 The
discourse dynamic involved is quite complex. It begins with the speaker offering an answer
to some question under discussion, and proceeds with the addressee not fully accepting this
answer. The addressee then asks a conditional question, thereby accepting the attempted
answer for cases where the conditional is not true, and “re-asking” the question for cases
where it is true (Rawlins, 2011, 348). Conversational backoff is the term Rawlins uses
to describe the partial acceptance triggered by the conditional component of the question,
which allows the addressee to challenge the exhaustiveness of the answer they have been
given. In (56) below, the addressee challenges the speaker’s claim that Alfonso is going
to the party by raising the issue of Joanna’s presence there. According to Rawlins (2011),
by asking a conditional question, A accepts B’s answer for those cases that Joanna is not
going to the party, and further asks whether or not Alfonso will go if Joanna is going.
(56)

A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
B: Yes, he is.

40

As such, these responses are most similar to clarification requests (see Rawlins 2011, §2.1).
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A:


What if Joanna is there?

















Even if Joanna is there?
What about Joanna?

Will he (really) go if Joanna is there?

(Rawlins, 2011, 347)
The addressee in the dialog in (55) can use a variety of conditional questions to back
off from the speaker’s claim that the driver ought to take Route 2. For example, asking
Even if he wants to save time? would be a way of accepting the necessity of taking Route 2
in case the driver doesn’t care about saving time, but questioning this conclusion in case
the driver does have such a preference. Raising a relevant consideration in the question
(i.e., that the driver wants to save time) allows the addressee to ask the speaker indirectly
to clarify which priorities they had in mind when uttering the weak necessity claim.
Rawlins (2011) argues that a precondition for conversational backoff is that the assumption raised by the conditional question be undecided in the discourse. More formally, the
proposition raised by the conditional question must be unsettled in the common ground,
which in turn is modeled as the intersection of the individual participants’ commitment
sets (following Gunlogson 2001, 2008).41
A central feature of all these cases is that conversational backoff can only
target publicly omitted assumptions – it is not licensed if the crucial assumption
has been committed to by a speaker in prior discourse.
A: Is Alfonso going to the party?
B: Yes, he is, even if Joanna might be there.
...
A’: # Even if Joanna is there?
The assumptions in play during conversational backoff are purely implicit.
(Rawlins, 2011, 350)
41

The proposition q signaled by the conditional question must be unsettled in csCX ∩ csCY , where csCX , csCY
are the worlds compatible in a context C with the public commitments of the discourse participants X
and Y (Rawlins, 2011, 359). A proposition p is unsettled in c if and only if c ∩ p 6= 0/ and c ∩ p 6= c (cf.
ibid.)
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In the successful cases of conversational backoff following a weak necessity claim,
we can conclude that the assumptions raised in the questions following the modal claim
had not been previously committed to in the conversation. Thus, it is unsettled whether
the driver wants to save time, or cares about speed, or doesn’t care for pretty scenery.
Consequently, I assume, the conversational participants are not committed to any of the
related priorities (that the driver save time, that the scenery be unremarkable, etc.) as
priorities they are prepared to defend. Considerations of a leisurely drive or pretty scenery
would make Route 2 a necessary choice among the four possible routes to Amherst, and
they are precisely the kind of considerations that would be included in a secondary ordering
source in von Fintel and Iatridou’s system.
Conversational backoff further distinguishes between two types of priorities that weak
necessity modals are relativized to. The secondary considerations are felicitous as triggers
of backoff, but the primary ones – that the trip will be a road-trip, and that Amherst is
the destination – are infelicitous as triggers. Notably, the propositions raised by the second batch of questions in (55) are mutually assumed in the conversation. It is part of the
contextual setup that the driver wants to go to Amherst and that he plans to drive, and we
may assume that the conversational participants are consequently committed to the related
priorities (that the driver go to Amherst, that it will be a road-trip). This description of the
primary priorities as enjoying a presupposition of collective commitment is consistent with
Rawlins’s analysis, although it doesn’t follow from it (there might be other sources for the
observed infelicity, for example).
In sum, we have seen that discourses with conversational backoff can be used to diagnose a split among the priorities that weak necessity modals are relativized to. Only a
proper subset of these priorities can be raised in a subsequent conditional question to challenge the extent of a weak necessity claim, and these are precisely the priorities for which
lack of collective commitment is presupposed.
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Taken together, the interaction of necessity modals with conversational backoff, rising
declaratives, and directives supports the hypothesis that necessity modals differ with respect
to presuppositions about collective commitment to the priorities they are relativized to.
I presented converging evidence from these different sources that, first, strong necessity
modals only reference priorities that are presupposed to be collectively committed to in the
conversation; second, the evidence suggests that weak necessity modals are relativized in
addition to prioritizing premises that are presupposed not to be collectively committed to.
The next step is to formally state this newly found sensitivity to collective commitments, keeping in mind the desideratum of accounting for the scalar-like inferences that
relate the two types of necessity modals.

2.4

Weak necessity as departure from collective commitment

In this section, I formalize an analysis of weak and strong necessity modals that exposes
their different presuppositions about the priorities they are relativized to. I use the analysis
to explain the observations about modal discourse discussed in the previous section (Section 2.4.1.1) and show that it derives the scalar-like inferences that relate weak and strong
necessity modals (Section 2.4.1.2). As a further application, I suggest a new perspective
on the phenomenon of the performativity of strong necessity modals (Section 2.4.2). Section 2.4.3 highlights differences between secondary priorities and conditional antecedents
which argue against analyzing the former as a silent analog of the latter. Finally, in Section 2.4.5, I offer an interpretation of the modal landscape embodied by the proposal (an
interpretation elaborated in Appendix B). Section 2.4.6 concludes and presents directions
for future research.

2.4.1

Formal proposal

This section offers a formalization of sensitivity to collective commitment within a
domain restriction approach to weak necessity.
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I assume a representation of the conversational context C as a tuple containing at least
a modal base f , an ordered sequence of ordering sources, < g1 , . . . , gi >, and individual records of the priorities that the participants in C are publicly committed to.42 These
records, called priority slates, are modeled on analogy to the individual records standardly
assumed to represent the discourse participants’ public beliefs (Hamblin 1971, Gunlogson
2001, 2008, Farkas and Bruce 2010, Rawlins 2011).
Priority Slates A priority slate of a participant X in C is a set of propositions:
psX = {p<s,t> : X publicly endorses p in C as desirable}.
Collective Commitment to Priorities A priority p is collectively committed to in a context C iff p ∈ psX ∩ psY ∩ . . ., where X,Y, . . . are participants in C.
The priority slate of a discourse participant should not be confused with their To-Do
List, in the sense of Portner (2004, 2007). A To-Do List of a conversational participant
keeps track of properties that participant is expected to make true of himself, such as properties denoted by imperatives that are directed at that participant. A priority slate, in contrast, concerns not how the participant is expected to act, but what he or she is committed
to. It may contain priorities that individual has concerning the actions of other individuals
(“that my son eat his spinach”), concerning desirable future states of the worlds (“that there
be world peace”), and so forth. What the constructs have in common is that they operate
“at the public, mutually presupposed discourse level” (Portner, 2007, 359). If the speaker’s
To-Do List contains the property of taking Route 9 to Amherst, the corresponding proposition (“that the speaker take Route 9 to Amherst”) is on the priority slate of every participant
in the conversation.
42

The notion of public endorsement that is intended here is similar to the one standardly assumed in the
literature on common knowledge and the common ground. Propositions in priority slates represent
priorities that the conversational participants are committed to, believe that others are committed to, and
believe others believe they are committed to.
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Following Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012), modal bases and ordering sources are functions
of type <s,<st,t>>, mapping possible worlds to sets of propositions. I define primary
ordering sources as ordering sources whose content is collectively committed to in the
sense defined above.
Primary Ordering Sources A function g from worlds to sets of propositions is a primary
ordering source in a context C iff for every world w in the domain of g and every
proposition p such that p ∈ g(w), p is collectively committed to in C.
I propose that ordering sources that are represented in the conversational context contain
only priorities that are collectively committed to.
(57) Condition on Contextual Ordering Sources
Every ordering source in < g1 , . . . , gi > in C is a primary ordering source.
Strong necessity modals are relativized to the primary ordering sources in < g1 , . . . , gi >.
The lexical entry I adopt for them, in (58), is identical to the lexical entry proposed by von
Fintel and Iatridou (2008) (see (38)-(39) above). Writing down this denotation requires introducing the assumption that there is always a set of worlds that come closest to the ideal
represented by an ordering source (an assumption that is not made in Kratzer’s semantics
for modals, following Lewis (1973); see Appendix A). Multiple ordering sources are applied one by one to retrieve the set of favored worlds: the worlds in the intersection of the
propositions in the modal base which are best according to the ideals represented by the
sequence of primary ordering sources.
(58) [[have to]]C = λ q<s,t> λ w.∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w).q(w0 ).
Favored Worlds FavC (w) = maxgC (w) (...(maxgC (w) (
i

1

T C
f (w))), where for any set of worlds

X ⊆ W and set of propositions A: maxA (X) = {w ∈ X : ¬∃w0 ∈ X.w0 JA w}.
(Following von Fintel and Iatridou 2008, von Fintel and Heim 2009)
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Weak necessity modals are also analyzed as universal quantifiers over possible worlds,
with a domain of quantification that is a subset of the domain that strong necessity modals
quantify over. A restricted domain is arrived at by employing a secondary priority, b, which
is defined to be a priority that is not collectively committed to in the context (see Figure
2.3). It is left open that different participants would use different secondary priorities to
base their weak necessity claims on. To reflect this potential source of disagreement among
participants, secondary priorities, in contrast to primary ordering sources, are not allotted a
designated slot in the discourse context. To use Lewis’s (1979) metaphor of the “conversational score,” secondary priorities do not belong on the scoreboard (independently of being
represented elsewhere in the context, e.g., in the speaker’s priority slate) until their status
in the conversation has been clarified.
In the preliminary proposal presented (59), no further restriction is encoded about secondary priorities in the semantics.
(59)

(Preliminary proposal)
[[ought to]]C = λ q<s,t> λ w.∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w) ∩ b.q(w0 ), where b is a secondary
priority in C.

Secondary Priorities A proposition p is a secondary priority in a context C iff p is not
collectively committed to in C.
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Worlds favored according to f C and gC1 , . . . , gCi

have to

By a
priority
that is not
collectively
committed
to in C

ought to

Figure 2.3: Domain restriction with sensitivity to collective commitments (preliminary).
In a context C, a weak necessity modal quantifies over a subset of the worlds that are
accessible and highly ranked based on priorities that are collectively committed to in C.
The secondary priority it employs is not represented in the context.

The picture suggested by Figure 2.3 is that a secondary priority can be any proposition
that is compatible with the set of contextually favored worlds (so that intersecting this
proposition with the favored worlds results in the highlighted subset of the favored worlds
as ought’s domain of quantification). This picture may capture the logical weakness of
ought in comparison to have to, but it is too simplistic.
The main problem with the lexical entry in (59) is that it predicts far too many weak
necessity claims to be true in a given context. For example, in a conversation about which
route to take to Amherst, (59) incorrectly predicts the truth of You ought to take Route 9
and have your night driving glasses handy. How is this prediction derived? Obviously, if
it is not a collective commitment in the context that you will drive through Worcester, so
it definitely is not a collective commitment that you will drive through Worcester at night.
The problem is that the priority of driving at night through Worcester counts as a secondary
priority in the context, since there is a subset of the accessible worlds (those in which you
drive to Amherst) in which you drive at night through Worcester. Relativizing the modal
to this secondary priority incorrectly predicts the above sentence to be true. To fix this
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kind of problem, we need secondary priorities to cut down on the set of favored worlds
without introducing considerations that are more fine grained than those under discussion
in the conversation (e.g., time of travel). Defining priorities in relation to a Question Under
Discussion (Ginzburg 1996, Roberts 1996, Büring 2003) can solve this problem. In the
conversation about driving to Amherst, the question under discussion is which route the
driver will take. We can require the secondary priority to constitute a pertinent answer to
this question (following Groenendijk 1999), and this will rule out propositions that are too
fine grained from being treated as possible candidates for secondary priorities.
Following Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984, 213ff.), we view the denotation of a question as a partition of a set of possible worlds. A partition of a set X is a set of non-empty
and non-overlapping subsets of X (called the cells of the partition) whose union equals X.
I assume that the set of worlds that undergoes partitioning in modal discourse is the set of
favored worlds, FavC (w).
Question Under Discussion A context C includes a question, QUD, whose denotation in
a modal conversation evaluated at w is a partition of FavC (w).
Pertinent Answer A proposition p is a pertinent answer to a question q iff p ∩ [[q]] is
S

the union of some but not all cells of [[q]].
(Following Groenendijk 1999)
In my final proposal for the lexical entry of ought, below, it is required that the secondary priority that derives the modal’s restricted domain also cohere with the question
under discussion in the conversation.
(60)

(Final proposal)
[[ought to]]C = λ q<s,t> λ w.∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w) ∩ b.q(w0 ), where b is a secondary
priority in C and b is a pertinent answer to QUDC .

With this definition, only certain secondary priorities can serve to focus on a subset
of the favored worlds. For example, when the question under discussion is which route
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the driver will take to Amherst, only propositions that pick out one, two, or three out of
the four possible routes can play this role. Within these limitations, the options are still
essentially unlimited: the secondary priority for taking a route with an auspicious number
determines the same domain of quantification – and the same weak necessities – as the
secondary priority of passing through Worcester. Both make it a weak necessity to take
Route 9.

2.4.1.1

Discussion of motivating examples

In this section, I revisit some of the examples that were used in the preceding sections
to motivate a commitment based split between necessity modals.
Stereotypes The first example I wish to revisit is also the first one that was mentioned in
connection with the notion of commitment, in Section 2.2.2.1. I presented this example,
the Vladivostok example and its variants, as a challenge for analyses of weak necessity that
associate rationale clauses with the expression of primary priorities.
(61)

[Two trains serve Vladivostok: a Russian train and a Chinese train. Of the two,
only the Chinese train offers a comfortable ride.]
To go to Vladivostok comfortably, you {have to, ought to} take the Chinese train.

In this scenario, taking the Chinese train is a necessary condition for reaching Vladivostok and doing so comfortably. There need not be any additional priority above and beyond
these for the ought claim to be true. From the perspective adopted in this chapter, we expect the choice of modal to correlate with whether or not these priorities are collectively
committed to. This expectation is borne out by the elaborated contexts below (repeated
from (35) and (36)).
(62)

[Babushka is preparing to take the Trans-Siberian train from Moscow to visit her
daughter in Vladivostok.]
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Babushka: I want the trip to be pleasant.
Daughter: To get here comfortably, you have to (/ought to) take the Chinese train.
(63)

[At the train station, Babushka asks the clerk about the trains to Vladivostok.]
Babushka: I want the trip to be pleasant.
Clerk: To get there comfortably, you ought to (/have to) take the Chinese train.

In both scenarios, Babushka publicly commits to the priority of taking a comfortable
train ride. The daughter, who knows her mother and her situation intimately, may thus
presuppose that her mother is indeed committed to paying for a comfortable ride, and
commit to this priority herself. Since there is a presupposition of collective commitment
to the priority, the priority has the status of a primary priority and have to is relativized
to it. The clerk at the train station, in contrast, does not know the woman who stands in
front of him and says she wants a pleasant trip. He cannot judge how strong her desire
is and whether she is willing to back it up, and in order to be on the safe side, he does
not automatically endorse the priority himself. In this case, the priority does not have the
status of a primary priority. Since it is a pertinent answer to the question of which train the
passenger will take (it rules out an entire cell in the partition of the set of accessible goal
worlds, according to nationality of the train), it is a priority that ought can be relativized to.
The expression of preferences in directives Next, let us return to the yoga scenario,
repeated in (64), to examine the interaction between imperatives and varieties of necessity. We observed that the choice of necessity modal in this example varies with certain
background assumptions about the speaker. Assuming that the speaker is cooperative, the
doctor’s utterance of the imperative causes her to commit to the priority it denotes (namely,
her not skipping yoga). It is further presupposed that this priority is on the priority slates
of the doctor and the friend in the room, so collective commitment is presupposed and a
strong necessity modal is used. If the imperative is rejected by the patient, for example
if she chooses not to cooperate with the doctor, the relevant priority is not added to her
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priority slate. Although the priority is not represented in a primary ordering source in this
kind of context, it nevertheless qualifies as a secondary priority: the doctor’s order would
rule out one of the two options the girls are discussing, so it can be used as a secondary
priority to make a weak ought claim about going to yoga.
(64)

[A friend and I are deciding what to do together after a doctor’s appointment that I
have. We’ve narrowed down the options to yoga and a play. At the doctor’s office,
I get a physical.]
Doctor (to me; friend is in the room, listening): You are not in good shape. Don’t
skip those yoga classes!
Me (to friend): I have to/should go to yoga.

Rising declaratives

In Section 2.3.2, I observed that certain statements of priorities are

felicitously uttered with rising intonation following ought/should claims, while certain others are not. This contrast is seen in the example below (repeated from (51)).
(65)

[Getting ready for a road-trip.]
A: We should find a good map of the area.
B: ? You’d like not to get lost on the way?
You’d like to be able to turn off your smartphone and its GPS for the weekend?

In (65), A utters a weak necessity claim based on some secondary priority she has, and
B asks questions to discover what that priority is. Priorities that are collectively committed
to, like the priority not to get lost, are not possible candidates for being secondary priorities.
B’s first rising declarative is infelicitous because it violates the condition for contingency
that the rising intonation contributes (following Gunlogson 2008). In her second utterance,
B asks for A’s confirmation or rejection of a priority she does not know if he is committed
to. Rising intonation on a statement of this priority is the perfect way to raise this question.
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Conjunctions of incompatibles

A final issue I wish to discuss concerns conjunctions of

weak necessity statements. The analysis I have proposed allows for the truth of conjunctions of the form ought p and ought ¬p (assuming that neither p nor ¬p are presupposed to
be collectively committed to in the conversation), and this may seem like a problem: how
can one and the same individual present two conflicting weak necessities as being both
true? I would like to argue that it is possible for such conjunctions to be true, under certain
circumstances, and thus this flexibility of the analysis is welcome. First, an example showing the problem raised by conjunctions. Assuming that it is not an option to rest and work
out on the same day, (66) sounds like a contradiction.
(66)

[An athlete consults her coach about how to spend the last day before the competition. It is not possible to rest and work out on the same day.]
Coach: You ought to rest today and you ought to work out today.

The crucial point is that the sentence sounds like a contradiction specifically when
coming from the coach. If we imagine the athlete consulting with a friend, her friend
could utter the same sentence without any air of contradiction. Intuitively, there is an
added pragmatic presupposition in (66) that the coach has an opinion about which priority
prevails: the one which necessitates rest, or the one which necessitates a workout, while the
friend is allowed to hypothetically reason through conflicting options, leaving the resolution
of the conflict to the athlete herself.

2.4.1.2

Inference patterns

The domain restriction approach to weak necessity accounts directly for the inference
patterns that relate weak and strong necessity modals. Strong necessity claims logically
entail corresponding weak necessity claims with the same prejacent, since the domain of
quantification of the former is a superset of that of the latter.43 As an implementation of
43

See Section 2.1 on additional scalar-like inferences.
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this approach, the analysis proposed in Section 2.4.1 accounts for these patterns. I would
like to comment on an alternative statement of the sensitivity to collective commitment that
I have rejected since it does not deliver these predictions.
The idea would be, along the lines of (67), to encode a presupposition of collective
commitment just in the lexical entries of strong necessity modals (not as a general requirement on ordering sources in C, as I have done), and to associate weak necessity modals
with a lexical entry devoid of any presupposition. With a pragmatic principle such as Maximize Presupposition (Heim, 1991), the use of weak necessity modals would be predicted in
cases that the necessity claim relies on priorities that are presupposed not to be collectively
committed to.
(67)

(Alternative rejected)
a. [[have to]]C is only defined if < g1 , . . . , gi > in C are collectively committed to.
If defined, [[have to]]C = λ qλ w.∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w).q(w0 ).
b. [[ought to]]C = λ qλ w.∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w).q(w0 ).

This analysis is problematic because it does not allow strong modals to ignore ordering
sources representing priorities that are not collectively committed to. If g1 (w) contains the
collectively committed to priority of driving to Amherst, and g2 (w) contains the secondary
priority of driving through Worcester, the weak claim You ought to take Route 9 is correctly
predicted to be true by the analysis, but the strong claim You have to drive would result in
presupposition failure (due to the offending g2 (w)).
Now, if in order to solve this problem we allow strong modals to “pick and choose” the
ordering sources they are relativized to, we lose the ability to account for the entailment relation between the modals. Suppose g1 (w) and g3 (w) contain priorities that are collectively
committed to, and g2 (w) does not, as before. A modal which is relativized just to g1 and g3
is not guaranteed to have a domain of quantification that includes the worlds that are most
ideal according to all three of g1 , g2 , and g3 .
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It is possible to avoid such problems by splitting the ordering sources in C to primary
ones and secondary ones (as in the proposal by von Fintel and Iatridou 2008), according
to the criterion of collective commitment. However, the representations in (67) would no
longer be appropriate in such a setup, since the quantification domains for strong and weak
modals would have to be made sensitive to different parts of the bipartition. The difference
between my proposal and the alternative just sketched then boils down to a question of
whether or not secondary ordering sources should be represented in the context. I believe
that disagreements about secondary priorities argue against representing them in the context
as ordering sources, but I will not provide a detailed argument to support this position here.

2.4.2

Performativity and strong necessity

As a first result of my proposals, I would like to suggest a connection between modal
strength and the phenomenon of performativity of strong necessity priority modals.44 This
connection has also been noted independently, and worked out in more detail, in recent
work by Silk (to appear).
Following up on an intuition in the descriptive literature on modality, Ninan (2005)
argues that deontic must is different from deontic should in having imperative-like force.
This imperative-like contribution wins must the status of a performative modal, since “in
uttering a simple must sentence, the speaker is attempting to initiate action – she’s either
trying to get someone to do something or committing herself to doing something” (ibid.)
Performativity is said to be responsible for two patterns that distinguish between must and
should in their uses as deontic modals. First, an assertion of must/should q permits a denial
of q if the modal is should, but not if it is must (68). Second, when must takes past/perfect
complements it cannot be interpreted deontically, but should can (69).
(68)
44

a. Sam should/ought to go to confession, but he’s not going to.

See Ninan (2005) and Portner (2009, §4.3.3) for a survey of the descriptive and theoretical literature on
the topic.
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b.
(69)

# Sam

must go to confession, but he’s not going to.

a. Sam should/ought to have gone to confession. (Deontic interpretation possible)
b. Sam must have gone to confession. (Epistemic interpretation mandatory)
(Ninan, 2005, §1)

I will not go into the details of how the two patterns are explained by assuming that
must has an imperative-like meaning (the reader is referred to Ninan 2005 for discussion);
I wish only to raise the question of whether this is indeed a separate meaning component
of the strong necessity modal, as has been assumed in the previous literature.
Ninan (2005) explicitly addressed the question of whether performativity and modal
strength (practicality and uniqueness in his terms) are related. Considering the domain
restriction analysis of weak necessity that was around at the time (due to von Fintel and
Iatridou 2005b), Ninan concluded that performativity and strong necessity are not related.
The gist of the analysis should be familiar: must was analyzed as being sensitive to one
normative parameter, while ought was analyzed as being sensitive to two normative parameters. Formally, it was proposed that only weak necessity modals have access to an
ordering source.45,46
I mention this difference between should and must only to set it aside.
I don’t think it will solve our puzzle, because it only serves to make must
stronger than should by allowing must to ignore the ordering source. But it is
45

This predecessor of the analysis presented by von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) is discussed in Section 2.4.5.

46

Ninan (2005) presents the empirical contrast in (i) as a further argument that the puzzle in (68) is not
related to the strength of the modals involved. The argument is that while the modals in (ia) and (ib)
are equally strong, one can be followed by a denial of its prejacent, but the other cannot. (An analogous
argument is made regarding the puzzle in (69).)
(i) a. Religious duty absolutely requires John to go to confession, but he’s not going to go.
b.

# Sam

must go to confession, but he’s not going to.

This contrast points to a difference between require and must in the type of modalities they allow, a difference that could be lexically or grammatically determined (e.g., given the different types of syntactic
complements they take).
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difficult to see how this could solve either of our two puzzles, since must and
should have the same basic semantics, except that the domain of worlds that
must quantifies over is a superset of the domain of worlds should quantifies
over.
(Ninan, 2005, §3.1)
In light of the updated implementation of the domain restriction approach, I would
like to suggest that we revisit this conclusion. The possibility to be explored is that the
performative aspect of strong necessity modals can be derived from their semantics and the
constraints on ordering sources, without introducing a separate imperative-like component
to their meaning (as proposed by Ninan 2005).
Strong necessity modals are sensitive to conversational backgrounds which all carry a
presupposition of collective commitment. When a speaker utters a strong necessity claim,
despite being aware that her addressee is not committed to the priorities on which that
claim is based, she conveys her expectation that the addressee will revise his priorities.
Depending on the authority of the speaker and other considerations, this expectation may
lead the addressee to endorse the necessary priority (and revise his other commitments as
appropriate). The result is an air of forced update of commitments which is related to the
forced update triggered by imperatives, as in the analysis of imperatives by Portner (2004,
2007). Assuming an analysis of imperatives along these lines, performative modals and
imperatives have in common a potential to update the context with priorities that become
collectively committed to.
Performativity in the domain of priority modals emerges as a phenomenon that is intimately related to strong modality, although the details of this connection still need to be
elaborated and fleshed out in detail (see Silk to appear for a proposal). Although I do not
undertake this task here, I expect that such an analysis will be free of some of the problems
facing Ninan’s (2005) speech act-based approach to the performativity of must.47 Answering the question of how priority modals are interpreted when embedded is particularly
47

See ibid. §5.3 “Complications” and §6.1 “Embedding.”
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urgent, given that must “loses its performativity” when embedded under attitude verbs and
in antecedents of conditionals (Ninan, 2005). Obviously, this is an important question to
which I owe an answer as well.

2.4.3

Secondary priorities versus conditional antecedents

The function of the not-collectively committed to proposition b in (60) is to restrict the
quantification domain of a modal. This is exactly what an if -clause modifying the modal
would do, according to the view pioneered by Lewis (1975) and Kratzer (1981, 1986).48
Recently, a conditional analysis of weak necessity has been proposed, in work by Alex Silk
(to appear). In this section, I discuss differences in persistence that distinguish between
secondary priorities of weak necessity modals and conditional antecedents, taking up a
more detailed evaluation of the particular conditional analysis proposed by Silk (to appear)
in the following section.
From the parallel in function between them, secondary priorities emerge as the silent
analog of a conditional antecedents. However, there are two basic properties that distinguish conditional antecedents from the extra assumptions accompanying weak necessity
modals. First and foremost, the latter are not reliably conveyed by linguistic content,
whereas if -clauses are always included in the overt linguistic signal. Relatedly, b does not
persist in the discourse unless it is introduced overtly (e.g., by a rationale clause), whereas
the content of an if -clause normally has the option to persist.
Conditional antecedents do not only affect the context in which their consequent is
interpreted, but they may also shape the context for the interpretation of subsequent sentences. Roberts (1989) discusses this property of if -clauses, exemplified in (70), in the
broader context of the phenomenon of modal subordination. The discourse as a whole can
be true, Roberts notes, even if in actuality the birds do not get hungry.

48

Heim (1982), von Fintel (1994), Rawlins (2008).
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(70)

a. If Edna forgets to fill the birdfeeder, she will feel very bad.
b. The birds will get hungry.
(Roberts, 1989, 683)

Dynamic treatments of modal subordination allow the hypothetical fact raised by the
antecedent to affect the interpretation of subsequent sentences in the discourse (Frank 1996,
Stone 1999). The if -clause is assumed to establish a temporary context against which
multiple sentences may be evaluated, and thus is said to “persist.”49
The infelicitous exchange in (71) is designed to show that the additional assumption
that accompanies a weak necessity claim – if implicit – does not persist in the discourse.
Suppose that the first ought claim in this exchange rests on a preference speaker A has for
seeing pretty scenery (b0 ). This preference is inaccessible to speaker B. It therefore cannot,
and does not, circumscribe the domain for a modal claim in the sentence that follows. This
is the case even if the subsequent claim itself is merely a weak necessity.
(71)

A: How does one get to Amherst from here?
B: There are four routes; the ones you see on this map.
A: I ought to take Route 2 then. (unspoken b0 = enjoy the scenery)
B: ? Yes, and you ought to leave early. (unspoken b = avoid the afternoon fog that
obscures the view)

Note that the additional assumption does not persist even if its content is easily inferable
in the context. Thus, in (72), even though B outlines all the possible sub-goals for A, and
A can be taken to make his or her choice between these sub-goals, B’s second ought claim
cannot be modally subordinated to the context created by the first. The final sentence in
(72) is just as infelicitous as it is in the exchange (71).

49

See Stone and Hardt (1997), Kaufmann (2000), Isaacs and Rawlins (2008), Rawlins (2011).
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(72)

A: How does one get to Amherst from here?
B: There are four routes; the ones you see on this map. Choosing between them
depends entirely on whether you prefer to visit Worcester or whether you prefer
scenery. Route 2 is the most scenic, but it doesn’t pass near Worcester. The other
three routes do.
A: I ought to take Route 2 then. (unspoken b0 = enjoy the scenery)
B: ? Yes, and you ought to leave early. (unspoken b = avoid the afternoon fog that
obscures the view)

Of course, if the preference for pretty scenery is collectively committed to (so a strong
modal like have to has access to it), it necessarily circumscribes the domain of possibilities
for modals in the discourse. This is what we see in (73).
(73)

A: What is the prettiest road to Amherst from here?
B: Route 2, I would say.
A: I have to take Route 2 then. (gC = {enjoy the scenery})
B: Yes, and you ought to leave early. (unspoken b = avoid the afternoon fog that
obscures the view)

Conditional antecedents differ from implicit assumptions that accompany ought claims
not only in terms of persistence, but also in terms of identifiability. If -clauses are clearly
packaged in the linguistic signal, whereas the content of a b-proposition is harder to pin
down. In the absence of an anaphoric relation to a salient proposition in the discourse,
preferences the speaker has – about himself or others – seem to determine the content of
b in unembedded weak necessity claims. Perhaps it is not surprising, therefore, that when
the secondary priority is raised explicitly, e.g., in a rationale clause modifying the modal
claim, it has the option to persist.
(74)

A: How does one get to Amherst from here?
B: There are four routes; you can see pictures I took on each one in this album.
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A: To enjoy scenery on the way, I ought to take Route 2 then. (b0 = enjoy the
scenery)
B: Yes, and you ought to leave early. (unspoken b = avoid the afternoon fog that
obscures the view)
It is not clear, however, that what we see in (74) is persistence of a temporary assumption in the discourse. One thing that is clear is that this “persistence” is not automatic.
When multiple secondary priorities are enumerated in a list, as in (75), the last one does
not have a privileged status over the first few in delimiting the favored worlds for a following modal. A plausible explanation of the dynamic in (74) is therefore that persistence of
b in B’s final utterance reflects a change in the contextual commitments (such that there is
presupposition of collective commitment to the priority of scenery at that point, triggered
by A’s preceding weak necessity claim). In (75), in contrast, speaker A is not presupposed
to be committed to any one of the priorities she enumerated. The presupposed collective
commitments at the end of the conversation are just as they are in the beginning: A’s goal
is to reach Amherst, and there are multiple ways to get there.
(75)

A: How does one get to Amherst from here?
B: There are four routes; you can see pictures I took on each one in this album.
A: To enjoy scenery on the way, I ought to take Route 2 then, and to visit Clark
University in Worcester, I ought to take another route.
B: ? Yes, and you ought to leave around noon. (unspoken b = avoid the morning
rush hour traffic to Worcester)
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2.4.4

Conditional application of priorities: a brief comparison

In this section, I briefly comment on a recent analysis of weak necessity by Silk (to
appear) which includes a conditional component and responds to my previous work on
weak necessity.50
Silk (to appear) advances an interesting proposal about the representation of ordering
sources, which he uses to develop an analysis of weak necessity within the domain restriction approach. Silk’s idea is that a priority (e.g., a desire, a goal, a norm) is usually not
categorical, but rather comes with a specification of its applicability conditions: the conditions under which, and only under which, it is to be pursued (ibid. §3). These applicability
conditions are used to determine the restricted quantification domains of weak necessity
modals, as well as the priorities that necessity modals in general – weak and strong – are
sensitive to. For example, if the value of you going to Amherst is established in the conversation (for Silk, this means representation in the common ground), the ordering source
representing this priority will contain a biconditional in which the priority of you going
to Amherst is paired with the applicability condition that “there are no more important
countervailing values” (ibid. (10)):
(76) g(w) = {You go to Amherst ←→ there are no more important countervailing values}
(Silk, to appear; adapted to the driving to Amherst scenario)
There is just one ordering source which is used to make both strong and weak necessity
claims, and priorities end up influencing the ordering of accessible worlds differently, depending on whether or not their applicability conditions are satisfied. What makes a weak
necessity modal weaker is that it uses some (potentially all) of the applicability conditions
in the ordering source to ignore some of the accessible worlds determined by the modal
base: the worlds in which those specific applicability conditions are not satisfied. The lex50

The manuscript cited here as (Silk, to appear) has not yet been published, and I thus refer to example and
section numbers instead of page numbers in this discussion. Silk (2011) and Silk (2012) also provides
relevant discussion of the semantics of weak necessity modals.
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ical entries for weak and strong necessity modals proposed by Silk (to appear) are given in
(77) (some of the notation has been adapted to fit the conventions I have been using).
(77)

a. [[must φ ]]c,w = 1 iff ∀w0 ∈ maxg(w) (

T

0

f (w)).[[φ ]]c,w = 1.
0

b. [[should φ ]]c,w = 1 iff ∀w0 ∈ maxg(w) ( ( f (w) ∪Cg(w) )).[[φ ]]c,w = 1,
T

where Cg(w) is a (properly improper) subset of the set of applicability conditions
for each of the premises in g(w).
(Silk, to appear, §5.1, notation adapted)
In the two examples of ordering sources Silk provides, the applicability conditions for
priorities are superlative and related to the priorities they are paired with. That is, we have
conditions like “there are no more important countervailing values,” or “you don’t prefer
to do anything else more” (ibid. ex. (6)), which means that the contents of such ordering
source are propositions of the form “p ←→ there are no more important countervailing
values than p.” This is crucial, as I will now argue. Nothing in Silk’s account seems to
prevent other applicability conditions from being paired with priorities, however. Consider
(78), for example.
(78) g0 (w) = {You go to Amherst ←→ there is one more important countervailing value}
This ordering source seems to represent a somewhat strange priority or goal, e.g., a
priority that you go to Amherst if and only if Amherst is the least preferred of two possible
destinations. A biconditional like this in the ordering source will generate the prediction
that the strong necessity claim You have to drive is true, assuming that all the circumstantially accessible worlds in which you go to Amherst are worlds in which you drive. This
is an incorrect prediction if the circumstantially accessible worlds are diverse with respect
to the destination you go to, and the more preferred destination is one you reach by plane,
for instance. In a situation in which it is the case that there is one other destination that you
prefer more than Amherst, this aspect of the situation would be treated as one of the relevant circumstances in the modal base (ibid. discussion of ex. (6)). Thus, the applicability
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condition in (78) would be satisfied throughout the contextually determined circumstantial modal base. The modal would quantify (universally) over all the accessible worlds in
which the priority of going to Amherst is satisfied, and the strong necessity claim that you
have to drive is predicted incorrectly to be true.
I take this to show that it is not enough to pair priorities with any applicability condition
to explain the semantics of strong necessity. Those priorities that are relevant are those
for which, I have suggested, there exists a presupposition of collective commitment in
the conversation. Collective commitment depends on presupposed commitment of every
conversational participant, and commitment of each participant implies their endorsement
of the priority over its alternatives. If you haven’t decided whether going to Amherst is
something you prefer over going to Hartford, for example, then you are not committed
to any one of these priorities in the sense that is relevant for licensing a strong necessity
claim. We might say then that a primary priority p is a priority for which “there are no
more important countervailing values than p” in the conversational context. I have argued
that this characterization of primary priorities is an important ingredient that distinguishes
primary from secondary priorities, and it seems crucial for the analysis proposed by Silk
(to appear) based on ordering sources with applicability conditions as well.
A potential problem for the implementation of the conditional analysis proposed by
Silk (to appear) arises in scenarios with cascades of priorities. These kinds of scenarios,
which provided important evidence in arguing for a distinction between primary and secondary priorities, are not analyzed in detail in Silk’s paper. The problem for the conditional
analysis seems to be that applicability conditions that are mutually exclusive result in one
priority at most being operative as a positive priority, when in fact multiple ones should be.
Let’s step through an example. Suppose we are in the context of driving to Amherst, where
it is a collective commitment that you go to Amherst. Suppose, moreover, that you mention
that a scenic drive and a quick trip are also important, but I assume that you have not yet
committed to either one. According to my understanding of Silk’s discussion, the fact that
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you expressed a preference for going to Amherst, for pretty scenery, and for a quick trip
means that these priorities are all represented in the ordering source, with the applicability
conditions shown below.
(79) g(w) = {You go to Amherst ←→ you don’t prefer to do anything else more,
You take a scenic road ←→ you don’t prefer to do anything else more,
You take a quick road ←→ you don’t prefer to do anything else more}
Now, the weak necessity claim You ought to take Route 2 is true in this scenario, if pretty
scenery, for example, functions as a secondary priority. This is not what we get according
to the analysis in (77b). The sentence is true, according to (77b), if and only if you take
Route 2 in all the g(w)-best worlds in the subset of the modal base in which it is true that you
do not prefer anything else more than a scenic road. There are circumstantially accessible
worlds in which you take a scenic road to a different destination, however, not to Amherst.
At least in some of those worlds, you prefer a scenic road more than anything else, but,
importantly, you do not take Route 2. Indeed, in the restricted set of circumstantially
accessible worlds that ought to would be quantifying over, worlds in which you do not go
to Amherst are better according to this g(w) than worlds in which you do go to Amherst.
This seems problematic.
I believe these considerations merit closer examination of the conditional approach proposed by Silk (to appear) and detailed comparison with the commitment based approach I
have argued for here (and which is free from certain problems of its predecessor, Rubinstein
2011). I must leave these tasks for another occasion, however.

2.4.5

A different perspective on the modal landscape: negotiable norms, non-negotiable
norms, and facts

My proposal for the semantics of weak necessity modals makes use of “modal backgrounds” of three kinds: modal bases, primary ordering sources, and secondary priorities.
In this section, I would like to suggest a triply relative perspective on modal parameters that
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distinguishes these three kinds of backgrounds. From this perspective, modal bases and
primary ordering sources represent non-negotiable (consistent and potentially inconsistent)
information, and together they determine a simple, unstructured, set of live possibilities that
all modals are sensitive to. Secondary priorities represent negotiable information. Thus,
they do not eliminate possibilities from consideration, but only add structure to the set of
live possibilities by ordering it, allowing for comparison of alternatives.
How are secondary priorities related to the familiar kinds of conversational backgrounds,
namely modal bases and ordering sources? Ignoring the simplification of using a single
proposition instead of a set of propositions to represent relevant secondary priorities in a
context, secondary priorities are similar to ordering sources in that they “may themselves
be inconsistent or else be inconsistent with the established facts” (Kratzer, 1981, 307). In
contrast, sets of propositions determined by a modal base are always consistent, at least in
the case of circumstantial or factual modal bases (ibid.)
There is another sense, however, in which secondary priorities are distinct from primary
ordering sources. According to my proposal, secondary priorities represent negotiable priorities, priorities that are still up for discussion. In contrast, the priorities in a primary
ordering source are non-negotiable. They serve to eliminate possibilities from consideration in the same way, intuitively, that the relevant facts delimit what is possible and not
possible in a certain context. Sloman (1970) conveys this intuition clearly when he describes the class of possibilities to which ought’s prejacent is compared as reflecting prior
decisions, principles, and commitments:
Although the above is not an exhaustive or systematic classification of
types of comparison class, it does illustrate the variety of ways in which the
possibilities under consideration may be restricted. Of course, some race of
supermen might always consider all possibilities when trying to decide what
ought to be the case, or what ought to be done. But our considerations are
limited, not only by the bounds of our own imagination and knowledge, but
also by the structure of the practical situations in which we are faced with such
questions: our prior decisions, principles, commitments, etc., impose restrictions or constraints on the possibilities we can consistently take into account.
(Sloman, 1970, 388)
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From this second perspective, modal bases and primary ordering sources have something in common. Jointly, these conversational backgrounds determine the set of live possibilities that weak necessity claims are focused on. Secondary priorities carry out the true
purpose of an ordering source in a Kratzerian semantics: that of comparing possibilities
and ordering them according to how well they approach an ideal.
An early proposal by von Fintel and Iatridou (2005b) reflects this intuition about the
way that quantification domains for necessity modals are constructed. According to this
proposal, given in (80), weak necessity modals are relativized to a modal base, a designated
priority, and an ordering source, while strong necessity modals are relativized only to a
modal base and a designated priority.
(80)

a. to p, ought to q is true in a world w with respect to a modal base f and ordering
source g iff all the g(w)-best worlds in

T

f (w) where p is true are q-worlds.

b. to p, must q is true in a world w with respect to a modal base f iff all the worlds
in

T

f (w) where p is true are q-worlds.

(von Fintel and Iatridou, 2005b, ex. (24), notation slightly adapted)
Despite the intuitive appeal of the proposal, it does not generalize automatically to other
priority type interpretations. To accommodate deontic necessity claims, in particular, the
designated priority would need to be replaced by an ordering source, and one that might
contain an inconsistent set of propositions.
The technical challenge of dealing with inconsistencies has been overcome in a different
context, in work by Anette Frank. Frank (1996) defends the idea that facts and norms may
jointly determine unstructured modal domains, and develops the necessary tools for joining
consistent sets of propositions (modal bases) with potentially inconsistent ones (ordering
sources).51 While Frank proposes to dispense with ordering sources altogether, I suggest
that we conceptualize their role a bit differently – and keep them. Specifically, I suggest
51

Inspiration for some of these tools derives from Gazdar (1979) via Kasper (1992).
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that secondary priorities be used to order the unstructured domain of accessible worlds, or
live possibilities, that the facts and the primary priorities jointly determine. A formal sketch
of this suggestion is found in Appendix B.
In summary, the true power of ordering sources is in comparing possibilities, and comparisons are made when negotiable priorities are at stake. In this study, the connection
between ordering and lack of collective commitment, and hence negotiability, emerged
through the analysis of weak necessity. I suspect that it will play a role in the analysis of
other comparative modal expressions as well.

2.4.6

Conclusions and future directions

With this chapter, I hope to have shown that understanding certain aspects of modal
strength requires sensitivity to presuppositions about collective commitment in a conversation. I motivated a split between two kinds of priorities: ones that are presupposed to be
collectively committed to, and ones that are presupposed not to be collectively committed
to. I used independent probes of commitment status to show that weak necessity modals
are sensitive to priorities of both kinds, while strong necessity modals are sensitive only to
priorities of the first kind.
What makes weak necessity modals such useful modal words is that they allow interlocutors to entertain priorities that may be outright contested, controversial, or simply
still up for discussion. Different participants might have different opinions about the relative goodness of different priorities and, in normal conversation, disagreements about what
should or shouldn’t be done reflect this variety of opinions.
Since it provides a criterion for the split between priorities, I argued that sensitivity
to collective commitment solves a conceptual challenge facing the domain restriction approach to weak necessity. I proposed that this criterion is superior to criteria that have
previously been entertained in the literature (a split on conceptual grounds, or a split based
on the content of rationale clauses). Having argued that the domain restriction approach
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developed by von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) is superior to a number of probabilistic alternatives, I formalized sensitivity to collective commitments within this approach. The
crucial priorities that fix domains of quantification for weak necessity modals were defined
in relation to the Question Under Discussion in the conversation as priorities for which lack
of collective commitment is presupposed.52
A first application of my proposals concerns the performativity of strong necessity
modals, a phenomenon which may be analyzed as reflecting the presupposition of collective commitment that is required for the felicitous utterance of these modals.
The questions that remain most intriguing for me at this point concern the extent of
commitment-based weakness that one might expect to find in modal systems of natural
languages. As von Fintel and Iatridou (2008) have shown, languages differ in whether
or not, and how, they express weak necessity. What is the explanation for these differences? What are the relevant properties of languages that develop weak necessity modals
from strong ones? A further obvious question to ask, given the influence of presupposed
commitments on the expression of modal necessity, is whether similar influences can be
detected with possibility modals as well. The null hypothesis would be that they do, and
that we might be able to find an existential counterpart to ‘ought’ in languages that grammatically distinguish between weak and strong necessity.
Higher items on my to-do list, however, are two open issues regarding the composition
of priority modal meaning. The first concerns the analysis of weak necessity in embed52

This brings us closer to an integrated semantics-pragmatic theory of necessity modals that is oriented
toward the raising and resolution of issues, an important theoretical desideratum:
[. . . ] it is a widespread (and age-old) idea, that the organization of discourse is largely
determined by a mostly implicit process of raising and resolving issues, and that even
sentential structure, including the intonational contour of utterances, can only be properly understood, if we take that to heart. If there is some truth in this, then linguistic
semanticists should be worried by the fact that by and large they base themselves on a
logical paradigm that is biased to such an extent towards reasoning rather than exchange
of information.
(Groenendijk, 1999, 109)
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ded contexts. The second concerns the compositional contribution of rationale clauses in
teleological discourse. While there have been proposals to treat rationale clauses and if clauses on a par (von Fintel and Iatridou 2005b, von Stechow et al. 2006, Finlay 2010),
reconciling the differences in persistence between the two is reason to think afresh about
the relationship between them.
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CHAPTER 3
ROOT MODALITIES AND ATTITUDE PREDICATES

dpyd zeni lk wexid xdd
l`eye mleg cer ip`
dpey`xak jizegex meypl
.lnxk jliva akyl

The mountain, oh mountain that is always green
I still dare dream and dwell
To breathe in your winds as in the begin’
To lie in your shade, Carmel.
Yoram Taharlev, ‘The Mountain that is Always
Green’, cinz wexid xdd (1972)

Attitude verbs like want have a preference-based meaning, and like weak
necessity modals, they have been given modal, comparative, and probabilistic
analyses. In this chapter, I critically review recent developments in the semantics of preference-based attitudes, focusing on comparative and modal accounts
stemming from Heim (1992). I show that the introduction of focus alternatives
to the semantics of desire predicates and modal predicates like necessary is
not necessitated by the evidence amassed so far (contra Villalta 2006, 2008).
I propose a modal analysis of want and necessary and compare them to the
strong and weak modals analyzed in Chapter 2. Necessary is argued to be a
strong necessity modal that is nevertheless always priority-oriented.

3.1
3.1.1

Attitude verbs of desire
A conditional comparative analysis: Heim (1992)

Leading proposals in the semantic literature on want and other desire predicates are
designed with the idea that such predicates involve comparison of alternatives. This idea is
summarized succinctly in the following quote from Stalnaker.
[. . . ] wanting something is preferring it to certain relevant alternatives, the
relevant alternatives being those possibilities that the agent believes will be
realized if he does not get what he wants.
(Stalnaker, 1984, 89)
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Heim (1992) uses this characterization as motivation for proposing a conditional comparative semantics for desire verbs.
An important feature of this analysis is that it sees a hidden conditional in
every desire report. A little more explicitly, the leading intuition is that John
wants you to leave means that John thinks that if you leave he will be in a more
desirable world than if you don’t leave.
(Heim, 1992, 193)
The conditional paraphrase is then used to implement a semantics for desire verbs using
a version of the semantics proposed for conditionals (indicative and counterfactual) by
Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973). In this tradition, a conditional sentence of the form If
φ , then ψ is true in a world w if and only if the consequent ψ is true, not necessarily in w,
but in the worlds most similar to w in which the antecedent φ is true. For any proposition
p and world w, the p-worlds most similar to w are abbreviated as Simw (p).
(81)

Simw (p) = {w0 ∈ W : w0 ∈ p and w0 resembles w no less than any other world in p}.
(Heim, 1992, 195, 197)

According to the conditional paraphrase, a wants p means, roughly, that a considers
the p-worlds she can think of to be better than the ¬p-worlds she can think of. As von
Fintel (1999, 119) points out, there are two orderings of worlds at play in Heim’s analysis.
One is the above ordering based on similarity. The other is an ordering (of worlds and
propositions) based on desires or preferences of an individual:
(82)

a. For any w, w0 , w00 ∈ W ,
w0 <a,w w00 iff w0 is more desirable to a in w than w00 .
b. For any w ∈ W, X ⊆ W,Y ⊆ W ,
X <a,w Y iff w0 <a,w w00 for all w0 ∈ X, w00 ∈ Y .
(Heim, 1992, 197)

As hinted by the informal paraphrases, desires are evaluated in light of one’s beliefs,
not in light of what is actually the case. They are thus easily rooted in beliefs that do not
105

match reality, as shown by (83). Patrick may have a desire to sell a cello which is not in
fact in his possession, but which he thinks is.
(83)

Patrick is under the misconception that he owns a cello, and he wants to sell his
cello.
(Heim, 1992, 183(2))

Additional motivation for the connection with belief comes from examples like (84).
Let’s assume that worlds in which I don’t teach at all next semester are more desirable to
me than ones in which I get a good teaching assignment. But if teaching next semester is a
given, I believe it is not possible for me not to teach. That is, in all the worlds that represent
my beliefs in the evaluation world (these worlds are called my doxastic alternatives in the
evaluation world, or the worlds doxastically accessible to me in the evaluation world, or
simply my belief worlds), I teach next semester. Since (84) is typically judged true in the
situation described, it seems that the desirability comparison cannot reach out to worlds
that are not doxastically accessible to the subject in a given situation.
(84)

I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester.
(Heim, 1992, 195(35))

Assuming that comparisons of desirability are restricted by the subject’s doxastic alternatives, Heim (1992) defines the semantics of want as in (85). Doxa (w) here is a function
that retrieves the set of possible worlds that match the beliefs of an agent a in a world w. It
maps an individual to their doxastic alternatives in that world.1
1

This use of the term doxastic alternatives to refer to doxastically accessible worlds is standard practice
following Hintikka (1962). Note that it contrasts with the use of the term by Lewis (1986) to refer to
individuals: “[. . . ] a class of possible individuals – call them the believer’s doxastic alternatives – who
might, for all he believes, be himself. [. . . ] These individuals are the believer’s doxastic possibilities.
But they are not different possible ways for the world to be; rather, they are different possible ways for
the individual to be, and many of them may coexist within a single world.” For Lewis, “The doxastic
alternatives determine the doxastically accessible worlds, though not conversely: a world is accessible
iff at least one of the alternatives inhabits it.” (ibid., pp. 28-29).
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(85) [[want]](p)(a)(w) = 1 iff
∀w0 : w0 ∈ Doxa (w).Simw0 (Doxa (w) ∩ p) <a,w Simw0 (Doxa (w) ∩ ¬p).
(A static rendering of the dynamic proposal by Heim 1992, 197(39))
Heim’s motivation for crafting an analysis of desire predicates is to account for Karttunen’s (1974) observations about presupposition projection from complements of attitude
verbs. Although the original observations have not gone uncontested,2 Heim’s (1992) analysis of want has become the benchmark for much subsequent work on the semantics of
attitude predicates (e.g., von Fintel 1999, Geurts 1998). A particularly interesting adaptation of the theory has been proposed recently in work by Elisabeth Villalta.

3.1.2

Multiple alternatives and less reliance on belief: Villalta (2006, 2008)

Villalta (2006, 2008) proposes a semantics for a family of predicates, among them predicates of desire, which makes comparison of alternatives the driving force of the analysis.
Her proposal brings to light certain subtleties regarding the doxastic component of desire
predicates. It handles naturally cases in which there is more than a binary choice between
alternatives (although we will see below that the additional machinery it uses for this purpose is unnecessary). Finally, it applies not only to want and a handful of other desire
verbs, but to a number of classes of predicates unified in Spanish, the language analyzed,
by being predicates that select the subjunctive mood in their embedded clauses. Among
these are desire predicates and (adjectival and verbal) modal predicates.3
The first of Villalta’s contributions concerns the doxastic component of desire predicates. In the version of Heim’s conditional semantics in (85), she finds that “the desires
of the subject are too tightly connected to his/her beliefs” (Villalta, 2008, 478). Since the
desirability of p-worlds (over ¬p-worlds) is compared only in worlds that match the beliefs
2

See Geurts (1998), Moltmann (2006).

3

The complete list includes desire predicates, emotive factive predicates, modal predicates, predicates
expressing doubt, directive predicates, and causative predicates. For examples, see Villalta (2008), pp.
470, 518-519.
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of the subject of the sentence, the analysis in (85) predicts that if someone believes that two
propositions are equivalent, there is no way he or she can desire one to a different degree
than the other. This is incorrect, since in fact, “someone may believe that two propositions
p and q are true in the exact same set of worlds, and at the same time want p without
wanting q” (Villalta, 2008, 479). Let’s refer to this as the Doxastic Problem for Heim’s
analysis.
(86)

a. I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester.
b. I believe that I will teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester if and only if
I work hard now.
c. Invalid inference: I want to work hard now.
(Villalta, 2008, 478(33))

It should be noted that not all versions of Heim’s conditional semantics for want face
this problem. In particular, the truth-conditional version of her analysis, given in (87),
does not make this incorrect prediction. This is the version Heim (1992) considers before
transposing her proposal into the framework of context change semantics.
(87) [[want]](p)(a)(w) = 1 iff
∀w0 ∈ Doxa (w) : Simw0 (p) <a,w Simw0 (¬p).
(Following Heim 1992, 193(31))
In (87), the conditional component (which is based on the similarity ordering of possible worlds) is not limited to worlds that are included in the subject’s doxastic alternatives.
Therefore, worlds that are not doxastically accessible to the subject can also enter the desirability comparison. Their existence is enough to ensure that invalid inferences like (86)
do not go through.
However, when Villalta claims that the invalid inference is in fact derived, she remains
true to the spirit of Heim’s analysis. Heim (1992) states quite explicitly that worlds outside
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the subject’s doxastic alternatives should not enter the desirability comparison (see below,
emphasis in the original). Formally, while the truth-conditional version of her analysis in
(87) does not deliver this result, the version inspired by dynamic semantics, in (85), does.
[(85)] implies that all the desirability comparisons that enter into determining the truth of a want-sentence are entirely among the subject’s belief worlds.
If a belief world w’ has φ true in it, it must be more desirable than otherwise
similar belief worlds where φ is false, and if a belief world has φ false in it,
then it must be less desirable than otherwise similar belief worlds where φ is
true. The desirability of non-belief-worlds never has any bearing on the truth
of a want-report.
(Heim, 1992, 197)
Villalta’s argument regarding (86) is therefore valid. If doxastic alternatives constrain
the possibilities which are compared for desirability, then:
[. . . ] from the truth of [(86a)] it follows that in DoxI (w) all the worlds in
which I teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester are more desirable than
maximally similar worlds in which I don’t teach on Tuesdays and Thursdays
next semester. From the truth of [(86b)] it follows that in DoxI (w) the worlds
in which I teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester correspond exactly
to those worlds in which I work hard this semester. Hence, from [(86a)] and
[(86b)] it follows that in DoxI (w) all worlds in which I work hard this semester
are more desirable than maximally similar worlds in which I don’t work hard
this semester.
(Villalta, 2008, 478-479)
Villalta’s solution to the Doxastic Problem is to relax the connection between desire
and belief in the semantics of want. The subject’s beliefs are relegated to a definedness
condition of the predicate and no longer restrict the desirability comparison. According
to the proposal in (88), wanting p requires p and its alternatives to be represented in the
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subject’s doxastic alternatives, but the desirability comparison is not restricted to worlds in
this set.4,5
(88) [[wantC ]]g (p)(a)(w) is defined iff ∀q ∈ g(C) : Doxa (w) ∩ q 6= 0.
/
If defined, [[wantC ]]g (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff ∀q : q 6= p & q ∈ g(C) : p <DESa, w q.
(Villalta, 2008, 480(37), notation adapted)
A virtue of this analysis is that it avoids the universal quantification over belief worlds
in Heim’s proposal. Concerns about this aspect of the original comparative desire semantics have been voiced in the literature. Levinson (2003), for example, argues that according
to Heim (1992), “a person wants something only if he/she believes that it will necessarily improve the situation in any possible case. [. . . ], this excludes many actual cases of
wanting” (p. 230).
Notice that the embedded proposition p is compared here not to its negation ¬p, as in
(85) or (87), but potentially to many propositions in a set of alternatives g(C). This claim
about the comparisons carried out by the attitude verb is a central claim put forth by Villalta
(2006, 2008). C in (88) provides access to the relevant set: it is a variable that is anaphoric
to a contextually determined set of propositions (and receives its value from the variable
assignment g; cf. Rooth 1985, 1992, von Fintel 1994, Westerståhl 1985). I come back to
this innovation shortly.
4

Villalta (2008) adopts Kratzer’s (1991) definition of better possibility as the basis for comparing the
desirability of sets of worlds (as opposed to individual worlds). The following thus replaces Heim’s
definition of <a,w in (82b) above.
(i) a. For any w, w0 , w00 ∈ W , w0 <a,w w00 iff w0 is more desirable to a in w than w00 .
b. For any p ⊆ W, q ⊆ W, p <DESa, w q iff ∀w00 ∈ q ∃w0 ∈ p such that w0 <a,w w00 , and it is not
the case that ∀w0 ∈ p ∃w00 ∈ q such that w00 <a,w w0 .
(Villalta, 2008, 479(35), notation adapted)

5

In what follows, I limit myself to discussion of the pre-final version of Villalta’s (2008) proposal, ignoring the decompositional degree-based refinement she introduces (see Villalta 2006, Villalta 2008,
§8.3).

110

The invalid inference in (86) is no longer derived in the new setup. There are two desire
statements being considered: one concerns my wanting to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays
next semester, the other concerns my wanting to work hard now. The Tuesday-Thursday
schedule is compared to a Monday-Wednesday-Friday schedule, and preferred over it. The
contextually determined alternatives to which the second statement is compared are different, and include the alternative that I don’t work at all and the alternative that I work only
a little (Villalta, 2008, 480). All the alternatives mentioned are represented in my belief
worlds, so the doxastic definedness condition is satisfied. However, since the desirability
comparison is not restricted to worlds the subject believes to be possible, the comparisons
may yield different results in (86a) and (86c). If it is the case that the most desirable worlds
are Tuesday-Thursday-worlds in which I do not work hard, (86c) would be false.

3.1.3

Refuting the argument for multiple alternatives

The semantics proposed by Villalta (2008) for desire predicates in (88) includes a treatment of alternatives which marks a departure from Heim (1992) in several respects. For
Heim (1992), there are exactly two alternatives that enter the comparison, p and ¬p, where
p is the proposition complementing the desire predicate. Villalta (2008) argues that it is
necessary to compare p to a set of contextually determined alternatives, not just to ¬p.
Furthermore, she argues that this set is to be derived based on p’s focus structure. My aim
in this section is to discuss the first of these two innovations. I point out that Heim’s analysis, without any change, can deal with a purported counterexample advanced by Villalta
(2008). Thus, moving from a singleton set of alternatives to a potentially larger set is not
necessitated by the evidence amassed so far. I will leave the details of the focus-based
analysis for another occasion.6
6

Thus, I will ignore for the sake of this discussion what happens when p does not contain any focusmarked constituent in it, as well as some inaccurate predictions of the theory regarding association with
focus (see Villalta 2008, footnote 13, for one such challenge).
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Villalta’s argument for generalizing the definition of alternatives in the semantics of
desire predicates is based on examples in which there are more than two contextually available alternatives (p and at least two more) that seem to be compared. The picnic potluck
scenario is such an example.
Sofı́a has promised to bring a dessert to the picnic. Victoria believes that
there are three possibilities for what she may actually do. She could prepare a
chocolate cake, even though Victoria considers that extremely unlikely because
it represents far too much work. She might bring an apple pie, which Victoria
considers very likely since she can just buy it at the bakery nearby. Or Sofı́a
might bring ice-cream, which seems most likely to Victoria, since she usually
has some in her freezer. Victoria prefers the chocolate cake over the apple pie
and the apple pie over the ice-cream.
(Villalta, 2008, 476(28))
In this scenario, Victoria’s preferences run counter to what she believes is likely to
happen. She would prefer Sofı́a brought a chocolate cake, but this is also the most unlikely
thing that could happen, in her mind. Rather, she thinks it is most likely that Sofı́a will
bring ice cream, the least desirable option of the three as far as she is concerned. It is clear
that the sentence in (89) is false in this scenario.7
(89)

False Victoria

wants Sofı́a to bring an apple pie.

The question is whether Heim (1992) makes this prediction, and the claim is that it
doesn’t.
Contrary to intuitions, Heim’s conditional semantics for the verb wish predicts that this sentence should come out as true in this scenario. Under Heim’s
proposal, the sentence [(89)] is true iff for all worlds w’ that are compatible with Victoria’s beliefs, the worlds in which Sofı́a brings the apple pie are
more desirable to Victoria than all the minimally different worlds in which she
doesn’t. This is true, since, in the given scenario, the closest worlds in which
Sofı́a doesn’t bring an apple pie are worlds in which she brings ice-cream.
This set doesn’t contain worlds in which she brings chocolate cake (these are
not minimally different for Victoria since she considers them extremely unlikely).
(Villalta, 2008, 477)
7

Villalta (2008, 477(30)) uses a version of this sentence with wish instead of want, but it is clear that she
is making an argument about want.
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This conclusion is not warranted. The problem is that the argument ignores worlds
in which Sofı́a does bring a chocolate cake, “against all odds.” Such worlds exist in the
set of Victoria’s doxastic alternatives, DoxV (w), because she considers the possibility that
Sofı́a bring a chocolate cake unlikely, but not impossible. Crucially, the desirability of
these worlds according to Victoria is higher, not lower, than any minimally different world
in which Sofı́a brings apple pie. The analysis of (89) based on comparison of just the
prejacent and its negation, in (90), captures this fact. For any world w00 in DoxV (w) such that
w00 ∈ [[Sofı́a brings chocolate cake]], it holds that Simw00 (¬[[Sofı́a brings apple pie]]) simply
equals {w00 } (a world is always most similar to itself). But such a world w00 is ranked
higher by Victoria’s desirability ordering, <V,w , than any world minimally different from
w00 in which [[Sofı́a brings apple pie]] holds. Therefore, (89) is predicted correctly to be
false in the given scenario.
(90) [[want]]([[Sofı́a brings apple pie]])(V )(w) = 1 iff
∀w0 ∈ DoxV (w) : Simw0 (DoxV (w)∩[[Sofı́a brings apple pie]]) <V,w Simw0 (DoxV (w)∩
¬[[Sofı́a brings apple pie]]).
In sum, the picnic scenario does not provide an argument for replacing ¬p in the semantics of want with a set of alternatives, even though the proposition ¬p represents a
number of finer grained alternatives to p.8
Villalta’s approach nevertheless provides a solution to the Doxastic Problem she identified in Heim’s theory.
Can we apply the solution proposed by Villalta (2006, 2008), namely relaxing the dependency of want on belief, in order to come up with a comparative proposal that only has
p and ¬p as the alternatives compared? A first stab at such a lexical entry is (91).

8

Additional empirical arguments Villalta (2008) uses to support her proposal do not seem to depend on
the cardinality of the set of alternatives (e.g., the gradability of some of these predicates and their ability
to appear in certain comparative constructions).
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(91)

(First try)
[[want]](p)(a)(w) is defined iff Doxa (w) ∩ p 6= 0/ and Doxa (w) ∩ ¬p 6= 0.
/
If defined, [[want]](p)(a)(w) = 1 iff p <DESa, w ¬p.

This implementation is reminiscent of Heim’s truth-conditional semantics for want in
(87), minus the similarity constraint built into that proposal, and for this reason it fails to
account for the truth conditions of desire statements that seem to be circumscribed by what
is believed to be possible. In particular, the naive semantics for want in (91) incorrectly
predicts I want to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester to be false in a situation in
which I would really prefer not to teach at all. Worlds in which I don’t teach are irrelevant
in a context in which my teaching is a given, but we lose the ability to keep them out of the
desirability comparison by comparing p to all of ¬p.
We need a way of circumscribing the possibilities want has access to so that irrelevant
possibilities do not impact the desirability comparison. A straightforward way to do this is
to use a contextually determined modal base to allow certain background assumptions to
choose subsets of p and ¬p for the desirability comparison. This is the function f in (92).
(92)

(Second try)
[[want]] f (p)(a)(w) is defined iff
T

T

f (w) ∩ Doxa (w) ∩ p 6= 0/ and

f (w) ∩ Doxa (w) ∩ ¬p 6= 0.
/

If defined, [[want]] f (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff

T

f (w) ∩ p <DESa, w

T

f (w) ∩ ¬p.

In order to avoid the Doxastic Problem, the modal base should not be hard-wired to
equal the subject’s doxastic alternatives (or the superset of the doxastic alternatives derived
by ignoring beliefs the subject has about their own future actions, which is what Heim
ends up proposing).9 The modal base f can be circumstantial, as is arguably the case in
9

“[. . . ] we don’t take into account all [the subject’s] beliefs, but just those that he has about matters
unaffected by his own future actions” (Heim, 1992, 199); see also von Fintel (1999). In the teaching
scenario, my teaching next semester would be a belief I have about my future actions; nevertheless, it is
not ignored for the purpose of the desire claim I want to teach a Tuesday-Thursday schedule.
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the teaching scenario. The intuition that no-teaching worlds do not annul my desire to
get a particular teaching schedule is modeled by allowing f to be a circumstantial modal
base that contains the proposition [[I teach next semester]]. I want to teach Tuesdays and
Thursdays next semester is predicted to be true, and I want to work hard now is predicted
to be false given my preferences in the scenario (see Figure 3.1). The modal base f can
also be a doxastic modal base, if the relevance of someone’s belief state is made explicit
(e.g., Patrick is under the misconception that . . . , and he wants . . . , Heim’s example (83)
above).10

Belief worlds
TuThWork,
MWF¬Work
Outside belief worlds

¬Teach

TuTh¬Work,
MWFWork
Teach

W
Figure 3.1: Accessible worlds in desire statements. Doxastic alternatives may be a subset
of the worlds determined by the modal base. In the teaching scenario of (86), the modal
base worlds are circumstantially accessible worlds in which I teach next semester (left side
of the figure, in blue). Only a proper subset of these are the belief worlds of the subject.
The larger set is relevant for evaluating I want to (not) work hard (and perhaps also I want
to teach Tuesdays and Thursdays next semester, although focusing just on the doxastic
alternatives would also predict the truth of the sentence since the MWF schedule is less
desirable than the TuTh schedule in general).

10

Note that if the facts are that Patrick does not own a cello, the unmodified desire statement Patrick wants
to sell his cello is odd.
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Finally, Heim (1992) notes that reports of unrealistic desires with want, e.g., (93), are
problematic for a semantics of desire that is tied to belief. This “loose end” for the Heimian
analysis is more easily accommodated by an analysis that leaves the identity of f open.
(93)

I want this weekend to last forever. (But I know, of course, that it will be over in a
few hours.)
(Heim, 1992, 199(42))

What such examples show is that the possibilities that are relevant for a desire statement
may be possibilities that are circumstantially accessible, yet doxastically inaccessible. Although it is impossible for any Sunday to last more than 24 hours, it is possible – circumstantially – that my work engagements on Monday will be canceled and my “weekend”
will last one day longer. If doxastic alternatives can, but need not, restrict what is desired,
a third stab at the semantics of want would be (94). The truth-conditional part of the denotation can also be given a quantificational implementation as in (95), following von Fintel
(1999).11 The function maxg ( f ) retrieves the g(w)-best worlds among a set of accessible
worlds

T

f (w) (which, I have argued, need not match the attitude holder’s set of doxastic

alternatives).12 In the case of want, the attitude holder’s desires in the world of evaluation
contribute the ordering source.
(94)

(Third try)
[[want]] f (p)(a)(w) is defined iff

T

f (w) ∩ p 6= 0/ and

If defined, [[want]] f (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff
(95)

T

T

f (w) ∩ ¬p 6= 0.
/

f (w) ∩ p <DESa, w

T

f (w) ∩ ¬p.

(Quantificational implementation)
If defined, [[want]] f (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff ∀w0 ∈ maxDESa, w ( f (w)).p(w0 ).

11

See Crnic̆ (2011) for recent discussion of monotonicity properties of desire predicates in relation to the
Heimian similarity-based analysis and the quantificational analysis due to von Fintel (1999).

12

See (39) in Chapter 2 for the definition of this function.
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This denotation for want is similar in some ways to the denotation for weak necessity
ought to developed in Chapter 2. Both predicates require their prejacent p to be unsettled
in a set of accessible worlds (the definedeness condition), and both bring in an additional
consideration which favors p-worlds over ¬p-worlds among the accessible worlds. What is
special about want is that the additional consideration is restricted to desires and linked to
a particular individual, namely the individual denoted by the verb’s subject. Are considerations of personal desire also similar to ought’s secondary priorities in terms of presupposed
commitments in the discourse? Comparing ought not just to want, but also to necessary, is
helpful in answering this question.

3.2

From verbs of desire to modal predicates

One of Villalta’s (2008) central proposals is that the comparative analysis of desire
verbs extends to a class of predicates in Spanish that select for subjunctive-marked embedded clauses. Among these are the modal predicates es necesario ‘is necessary,’ es probable
‘is probable,’ es posible ‘is possible,’ and necesitar ‘need’ (ibid., p. 519).
In this section, I discuss the analysis of one predicate in this class: the necessity modal
adjective necessary. Exposing the inherently goal-oriented nature of this modal as a clausal
operator, I argue that necessary does not contribute a likelihood-oriented modality (as argued by Villalta 2008) and neither is it the general purpose necessity modal operator it is
often considered to be (Sections 3.2.1-3.2.2). However, I observe that necessary is a strong
modal, like have to, and thus propose that it places different presuppositions on the priorities it is sensitive to than a weak necessity modal like ought does. Want, on the other hand,
is similar to ought in being sensitive to prioritizing information that is presupposed not to
be collectively committed to (Section 3.2.3).
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3.2.1

The comparative analysis extended to modals: Villalta (2006, 2008)

In Spanish, both querer ‘want’ and es necesario ‘is necessary’ are predicates that select
for subjunctive mood in their embedded clauses. Villalta (2008) proposes that this shared
trait means that ‘want’ and ‘necessary’ both have a semantics that is based on comparison
of alternatives. The lexical entries she associates with the two predicates are shown below,
side by side (the first is repeated from (88)).
(96) [[wantC ]]g (p)(a)(w) is defined iff ∀q ∈ g(C) : Doxa (w) ∩ q 6= 0.
/ If defined,
[[wantC ]]g (p)(a)(w) = 1 iff ∀q : q 6= p & q ∈ g(C) : p <DESa, w q.
(97) [[be necessaryC ]]g (p)(w) = 1 iff ∀q : q 6= p & q ∈ g(C) : p <LIKELYw q.
(Villalta, 2008, 482(42), notation adapted)
A modal predicate like be necessary differs from want in three respects according to
these proposals. First, it does not have an individual argument. Second, it does not include a precondition that restricts alternatives to ones that overlap with a set of beliefs.
And third, it compares alternatives based on likelihood instead of desirability. The notion
of likelihood that is used to discriminate between alternatives is “based on comparative
similarity (closeness to the actual world, cf. Lewis 1986)” (ibid., p. 483).
(98)

a. For any w, w0 , w00 ∈ W, w0 <w w00 iff w0 is closer to w than w00 .
b. For any p ⊆ W, q ⊆ W, p <LIKELYw q iff ∀w00 ∈ q ∃w0 ∈ p such that w0 <w w00 ,
and it is not the case that ∀w0 ∈ p ∃w00 ∈ q such that w00 <w w0 .
(Villalta, 2008, 482(42), notation adapted)

An immediate worry that arises is that this analysis creates an entailment relation between be necessary and be likely, a relation that does not exist in everyday English (in
contrast to modal logic). First, what is necessary may be unlikely:
(99)
13

a. Marijuana reform necessary, but unlikely.13

Opinion, http://www.thecorsaironline.com/opinion/marijuana-reform-necessary-butunlikely-1.1374244. Last accessed June 26, 2010.
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b. It is necessary, but unlikely that the countries who need such a central clearinghouse would actually take advantage of it.14
Second, what is likely may be unnecessary. Villalta’s picnic potluck scenario (see
above, p. 112) illustrates this point. Since the most likely event in that scenario is that
Sofı́a will bring ice cream, the semantics of be necessary in (97) seems to predict that It is
necessary that Sofia bring ice cream is necessarily true in the context. This is not the case,
however, even if Sofı́a does bring ice cream to the picnic in actuality.
Independently of the meaning of necessary, the definition of likelihood in (98) is problematic for the reason that it equates likelihood with greater similarity to the evaluation
world. As we know from good detective stories, the real world can be host to highly unlikely events:
There are certain worlds among the accessible worlds which are more farfetched than others. [. . . ] Far-fetched in respect to what? In respect to what
is the case in the real world? This can’t be true, since it seems quite natural
to say that something which was almost impossible, turned out to be the case.
Actually, it is things like this which usually happen in detective stories. The
most unlikely candidate is the murderer.
(Kratzer, 1981, §3)
An additional concern regarding the semantics in (97) has to do with the type of modality conveyed by necessary. Villalta’s proposal was made specifically in the context of
teleological interpretations of be necessary. This is not apparent in the denotation in (97),
but is somewhat more apparent in a proposal by Krasikova (2008), on which Villalta’s semantics for necessary is based. Krasikova (2008) proposes that the semantic contribution
of purpose clauses, whether overtly present or supplied by context, is to provide a standard of comparison to which the likelihood of the proposition embedded under the modal
is compared. The purpose clause is understood as setting a lower bound for the likelihood
14

On minefields in space, http://theconquestofspace.blogspot.com/2009_02_15_archive.
html. Last accessed June 26, 2010.
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of the proposition embedded under the modal. According to this view, modals like necessary “relate propositions to degrees of their comparative possibility in a given world”
(ibid., p. 346). I will not at this point delve deeper into the specifics of this proposal. This
would require at the very least clarifying how the likelihood of propositions is assumed
to be calculated, something which is not immediately clear from Krasikova’s presentation.
Some of the challenges facing a comparative probabilistic account of teleological modality
were discussed in Chapter 2 in connection with Finlay’s (2009, 2010) recent work (see
Section 2.2.1).
Based on English data, I argue instead that necessary is a priority type necessity modal
which, at least as a clausal operator, is primarily teleological.

3.2.2 Necessary that there be a goal
A rough guide to the semantics of necessary are its synonyms, a cohort which includes
the modal adjectives essential and crucial. Tracing the diachronic development of essential
and crucial in English, Van linden et al. (2008) explain how over time these adjectives have
developed what we would call teleological, or goal-oriented interpretations.15 The fact
that necessary is often provided in definitions of these two modals and offered as their
synonym (especially essential, see, e.g., the Oxford English Dictionary) suggests that it too
is a teleological modal, at least in some of its uses.
I will argue in what follows that necessary always depends on a priority to get its domain of quantification. In certain syntactic configurations (in particular, when it takes untensed that-clause complements or (for)-to-infinitives), this results in strictly goal-oriented
interpretations of the modal. This claim is new and surprising. It contradicts what seems
to be a common, if mostly silent, assumption that necessary is a general purpose (or poly15

They also conclude that the adjectives have undergone a further semantic change and are able to express
deontic modality as well. See Section 4.4 for arguments against this conclusion.
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functional) necessity modal which can be used deontically and even non-circumstantially
in appropriate contexts.
Intuitively, it is impossible to decide if something is (or is not) necessary without first
specifying what it is necessary for. Suppose we had in front of us a few drops of lemon
juice. We could run a series of tests on the juice to measure some of its properties: the
degree to which it is yellow, transparent, heavy, or sour. We could not, however, measure
the degree to which the juice is “necessary.” The only way to make sense of a claim that
lemon juice is necessary, as in (100), is to evaluate if it follows from the achievement of
some priority or goal. In this example, the relevant priority is to prepare poppy seed tea.
(100)

Is lemon juice necessary when preparing poppy seed tea/wash?16

Being necessary is not a property that entities or events have independent of a particular
priority. Sometimes the priority is made explicit in a rationale clause, as in the notice below.

Figure 3.2: Goal-oriented necessary. Here in construction with a rationale clause to keep
the bagshare up and running (August 2010, Serio’s Market, Northampton, Mass.).

A surprising finding is that deontic interpretations of necessary are ruled out when the
modal takes an untensed that-clause complement. This is surprising on the traditional view,
16

Adapted from http://www.bluelight.ru/vb/showthread.php?t=236007.
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where all root (or non-epistemic) modality types are grouped together in one natural class,
generating the expectation that a polyfunctional modal will allow different root interpretations in different contexts of utterance. Consider (101). Rationing food is a teleological
necessity if one’s priority is to survive a famine. It can also be a deontic necessity, e.g., if
there are rules mandating the rationing during that time. Both (101b) and (101a) would be
true in such a situation, but for different reasons. Whereas (101a) describes the content of
a law, (101b) describes survival during difficult times.
(101)

During the famine, . . .
a. . . . it was mandated by law that food be rationed.
b. . . . it was necessary that food be rationed (and retired laboratory animals eaten).

Next, consider (102). This example shows that necessary that q cannot convey the
deontic necessity that mandated by law that q does. The context in this example supports
food rationing as a deontic necessity (and therefore (102a) is clearly true). But since the
priority of survival can be reached without food rationing, the teleological necessity based
on survival is false.
(102) Years of plenty. After the famine ended there was plenty of food again for everybody, but the law hadn’t changed for a while.
During that interim period, . . .
a. . . . it was mandated by law that food be rationed.
b. . . . it was necessary that food be rationed.
Why are we still hesitant to say that (102b) is false – full stop – in this context? The
reason is that necessary depends on a priority, and a different priority could make the
sentence true. In particular, since the prejacent to the modal matches what is deontically
necessary in the scenario, the preference of abiding by the law would do the trick. Imagine
that (102b) is uttered by a lawmaker who is an adamant believer in upholding and enforcing
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the law. (102b) is true in the context of (102) if necessary means “necessary in order to
behave in accordance with the law.” To the extent that we are willing to judge (101b)/(102b)
as “deontic,” it is not because the modal describes the content of the law in these examples
(this necessary cannot do), but rather because it is restricted by a priority that exists because
the law exists, as a side-effect if you will.17
Another kind of apparent non-teleological use of necessary is common in the writings
of logicians (103), who use this modal in an alethic sense. Alethic modality (from the
Greek word for ‘truth’) is the philosophical modality of modal logic, the modality used
to talk about what is “necessarily true” (Gamut, 1991, Vol. 2, 30). In its alethic use, is
necessary can often be paraphrased as is a necessary fact.
(103)

a. It is necessary that gold has atomic number 79.18
b. If something is necessary, then it is necessarily so.19
c. It is possible that you don’t understand me, but it isn’t necessary.20

How do these uses fit the generalization that necessary is teleological in nature? First,
note that the modal’s prejacent in (103) (a, and elided in c) is tensed.21 This type of complement is not natural in everyday non-technical English. (In the OED, alethic-type interpretations are associated specifically with uses of the adjective in philosophical and theological
discourse; s.v. necessary, adj., senses III 6. a. and III 6. b.) When we give the modal an
untensed that-clause complement, we see that necessary, the adjective, is degraded as an
17

See Chapter 4 for further discussion.

18

Halbach and Welch (2009, 72).

19

Gamut (1991, Vol. 2, 21).

20

Gamut (1991, Vol. 2, 21).

21

Brennan (1993) notes that epistemic interpretations of necessary that are found only when the modal’s
complement is tensed (p. 88, note 19). Portner (2009) groups alethic modality in the same class as
epistemic modality (suggesting factual modality as a term that covers the two types and perhaps others;
p. 135).
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alethic modal in comparison to the adverb necessarily. Consider (104), a pair inspired by
the example in (103a).
(104)

If this particle is Helium, then . . .
a. . . . necessarily it has atomic number 2.
b. . . . ? it is necessary that it have atomic number 2.

The sentences in (105) make the same point for the culinary inclined. Using necessary
in the consequent clause invites the interpretation that containing olives is somehow useful
(for the spread, for reaching some goal). But we have no clue as to what this usefulness is
about, and the result is that (105b) sounds strange and is degraded with respect to (105a).
Furthermore, the comparison between (105b) and (105c) highlights the fact that a teleological interpretation (where the goal is provided in the if -clause) restores the acceptability of
necessary in the main clause.
(105)

a. If this spread is a tapenade, then it necessarily contains olives.
b.

? If

this spread is a tapenade, then it is necessary that it contain olives.

c. If you want to call this a tapenade, then it is necessary that it contain olives.
From a purely logical perspective, there are reasons to treat phrases in which the adjective necessary is interpreted in an alethic sense as standing in for (perhaps as a shorthand
for) phrases including necessarily and a predicate of truth. The argument for considering
this substitution comes from quantificational statements involving alethic necessary (e.g.,
All theorems of Peano arithmetic are necessary), which cannot be formalized in a firstorder logic augmented with a necessity modal operator, 2 (“box”). Halbach and Welch
(2009) argue that replacing is necessary by is necessarily true in such statements solves the
formalization problem and is furthermore technically feasible.
Let’s set aside alethic uses of necessary, then.
The goal-oriented generalization still falls short of explaining the interpretation of necessary in other syntactic configurations, and as an attributive modifier in particular. Mod124

ifying nouns like result and consequence, the modal is used to qualify events as being
“inevitably determined or produced by a previous state of things” or “occurring as the next
logical step in a sequence of events” (OED, s.v. necessary, adj., sense III 6. c.)22
(106)

a. The Sitwells are known to everyone who has even a casual acquaintance with
modern literature . . . This is a necessary consequence of the Sitwellian methods of publicity. (OED 1927)
b. Along with references to the traditional rise and fall of fortune, there is a tendency to regard the rise of Bullingbrook as a necessary result of Richard’s
negligence. (OED 1992)

Descriptively, when necessary modifies nouns of result and consequence, it evaluates
accessible possibilities of the kind described by the complement to the noun. One might
argue that even in this case the modal does its ordinary job, except that the “goal” it is
oriented to is of a circumstantial nature. I leave the details of this argument for future
work.
The teleological generalization thus applies primarily to the interpretation of necessary
when it takes tenseless clauses as complements. This interpretation is evident even in examples like (107), which are designed to encourage a dynamic, dispositional-type, reading of
the modal (see Brennan 1993, 88, note 19). There is nevertheless a hint of goal-orientation
even here: the sentence conveys that signing is good for Peter, or sits well with his personality, not merely that he is disposed to do it (compare to dispositional will in In view of his
personality, Peter will sign whatever he’s presented with).
(107)

It is necessary, in view of his personality, for Peter to sign whatever he’s presented
with.
(Brennan, 1993, 88)

22

This meaning is arguably found also in Gamut’s (103c) above, especially once we consider this paraphrase of that sentence: It is possible that you don’t understand me, but it isn’t (a) necessary (result).
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Finally, necessary is goal-oriented where a more polyfunctional necessity modal like
have to can be purely circumstantial. Have to can be used to express the circumstantial
necessity that non-parallel lines intersect (108a), or that I can’t help sneezing when I’m out
in the sun (109a). In the corresponding sentences with necessary, the modality is teleological and the sentences invite a What for? follow-up. (109b) cannot be used to express an
incontrollable urge to sneeze, for example, but suggests that sneezing is a necessity in light
of achieving some goal, e.g., making it difficult to hear what someone next to me is about
to say.
(108)

a. If these lines are not parallel, they have to intersect at some point.
b. If these lines are not parallel, it is necessary that they intersect at some point.

(109)

a. I have to sneeze.
b. It is necessary for me to sneeze.

3.2.3

Want, necessary, and ought: similarities and differences

A lexical entry for necessary must capture the observation that the modal is teleological,
and thus different from a polyfunctional necessity modal like have to. What complicates
the task of writing down a lexical entry is that both of these modals are strong necessity
modals (in the sense of Chapter 2), as we will now see.

3.2.3.1

Necessary is a strong necessity modal

How does necessary compare in strength to other necessity modals in the inventory of
English? Is it strong, like have to, or weak, like ought?
Entailment patterns that have been used in the literature to establish the weakness of
ought fail to detect weakness with necessary. For example, (111) is just as contradictory
as (110b), suggesting that must, have to, and necessary all express strong necessity.
(110)

a. You ought to take the train, but you don’t have to.
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b.

# You

must take the train, but you don’t have to.

(Following von Fintel and Iatridou 2008; see (5) in Chapter 2)
# It’s

(111)

necessary that you take the train, but you don’t have to.

There is an interesting caveat to the claim above. A sentence of the form necessary q
can be true while the corresponding sentence with have to is false, but only when the modals
wear their restrictions on their sleeves, so to speak. Thus, (112a) may be a conjunction of
true teleological claims, but take away the phrases that describe the different backgrounds
for the modals and you end up with a contradiction (112b).
(112)

a. You don’t have to take the train (you can also drive there or fly), but it’s necessary for reducing (/if you want to reduce) your carbon footprint.
b.

3.2.3.2

# You

don’t have to take the train, but it’s necessary.

Preliminary lexical entry for necessary

The claim that necessary is a strong necessity modal raises the following analytical
puzzles:
i. Assuming that teleological modality is analyzed as quantification over a restricted
domain of accessible worlds (namely, those in which certain priorities are achieved),
why does domain restriction lead to weakness in the case of ought, but not in the case
of necessary?
ii. How does the fact that necessary is primarily teleological relate to its being strong?
How does the fact that ought is weak relate to the fact that it admits epistemic interpretations?
I address these puzzles by referring to the distinction between negotiable (secondary)
and non-negotiable (primary) priorities defended in the previous chapter, and add a twist.
The basic idea is to relativize necessary just to primary ordering sources, namely those
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which are represented in the context and contain priorities that are presupposed to be collectively committed to in the conversation. This will account for the observation that the
modal is strong.
To explain the inability of necessary to receive pure circumstantial and dispositional
interpretations, I propose that the modal places a further condition on the context, requiring
it to provide a set of favored worlds (determined by f C and < g1 , . . . , gi > in C) that is a
subset of the worlds determined just by the modal base (i.e., by f C alone). This boils down
to a requirement that the ordering sources in < g1 , . . . , gi > be non-empty and non-trivial.
Have to, in contrast, places no restrictions on the contextual parameters it draws on and
is thus able to expresses necessities that characterize the set of modal base worlds in its
entirety, as in the case of pure circumstantial and dispositional modalities.
The condition placed by necessary cannot be as simple as < g1 , . . . , gi > being nonempty, however. After all, nothing prevents a non-empty, non-trivial, stereotypical ordering
source (implicated in an epistemic claim) or an ordering source representing relevant rules
(implicated in a deontic claim) from being represented in the context as primary ordering
sources. But even in such contexts, necessary is interpreted in relation to a priority, and
that priority goes beyond what the stereotypical or deontic ordering source provide. The
sentences in (99) are relevant examples of the first kind: the author that claims that Marijuana reform necessary, but unlikely is clearly attuned not just to the possibilities opened
up by the relevant circumstances, but also to what is likely and unlikely to take place. His
necessity claim is thus sensitive to a modal base, a stereotypical ordering source, and some
additional priorities that further restrict the possibilities that count as “favored” (in all of
these, there is marijuana reform). Necessary adds these additional priorities to the context.
I thus propose to incorporate the following additional ingredient into necessary’s lexical
entry: an update of the sequence of primary ordering sources with a new ordering source,
last in the sequence, that represents the additional priorities the modal is sensitive to.
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These ideas about necessary motivate the proposal of the preliminary lexical entry in
(113). According to this proposal, the modal has the same truth conditional contribution
as have to, but different presuppositions. Accepting the necessity claim amounts to confirmation of the contextual update effected by necessary, which is the addition of a new final
primary ordering source to the context.23 I assume that propositions in this primary ordering source are relevant to the question under discussion, just as ought’s secondary priorities
are.
(113)

(Preliminary proposal)
[[necessary]]C = λ q<s,t> λ w.∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w).q(w0 ), where b is a pertinent answer to QUDC and g such that g(w) = {b} is a new final ordering source in
< g1 , . . . , gi >.

A prediction of this analysis is that necessary is a performative modal, and moreover a
performative modal whose performativity originates in the semantics, not in the pragmatics
of conversation. This aspect of its meaning is predicted to be the main factor distinguishing
necessary from ought. This seems intuitively correct, as the contrast between the pair in
(114) suggests: the organizers of the bagshare chose to say (114a), not (114b). They use a
teleological modal that can force their priorities into the “conversation” with their patrons.
(114)

[The bagshare scenario of Figure 3.2.]
a. It is necessary for the bags to come back.
b. The bags ought to come back.

Taking stock of what we have explained about the different necessity modals, note that
there is still a piece that needs to be filled in. The observation that necessary is primarily
teleological, an important aspect of the modal’s meaning that I have argued for, is unexplained by the lexical entry in (113). Specifically, it is unexpected that a modal with such a
23

I thank Paul Portner for discussion of this point.
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Modal

Presupposition

Truth conditional contribution

necessary
have to
ought to
want

gCi+1 (w) = {b}, b is pertinent to QUDC
(no presupposition)
b is secondary, b is pertinent to QUDC
T
g = DESa, w , q isn’t settled in f (w) ∩ Doxa (w)

∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w).q(w0 )
∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w).q(w0 )
∀w0 : w0 ∈ FavC (w) ∩ b.q(w0 )
∀w0 : w0 ∈ maxg ( f (w)).q(w0 )

Table 3.1: Microvariation among necessity modals and attitudes of desire. Three types of
necessity modals and want compared.

lexical entry would not be able to express epistemic and deontic modalities. No problem,
one might suggest; simply add a lexical specification of this restriction to the preliminary
denotation in (113). While this move might be appropriate for necessary – perhaps this
modal is simply lexically restricted to one particular type of modality – I choose not to
adopt this solution. In light of the evidence to be presented in Chapter 4, I believe that this
aspect of the adjective’s meaning will receive a grammatical explanation.

3.2.3.3

Conclusion

I conclude the chapter with a side-by-side comparison of the key players in our discussion so far: the strong necessity modals necessary and have to, the weak necessity modal
ought, and the desire verb want (Table 3.1).
Three types of necessity modals have emerged from our discussion: ones that place no
restrictions on the possibilities they quantify over (e.g., have to), ones that require context to
highlight a way of restricting the domain of relevant possibilities (e.g., necessary), and ones
that rely on extra-contextual assumptions to achieve their restricted domain (e.g., ought to).
Attitudes of desire are unique among this group of predicates in relying on an attitude holder to acquire their ordering sources. However, the propositions in these ordering
sources are similar in nature to the secondary priorities that weak necessity modals are rel-
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ativized to. An individual’s desires, like secondary priorities, are typically not part of the
collectively committed to information.
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CHAPTER 4
A GRAMMATICAL CONSTRAINT ON THE INTERPRETATION
OF ROOT MODALS

The optimist says, “The glass is half full.”
The pessimist says, “The glass is half empty.”
The rationalist says, “This glass is twice as big
as it needs to be.”
Thomas Cathcart & Daniel Klein, Plato and a
platypus walk into a bar . . . (2007)

An interesting perspective on the relationship between modals and attitude predicates is provided by versatile modal words – words that compose
with multiple types of syntactic complements and express a variety of modality types. One can need a car and need to have a car in English, and a common
assumption is that these phrases mean the same thing. This chapter substantiates a semantic argument against the belief that transitive configurations of
intensional verbs are equivalent semantically to the infinitival configuration
of the same verbs. Based on experimental and crosslinguistic data, I show that
different subtypes of root modality are expressed in different syntactic configurations of versatile modals. When versatile modals take nominal complements,
they are shown to allow teleological interpretations and to resist deontic interpretations. When their complements are verbal, this limitation is lifted and the
modal is free to pick up on a range of priorities and deontic sources that are
available in the context. The recurrence of the phenomenon across languages
motivates a new look at the syntax-semantics mapping of root modals and the
limits of their context dependency.
How fine-grained is the sensitivity of natural language to different varieties of modality
types (modal “flavors”)? Obviously, our lexicons keep track of very fine-grained distinctions when it comes to modals and attitude predicates. We can talk about wanting things,
craving them, hoping for them, yearning for them, and having a host of other subtly different attitudes of desire towards them. We have no trouble keeping track of these subtle
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differences, which means that they must be encoded in our knowledge of our native language. The question about the sensitivity of the grammar to such distinctions is much more
interesting. Is there corresponding evidence that the grammar is sensitive to distinctions between subtly different types of modality? If so, what is the level of granularity with which
it allows us, the language users, to make distinctions among modal possibilities?
A test case that addresses one aspect of these broad questions is the distinction between
deontic and goal-oriented modalities. These sub-varieties are usually only distinguished
on conceptual grounds: the former is the modality of possibilities determined by rules
and norms; the latter is the modality of possibilities determined by goals and preferences
more generally. Portner (2009) suggests the term priority modalities to refer to deontic,
teleological, and desire-based modalities. Conceptually, these are the modalities that allow
us to talk about what would be possible or necessary if some priority (be it a desire, a
directive, or a goal) were to materialize. There are modals that are not restricted in the
range of priority modalities they can express in context, e.g., need to below.
(115)

Do we need to install a power outlet in the bathroom?
a. Yes, to get the house up to code. (deontic interpretation)
b. Yes, to put a digital picture frame in there. (teleological/bouletic interpretation)

In the literature, deontic and teleological varieties of priority modality are sometimes
not distinguished at all (Palmer 2001 is a notable example). If they are, the difference between them is usually not tied to semantic properties of the word introducing the modality.
For Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012) and much of the formal literature on modality, both deontic and teleological modals are analyzed as circumstantial modals that employ an ordering
source to rank their accessible worlds. Since the choice of ordering source is open to contextual pressure, the resolution of modal flavor is not made in the grammar. A grammatical
split among priority modals is not acknowledged even in theories that grant the grammar a
role in the calculation of modality types. Root modals in Cinque’s “Universal Hierarchy of
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Clausal Functional Projections” come in three varieties: ability, obligation, and permission
(Cinque 1999, and especially Cinque 2006, 92). The latter two seem to cover both deontic and teleological modalities, distinguishing modals only according to force. Hacquard
(2006, 2009) offers an inspiring approach to understanding the syntactic-semantic basis
of modality types, but she too does not draw a distinction between teleological modals
and the conceptually similar class of “ought-to-do” deontics.1 Existing theories generate
the expectation that a modal that is not lexically restricted to expressing a specific priority
modality type should be open to contextual influence on its interpretation. If the modal can
be interpreted teleologically in some syntactic configuration, it is expected to give rise to
deontic interpretations in that configuration as well, given appropriate contextual support.
The goal of this chapter is to show that the context dependency of root modals is restricted grammatically, since the syntactic configuration a modal appears in influences its
ability to express the full range of priority modalities. The argument is based on the extent
to which need and modals like it across languages can express deontic and teleological
modalities.2 I observe that need can express both sub-varieties of priority modality when
its complement is an infinitival clause, and that one particular sub-variety, namely deontic
modality, cannot be expressed when the modal’s complement is a noun phrase. This basic observation is presented in Section 4.1. Section 4.1.2 sharpens the distinction between
teleological modality and deontic modality and specifies the properties of contexts that can
be used to tease them apart. The relevant types of contexts are then used in two controlled
experiments to investigate the interpretation of need with infinitival and DP complements
(Section 4.1.3). The results of these experiments show a clear difference in the modal
potential of need depending on the syntactic category of its complement.
1

See also Brennan (1993), Barbiers (1995, 2002).

2

I assume that desires are a special type of goal (one that can be associated with a desiring agent) and
will thus not distinguish between teleological and bouletic modalities in the discussion. These two subvarieties of priority modality are hard to tease apart in many examples and should not be thought of as
mutually exclusive categories (Portner, 2009, 185).
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The second part of the chapter extends the empirical basis of the generalization to additional syntactic configurations (Section 4.2) and to additional languages (Section 4.3). The
basic correlation between type of modality and type of modal complement is observed in
Hindi-Urdu and Hebrew (with suggestive data from Czech). These languages also show
clearly that tenseless complementizer phrases (CPs) pattern with noun phrases in disallowing deontic interpretations of a modal they are in construction with (Section 4.4).
The empirical findings are stated as a generalization about the syntax-semantics mapping of modals and attitude verbs (Section 4.5). Several hypotheses about the source of
this generalization are described and evaluated in the course of the discussion, although the
theoretical basis for the generalization remains undetermined in the present work.

4.1

The basic observation: need to versus need

The empirical focus of the chapter is the expression of priority modality by necessity
modals like need. In terms of the strength of necessity it expresses, need groups with strong
necessity modals like have to and necessary.3 If my proposal in Chapter 2 is on the right
track, this means that it is sensitive to priorities that are presupposed in the conversation to
be collectively committed to by the conversational participants, or ones that are forced into
collective commitment following acceptance of the modal claim:
(116)

[Mother to her stubborn child:]
a. You have to eat your spinach!

3

Both need to and need with a DP complement pattern with strong necessity modals on the following
diagnostic of strength (see discussion of necessary in Chapter 3, p. 126):
(i)

(ii)

a. You ought to take the train, but you don’t have to.
b.

# You

must take the train, but you don’t have to.

a.

# You

need to take the train, but you don’t have to.

b.

# You

need the A train, but you don’t have to take the A train.
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b. It’s necessary that you eat your spinach!
c. You need to eat your spinach!
Things get a bit more interesting when we investigate the types of modalities the modal
expresses. When it takes infinitival complements, need is closer in its modal potential to
have to, but in other syntactic configurations it is more similar to teleological necessary.
What looks like a grammatically conditioned variability in modal potential will be the focus
of this chapter.
In English, we can appreciate the grammatical influence on need’s interpretation by
comparing sentences in which the modal’s complement is a to-infinitive and minimally
different ones in which the modal’s complement is a noun phrase. Compare the modal
question in (115) above with the corresponding question in (117) (A’s first utterance in the
dialog). The crucial difference between these question is the type of complement that need
takes in each. In terms of their meaning, need with a nominal complement is a strictly
teleological modal. If there is no reason to put in an outlet, then B is justified in concluding
that they don’t need an outlet. The modal is resistant to deontic interpretations in this
configuration. Even after A brings up a relevant rule, this rule is not immediately available
to serve as a background for interpreting the phrase need an outlet. In contrast to need with
a DP complement, need to has less problem receiving the missing deontic interpretation (as
in (115) above and in A’s final utterance in (117)).
(117) Outlets. There is a tiny bathroom in A and B’s garage. It is never used.
A: Do we need a power outlet in the bathroom?
B: No. I can’t think of any reason for putting one in there.
A: Doesn’t the building code require that there be an outlet in every bathroom?
B: Maybe, but it makes no sense. We don’t need an outlet down there.
A: Still, we need to install one.
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Note that need to in A’s final utterance in (117) gives rise to a necessity statement that is
almost as weak as the corresponding claim with ought to in (118). In both cases A bases the
final necessity claim on a priority related to the content of a regulation that is not endorsed
by her interlocutor, but only the need to statement has the performative effect of forcing
collective commitment to the regulation, postfactum. Consequently, if it is the case that we
need to install an outlet, it is also the case that we ought to do so, but the reverse does not
hold.
(118)

A: Doesn’t the building code require that there be an outlet in every bathroom?
B: Maybe, but it makes no sense. We don’t need an outlet down there.
A: Still, we ought to install one.

The dialog could also have evolved in a different direction after A brought up the rule
pertaining to power outlets. In (119), B accepts the relevance of the rule and uses the phrase
need an outlet to describe a necessity that follows from it.
(119)

A: Doesn’t the building code require that there be an outlet in every bathroom?
B: Okay, so maybe we do need an outlet down there.

Isn’t this an example of the modal taking a nominal complement and expressing deontic
modality? I will maintain that the modality in this kind of example remains teleological,
despite the reference to the content of the law. B’s utterance of okay, so . . . before the
need claim signals acceptance of the law as relevant for the deliberation, and commitment
to it. This move triggers a change in the priorities that are presupposed to be collectively
committed to, which in turn results in a change in the truth value of the modal statement in
the scenario. I will call this a pseudo-deontic interpretation: a goal-oriented interpretation
with a goal of abiding by the law. Changes in the committed to priorities bring out the
differences between deontics and pseudo-deontics in contexts like (117) (see Section 4.1.2).
The basic observation, to summarize, is that when the rules conflict with the priorities
that are presupposed to be collectively committed to in a context (i.e., the primary prior137

ities), a phrase like need a power outlet seems restricted to describing necessities in line
with the contextual priorities. In the very same context, need to install a power outlet
has access to the primary priorities as well as to contextually salient rules and regulations,
even if these are not presupposed to be collectively committed to before the modal claim
is uttered. The modal verb need is thus able to express more varieties of priority modality
when its complement is an infinitival; we may say that it has “greater modal potential” in
this configuration. Importantly, these examples show that the ban on deontic interpretations is not a lexical property of the modal. Quite the contrary, speakers of English have
plenty of evidence that need can express deontic modality in certain configurations. It will
be my working hypothesis that the restriction to teleological modality in construction with
nominal complements is a fact to be given a grammatical explanation.

4.1.1

Syntactic and semantic versatility

Modals that are of interest for testing grammatical constraints on the expression of priority modality are what I will call versatile modals. Versatility of a modal is both syntactic
and semantic, as follows.
i. Syntactic versatility: the modal takes verbal complements (e.g., infinitival phrases,
or IPs) as well as nominal complements (e.g., noun phrases, or DPs, and in some
languages also CPs).
ii. Semantic versatility: the modal allows teleological, deontic, and epistemic/circumstantial
interpretations with verbal complements.
English need is a versatile modal according to this definition. It takes both verbal
and nominal complements and exhibits the full range of modal interpretations with verbal
complements.
(120) Syntactic versatility of need:
a. I need to have a cup of coffee. (verbal complement)
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b. I need a cup of coffee. (nominal complement)
(121) Semantic versatility of need:
a. The soup tastes like water. There needs to be more salt in it. (teleological)
b. There needs to be more than one way to enter and exit each room in the building. (deontic)
c. According to the map, there needs to be a bus stop around the corner. (epistemic)
d. I really need to sneeze. (circumstantial)
It is noteworthy that epistemic interpretations of need to are rare and atypical (Smith,
2003),4 but even so, English speakers have evidence that need can accommodate many
different types of modality. It is thus all the more surprising that in one specific syntactic
configuration, the nominal complement construction of (120b), this richness disappears.
Note that I will refrain from calling this construction “transitive,” since some of the modals
we will discuss outside of English do not exhibit transitive syntax in the relevant configuration. That is, in some languages, the subject of the modal ‘need’ that takes nominal
complements does not receive nominative case and the nominal complement itself does
not receive accusative case (Harves 2008, Harves and Kayne 2012). Indeed, one result of
this chapter is that the modal potential of versatile modals with nominal complements is
restricted in exactly the same way crosslinguistically, regardless of the case marking on the
subject and object noun phrases in construction with the modal.

4.1.2

Deontic and teleological modalities

In the previous chapter, I drew a distinction between the sub-varieties of root modality
that are expressed by the modal adjectives mandatory and necessary (see (102)). While
4

The possibility of using need to when the modality is keyed to some body of evidence seems to depend on temporal orientation. Typical examples of epistemic reasoning are past-oriented and cannot be
expressed using need to.
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the existence of a law is enough to make a statement with mandatory true, it is not always
enough to make a corresponding statement with necessary true. The example we looked
at is repeated in (122): since an abundance of food means that there are multiple ways
for people to survive without rationing, a teleological claim oriented toward the priority
of survival is false in the context of (122). However, necessary can come quite close to
expressing the rule-based meaning that is conveyed by mandatory. This happens when the
priority it orients to is a priority of conforming to the law. For example, it is necessary
that food be rationed even in times of plenty if a desire for political order and lawful conduct is an operative priority. I concluded in Section 3.2.2 that necessary is a teleological
modal, in the sense that it is always interpreted with respect to a priority (either contextually
determined, or specified overtly, as in a rationale clause).
(122)

[For a certain period of time in the aftermath of a famine, rules mandating food
rationing were still in effect although food was already in large supply.]
During the interim period, it was {mandated by law, necessary} that food be rationed.

The ability to use the law as a source for the formation of priorities creates an affinity
between deontic and teleological modalities that makes it difficult to distinguish between
them in many cases (von Fintel and Iatridou 2005a, §5.5, Hacquard 2006). Hacquard (2006)
makes this point with respect to “ought-to-do” deontics (Feldman, 1986): deontic modals
that affirm a connection between an individual and a state of affairs.
In fact, many instances of ought-to-do deontics can be reduced to goaloriented modality, where the goal is unpronounced and often deals with avoiding some kind of punishment. The following sentence is not so much a statement about what the laws of this world look like, but rather a statement of what
I need to do, given a certain body of laws and regulations in effect in the actual
world, in order for me not to get a ticket: [. . . ] I have to take out the trash on
Wednesdays.
(Hacquard, 2006, 41)
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The famine context in (122) and the power outlet scenario in (117) are examples of a
type of context that is particularly useful in teasing apart deontic and teleological modalities. They present scenarios in which an original set of primary priorities is in conflict
with what the law provides in the scenario. (In the first scenario, there are ways to survive
without rationing food; in the second, there is no reason to follow protocol and install a
power outlet in a room that nobody uses.) A contextual shift in the primary priorities is
required in such scenarios for a teleological modal to be made sensitive to a priority that
derives from the law. Detecting a shift in priorities prior to the utterance of the modal is an
indication that the modal has received a pseudo-deontic interpretation, since a preparatory
priority shift is not required for the expression of true deontic modality.
Scenarios in which deontic and teleological modalities can be distinguished will be
called (+content/-preferences) scenarios, referring to the tension between what is lawfully
prescribed in them (the content of the law) and what the primary priorities are taken to
be (the preferences). In such scenarios, the set of favored worlds varies depending on
whether the law or other priorities are used to order the worlds determined by the relevant
circumstances.
Shifts in the contextual priorities are often not recorded in the speech signal, but sometimes they are. A shift is overtly indicated in (119), for example, where an acceptance
move (Okay, so . . . ) follows the mention of a rule that is relevant for the deliberation. A
plausible interpretation of B’s acceptance move in this dialog is that it indicates a change
in the priorities he endorses. This effects a change on what the collectively committed to
priorities are presupposed to be in the context.
All else being equal, if there is no indication of a shift in priorities, a strictly teleological
strong necessity modal is expected to be somewhat infelicitous in a (+content/-preferences)
scenario. This infelicity is subtle, but it can be detected by direct comparison of strictly
teleological and strictly deontic necessity modals, as we have done with necessary and
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mandatory in the famine scenario. In the next section, we will see that it is also psycholinguistically real.
Section 4.1.3 presents experimental evidence that need in its nominal complement construction is infelicitous in (+content/-preferences) scenarios in comparison to need taking
verbal complements.

4.1.3

Experimental findings

Two experiments were designed were designed to test the correlation between the syntactic configuration of need and its semantic interpretation in different contexts.5 The results obtained provide quantitative evidence, first, that the nominal complement construction of need is naturally used to express teleological modality, and, second, that need to is
significantly more open to expressing deontic modality than need complemented by a noun
phrase.

4.1.3.1

Participants

40 undergraduate students from the University of Massachusetts Amherst participated
in the two experiments reported here. The students were all native speakers of American
English. They were compensated with course credit for their participation.

4.1.3.2

Materials

Two experiments were designed to test the correlation between the syntactic configuration of need and the range of modal meanings it allows. Each experiment consisted of
twelve test items which took the form of a short paragraph followed by a target sentence, as
shown in (123). The complement to need in the target sentence varied between an infinitive
(the IP condition: needs to take the coconut cake) and a noun phrase (the DP condition:
needs the coconut cake).
5

This study was presented at the 23rd Annual CUNY Conference on Human Sentence Processing (Rubinstein, 2010).
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In both experiments, the verb in the complement to need was have in half of the items
and take in the other half. This variability resulted in stimuli that sounded natural yet were
able to express similar semantic relations, as described below.
(123)

This weekend the local community center is organizing a cake exchange event.
Everyone who comes brings a homemade cake and gets someone else’s cake in
return. The exchange is determined randomly in a drawing. When Sharon saw
what she had just won she was very upset: it was the coconut cake – the flavor she
hates most of all!
a. Sharon needs to take the coconut cake. (IP condition)
b. Sharon needs the coconut cake. (DP condition)

Stimuli were based on only two meanings that the polysemous verbs have and take can
express: the meaning of possession (as in needs to take the coconut cake) and the light-verb
meaning of undergoing or experiencing an event (as in needs to take a nap). Items in the
DP condition were able to express the same lexical relations of possession and undergoing
as their IP condition counterparts.6
Contexts in Experiment 1 described (+content/-preferences) situations. Like (123),
these were scenarios in which certain external rules or regulations were in conflict with
a salient priority of an individual in the scenario. There were a total of twelve items in this
experiment, six with have in the IP condition and six with take. Half of the have items
6

The observation that the full polysemy of lexical meanings associated with overt have (take) is also
available when the light verb seems to be missing has been used to argue for the existence of a covert
‘have’ (‘take’) in the nominal complement construction of verbs like want. For example, Harley (2004)
argues that, “[. . . ] John wants Mary or Jim wanted the apple pie is multiply ambiguous in exactly the
same way that John wants to have Mary or Jim wanted to have the apple pie is, making the notion that
want introduces have into the interpretation of [want DP] very plausible” (ibid., p. 259). More on this
below.
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described a possession relation and half described an undergoing relation. Among the take
items, two described an undergoing, and four described (grabbing into) possession.7
Participants were asked to rate how well the target sentence in each item fit with the
preceding short story, on a scale of 1 (Poorly) to 5 (Very well). We expected that sentences
would be judged as congruent with stories in the IP condition, and incongruent in the DP
condition.
Experiment 2 was used to further probe the interpretation possibilities of need in its two
syntactic configurations. Items took the same format as in Experiment 1, namely a short
story and a target sentence followed by a rating question about the fit between the story and
the sentence. However, the stories in Experiment 2 described scenarios of a different kind,
ones in which external rules or regulations were in agreement with the salient priorities
(124). Scenarios of this kind, which we might classify as (+content/+preferences), support
both a deontic and a teleological interpretation of need. The ratings of fit between stories
and target sentences were thus expected to be uniformly on the side of congruence in this
experiment, with nominal complement need picking up on the preferences given in the
story, and need to picking up on either the preferences or the content of the rules at play.
(124)

It is a rule at Sarah’s house that everyone naps for at least one hour between 2 and
4 in the afternoon. It’s 2pm, and Sarah just got back from a long day trip with her
friends. She is particularly tired right now because she also didn’t get much sleep
last night.
a. Sarah needs to take a nap. (IP condition)
b. Sarah needs a nap. (DP condition)

(125)

Why does Sarah need to take a nap?
a. Because of the rules of the house. (Deontic reason)

7

There is no good reason for this imbalance of senses except for the fact that I was guided by the naturalness of the target sentences in the design of scenarios. In Experiment 2, the relations were equally
represented for take, but not for have (there were 4 examples of undergoing and 2 of possession).
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b. Because she is tired. (Teleological reason)
As a window into the interpretation actually assigned by participants to target sentences,
every rating question in Experiment 2 was followed by a forced choice comprehension
question (Experiment 2’). (125) provides an example. The version of the question shown
is from an item in the IP condition, and one should keep in mind that the syntactic configuration of need in the follow up question always matched the one in the sentence rated
for fit. Items in the DP condition were expected to allow only an interpretation which was
based on the salient priority in the scenario, while those in the IP condition were expected
to be consistent with either this priority or the content of the rule that was described. The
option describing rules or regulations was always presented first in order to make sure that
it was read and considered in the IP condition even though the teleological reasons would
have been an appropriate choice there too.
Target sentences in both experiments were inflected with present tense and had a bisyllabic feminine proper name as subject.
In addition to the experimental items, 10 filler items were included that were similar
in form and length to the items in the two experiments. The fillers were created with two
requirements in mind. First, they were to show that a verbal complement to need may be
incongruent with a preceding scenario. Since, in both experiments, items in the IP condition
always resulted in congruent discourses, it was necessary to deter participants from using
this incorrect generalization to inform their responses. The scenarios in these filler items
would be characterized as (-content/-preferences). Four fillers had this property. As for
need with a nominal complement, items from Experiment 1 will have provided evidence
for the possibility of a negative rating of congruence in the DP condition. A second group
of fillers was designed for the forced choice task that, unlike items in Experiment 2, were
not compatible with both answers to the question. In particular, the contexts given in these
fillers were incompatible with needs that were based on rules or regulations. Two were of
the (-content/-preferences) type, and two were of the (-content/+preferences) type. These
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fillers were included in order to verify that participants were not picking the first answer
across the board, i.e. the answer based on a deontic interpretation. The remaining four
fillers featured the verb want in its transitive construction, and were similar in form to
items in the DP condition.
Each participant responded to a total of 24 experimental items and 10 fillers in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 together. Items within each experiment, filler items, and items
from three unrelated experiments were mixed and randomized for each participant. The
choice of items for a participant was determined based on their number in the experiment:
Subject 1 was given the first condition of item 1, the second condition of item 2, the first
condition of item 3, etc. Subject 2 was given the second condition of item 1, the first
condition of item 2, and so forth.
The experiments were implemented using the block reading template in the software
package Linger (version 2.94).

4.1.3.3

Procedure

Participants read items on a computer screen and used numbers on a keyboard to indicate their responses. For any given item, the scenario, the target sentence, the question
introducing the rating scale, and the rating scale appeared all at once on the screen. For
those items that included a comprehension question, this question along with its answers
were displayed immediately after the rating choice was recorded, on a fresh screen (no
longer containing the short paragraph describing the scenario). An additional keystroke
was required in order to advance from item to item and a 500 ms delay was inserted between items.
A practice session familiarized the participants with the structure of the experiment. It
included a total of 5 items, one of which demonstrated the setup of the rating task in the
experiments (the other four items were practice items from unrelated experiments). The
‘target’ in the practice did not contain the modal verb need, and participants were not given
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feedback on their choices during the practice. Participants were instructed to judge the fit
between the sentence and the story based on the information in the story. They were also
told that they would be asked a follow-up question after some items and that they would be
able to take a break midway through the experiment. Each session lasted approximately 30
minutes including the break.

4.1.3.4

Results

Sentences in which need’s complement was a noun phrase received lower ratings of
fit than corresponding need-IP sentences in the scenarios of Experiment 1 (Figure 4.1).
In Experiment 2, where stories were consistent with both a deontic and a teleological interpretation of the modal, need-IP sentences and need-DP sentences both received high
rating scores: 4.43 and 4.40 respectively (grand mean over all items and all subjects). Experiment 1 featured contexts which were only consistent with a deontic reading of need.
Here, need-DP sentences received a rating of 2.94 on average, whereas need-IP sentences
continued to be highly rated, 3.75 on average.8
To test whether the difference between the two types of modal complements was significant in the (+content/-preferences) scenarios of Experiment 1, we conducted a mixed
effects regression with crossed random effects for subjects and item (Table 4.1). The effect
of modal complement on the ratings was found to be significant (t = 7.155, p < 0.001). As
a further test of the main effect of complement type, we built a second model for the ratings
with random slopes for this treatment variable both by subject and by item.9 This model
embodies the assumptions that different subjects may have differed in their sensitivity to
need-DP and need-IP constructions and that different short stories brought out the difference between the conditions more clearly than others. In the more specific model, the type
8

All calculations and visualizations were carried out with the R open source software for statistical computing and graphics (R Development Core Team, 2008).

9

In R, the formula used to describe this model was Rating ∼ ModalComplement +
(1+ModalComplement|Subject) + (1+ModalComplement|Question).
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5

’How well does the sentence fit with the story?’

4.43

2.94

4
1

2

3

3.75

0

Average Rating (1 = Poorly to 5 = Very well)

4.40
DP
IP

Exp. 1

Exp. 2

Figure 4.1: Experimental results comparing need and need to in deontic and teleological
contexts. Need-DP sentences received significantly lower ratings than need-IP sentences
in Exp. 1 (t = 7.155, p < 0.001). In Exp. 2, the ratings in the two conditions did not differ
(t = 0.43, p = 0.66). The models fitted were linear mixed models with crossed random
effects for subjects and items. Between experiments, a t-test revealed that the difference
among the need-IP sentences was significant as well (t = 6.45, p < 0.001).

148

of modal complement still had a significant effect on participants’ ratings (t = 3.628). With
more degrees of freedom, this model is more complex, yet a likelihood ratio test shows that
it is justified (χ 2 = 18.435, p = 0.001015; see Baayen 2008, p. 253, for discussion).
Fixed effects
Predictor
Estimate
(Intercept)
2.9417
ModalComplement = IP 0.8083

Std. Error t value
0.1771
16.607
0.1130
7.155

Random effects (40 subjects, 12 questions)
Groups
Name
Variance
Subject
(Intercept) 0.26217
Question
(Intercept) 0.22128
Residual
1.53159

Std. Dev.
0.51202
0.47041
1.23757

N = 480, Log likelihood = -817.9
Table 4.1: Linear mixed model for Experiment 1. Summary of a linear mixed model fit to
the raw data from Experiment 1 using R’s lmer function (Bates et al. 2008). The formula
used in the call to lmer was Rating ∼ ModalComplement + (1 | Subject) + (1 |
Question).

We conclude from this that when need’s complement is a nominal, the modal does
not readily have access to modal interpretations that are based on deontic content. These
interpretations are nonetheless freely available to it when it combines with a to-infinitive.
Next, we turn to the findings of Experiment 2. Recall that scenarios in this experiment
supported both deontic and teleological readings of need, and the grand mean ratings of
sentences in the two conditions were correspondingly quite similar: 4.43 for the IP condition, 4.40 for the DP condition (see the right half of Figure 4.1 above). Statistical analysis
reveals no effect of modal complement on the ratings in this experiment (the estimated increase of 0.033 in mean ratings of IP complements was associated with a t-value of 0.43,
p = 0.66).
More interestingly, speakers’ responses to the forced choice comprehension question
that followed each item (Experiment 2’) give us direct insight as to the interpretations they
assigned to the modal in the two syntactic configurations tested. Recall that, for each item,
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participants chose between two possible answers to a why question about the item (as in
(125) above). This response was taken to reflect the interpretation they assigned to the
modal in light of the information provided in the short story. The deontic response was the
one that was based on rules or regulations mentioned in the story. The teleological response
was the one that was based on the preferences described in the story.
The number of responses indicative of deontic and teleological interpretations in each
syntactic configuration is shown in Table 4.2. Although there was no overall difference in
the proportions of the two types of response (the column totals are similar), the breakdown
by condition shows that items in the DP condition contributed the majority of teleological
interpretations (141/248 = 56.85%), whereas items in the IP condition were the main source
of deontic interpretations (133/232 = 57.33%).
Deontic response
IP condition
133
DP condition
99
232

Teleological response
107
141
248

Table 4.2: Results of Experiment 2’ (responses to comprehension questions). A question
like Why does Tammy need (to have) a laptop? was presented with two possible answers:
one based on the content of a rule or regulation (Because it’s company policy) and one
based on preferences or desires (To watch her DVDs). A significant tendency for contentbased deontic interpretations to be paired with the IP configuration of the verb (2.16 times
higher odds than in the DP configuration, p < 0.001) was found in a mixed logit model.

In order to model the random effects of subject and item while also respecting the
categorical nature of outcomes in this task, we applied a mixed logit model to these data.10
The properties of the resulting model are shown in Table 4.3. They confirm the significance
of the effect that syntactic configuration had on the interpretation of need in context.
The estimate for the fixed effect of complement type tells us that when the complement
to need was an infinitive, the odds for a deontic response (which was the one coded as
10

See Jaeger (2008) for a detailed critique of ANOVA-based approaches to data which are proportions of
categorical outcomes.
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1 in this analysis) were 0.7695 log-odds higher than when the complement was a noun
phrase. That is, the odds for a deontic interpretation were e0.7695 ≈ 2.16 times higher in
the IP condition than in the DP condition. As seen in the table, this difference between the
conditions is significant (p < 0.001). That is, even though the ratings for need in the two
conditions were essentially indistinguishable, they were clearly distinct in terms of their
interpretation.
Fixed effects
Predictor
Estimate
(Intercept)
-0.4525
ModalComplement = IP 0.7695

Std. Error z value
0.3709
-1.220
0.2122
3.627

Random effects (40 subjects, 12 questions)
Groups
Name
Variance
Subject
(Intercept) 0.90501
Question
(Intercept) 1.10807

p
0.222533
0.000287

Std. Dev.
0.95132
1.05265

N = 480, Log likelihood = -288
Table 4.3: Logit mixed model for Experiment 2’. Logistic regression was carried out by
specifying family = binomial in the call to lmer. The formula that was used in the call
was WhyResponse ∼ ModalComplement + (1|Subject) + (1|Question).

4.1.3.5

Discussion

The results of these experiments establish a clear distinction between the interpretations
available to modal need in two of its syntactic configurations in English. Experiment 1
showed a contrast in the acceptability of need depending on the type of its complement in
contexts that supported deontic but not teleological necessity claims. Sentences in which
the modal was complemented by a DP received significantly lower acceptability ratings in
these contexts, suggesting that the modal does not readily allow deontic interpretations in
this syntactic configuration. In Experiment 2 we saw that when rules and preferences were
in agreement, the difference in ratings between the two conditions disappeared. Need in
the nominal complement construction was appropriate and true in these scenarios because
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salient priorities, to which it is keyed, sanctioned a universal modal claim. Importantly,
the variable modal potential of need was manifest in this kind of scenario as well, in the
answers participants gave to the comprehension question that followed each item. Echoing
the finding from Experiment 1, we found a significant tendency for deontic readings of
the modal to be paired with its IP configuration. In summary, while both deontic and teleological modalities are expressible by the modal verb need, it is mainly teleological modality
that is available to it with nominal complements.
One must at this point wonder about two findings in the experiments that challenge
this generalization. First, if deontic modality is not a possible interpretation for nominal
complement need, why were there nonetheless traces of this interpretation in the data?
And second, if need to can accommodate both types of modality considered here, why
does there seem to be a difference in the ratings of sentences in the IP condition in the two
experiments? I address these two questions in turn.
The line that separates deontic modality from teleological modality is blurred by pseudodeontic interpretations, and therefore easy to overlook. The fact is that a deontic obligation
can be the basis for the formation of a priority, if following the rules is considered to be
a goal in itself. Following the rules entails at least fulfilling the latent goal of being obedient, and it is advantageous to be obedient, especially if the rules in question and one’s
own interests are not in conflict. The items we included in Experiment 1 tried to make
pseudo-deontic interpretations unlikely, by portraying situations in which following the
rules was disadvantageous to an individual and not something they would be expected to
be committed to (for example in (123), taking home a cake one cannot eat).
The benefits associated with following the rules are not easy to shake off, however,
and an example of how they might raise the acceptability of sentences with need in the
nominal complement construction is demonstrated by (126) below. This item received the
highest positive adjustment to the intercept among the twelve items in Experiment 1 and
is useful in making this point. If we focus just on Nicole’s preferences and purposefully
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ignore the new regulation at her workplace, it is reasonable to say that Nicole does not
need an assistant. But although she doesn’t need one, it would probably be more harmful
for her to object about the new policy than to swallow the unwelcome change and deal
with a personal assistant. Native speakers would likely attach little significance to the shift
in contextual assumptions that is required for Nicole needs an assistant to be true in the
context. They would have no difficulty construing the situation in a way that licenses a
pseudo-deontic interpretation of the modal in the DP condition.
(126)

Nicole is resourceful and independent. She always runs errands herself, manages
her bank accounts herself, and doesn’t like strangers interfering with her business.
That’s why she hates the new policy at her workplace: every manager in Nicole’s
rank or higher is required to hire a personal assistant starting next month.
a. Nicole needs to have an assistant. (IP condition)
b. Nicole needs an assistant. (DP condition)

Some items were better than others in the sense that they were more resistant to contextual manipulation of this kind. The very fact that items differed from one another in
this respect reminds us of the highly interactive nature of modal disambiguation in conversation. Depending on what aspects of a situation one chooses mentally to focus on,
a modal statement they heard will receive subtly different interpretations. These choices
are influenced by many factors, some of which are linguistic and concern the presentation
of considerations in the scenario, and some which are not linguistic. Often, the context
can only narrow down the options without resolving this indeterminacy completely. The
responses we see in our experiments reflect the complex nature of the phenomenon under
discussion.
The second question I raised concerns what looks like an effect of context type on
the rating of sentences in the IP condition. Sentences in this condition received lower
ratings in the (+content/-preferences) scenarios of Experiment 1 compared to the (+content/+preferences) scenarios of Experiment 2. A simple independent observations t-test
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shows that the difference we perceive visually between the two IP columns in Figure 4.1
is also statistically significant (t424.293,0.975 = 6.4509, p < 0.001). This is a bit surprising,
because one would think that need to would be completely felicitous as a deontic modal
in the scenarios of Experiment 1. However, since need to can (grammatically) accommodate a variety of priority interpretations, participants may have considered a teleological
interpretation of the modal in these sentences, in addition to a deontic interpretation. Since
settling on this interpretation of the modal would result in falsity, the sentences may have
been given a lower rating of fit overall. In other words, lower ratings may reflect intrusion
from an unsuccessful resolution of the modality as teleological in a (+content/-preferences)
scenario.
The experimental evidence presented in this section disconfirms an expectation from
the literature that deontic and teleological modalities would be equally possible as root interpretations of a versatile modal. We saw that need can express only a proper subset of the
priority root modalities in the nominal complement construction; it does not readily acquire
rule-based interpretations in this configuration, even in contexts in which the existences of
the rules is salient.
At a more general level, these results substantiate a new argument against a semantic
equivalence between modal verbs that combine with nominals (or “deceased clauses,” to
use McCawley’s 1974 figurative term) and those that combine with infinitivals.
In the next section we will see than not all nonfinite complements allow the semantic
flexibility we observed with to-infinitives.

4.2

English (for)-to infinitives and the Expressive IP hypothesis

A plausible hypothesis regarding the greater modal potential of need with infinitival
complements is that something about giving a versatile modal a nonfinite complement is
necessary and sufficient for allowing a deontic interpretation of the modal.

154

(127) (The Expressive IP hypothesis)
Given enough contextual support, a versatile modal may receive a deontic interpretation if and only if its complement is a nonfinite clause.
Sentences like (128) (with need) constitute a crucial test case for this hypothesis. These
are examples of what is traditionally called the Accusativus cum Infinitivo or “accusative
and infinitive” construction (AcI, Bresnan 1972, pp. 149ff.)11 In this configuration, a modal
or attitude verb is followed by an accusative marked noun phrase (him, optionally preceded
by for in the case of need) and an infinitival clause (to be in Amherst).
(128)

We {need (for), want} him to be in Amherst.

Assuming that AcI complements count as nonfinite clauses, the Expressive IP hypothesis predicts that they should pattern with smaller to-infinitives in allowing deontic interpretations of need. If the larger variety of modality types is somehow related to the presence
of a to-infinitive in a modal’s complement, we expect (for)-to-infinitives to have access to
this variety as well. This prediction of the Expressive IP hypothesis is not met.
Consider the (+content/-preferences) scenario in (129), where the law is once again in
conflict with the committed to priorities.
(129) Fences. City regulations mandate that home owners put up fences between their
properties. You and your neighbor get along very well without a fence. In fact, both
of you object to a fence because it would have to go right on top of the beautiful
flower beds that have been flourishing between your two properties. You say to
your neighbor:

11

a.

False We

need a fence.

b.

True We

need to put up a fence. (according to city regulations)

See Section 4.5.1 for a review of the distinguishing syntactic properties Bresnan (1972) associates with
“want type AcI.”
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The basic contrast between nominal and infinitival complements recurs: a nominal
complement to need in (129a) prevents the modal from receiving the deontic interpretation that is more freely available in (129b). What is surprising is that the (for)-to-infinitives
in (130), which seem to differ insignificantly from the infinitival complement in (129b),
nevertheless cannot automatically express the necessity that follows from abiding by the
law. In other words, (130) cannot naturally receive a deontic interpretation in this context,
although the modal’s complement contains an infinitive.
(130)

a.

False We

need (for) a fence to be here.

b.

False We

need (for) there to be a fence.

Moreover, while adding a phrase like according to city regulations helps bring out the
deontic interpretation of (129b) in this scenario, this addition is somewhat awkward when
need’s complement is a noun phrase or a (for)-to-infinitive, as in (131). Intuitively, the
awkwardness in these examples is due to a clash between the teleological interpretation
that need is forced into by the syntactic configuration it is in, and the deontic background
contributed by the adjunct.12 The city regulations do not set our priorities (i.e., the things
we need), they only determine what counts as lawful conduct (i.e., the things we need to
do).
(131)

a.

? According

to city regulations, we need a fence here.

b.

? According

to city regulations, we need (for) there to be a fence.

I conclude from these examples that giving need a nonfinite complement does not by
itself secure a deontic interpretation for the modal in (+content/-preferences) contexts. AcI
complements also show that size of the modal’s complement does not determine the range
of interpretations the modal will allow. It is clearly not the case that any complement
that is at least a to-infinitive allows for deontic interpretations of the modal. Only com12

I thank Kai von Fintel for this point.
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plements that are exactly to-infinitives – nothing more and nothing less – seem to make
non-teleological modality available.
Turning to other languages in the next section, we will see the English pattern recur:
modals with noun phrase complements are obligatorily teleological, and semantic versatility is only found when the modal’s complement is an infinitive. Moreover, in languages
that allow full (subjunctive/future-marked) CPs as complements to versatile modals, these
constructions pattern with nominal complement constructions in terms of modal potential.

4.3

Crosslinguistic data and the Lexical Ambiguity hypothesis

Since we see need appearing in different syntactic configurations with different meanings, a simple hypothesis is that it is simply a lexically ambiguous word. Ambiguity or
polysemy are not foreign concepts when it comes to need. As Loureiro-Porto (2009) notes,
the verb has traditionally been classified as having homomorphs belonging to three different lexical categories (auxiliary as in He need not go, full verb as in He needs a car, and
catenative verb need to; ibid. §1.2, Jacobsson 1974).13 Why not say that need that takes
nominal complements is lexically specified as a teleological modal, while the catenative
verb need to is lexically specified more generally as a priority root modal?
The Lexical Ambiguity hypothesis is not easily falsifiable. However, it seems implausible that the lexical ambiguity involved is of the kind invoked to account for idiosyncrasies in
lexical meaning. Blind lexical ambiguity generates expectations that are not met about the
pairing between the particular root meanings that verbs meaning ‘need’ express crosslin13

It is usually only in its guise as an auxiliary that need is referred to as a true modal in discussions of
the English modal inventory (e.g., Quirk et al. 1985, 138, Smith 2003, 245, Stowell 2004, 621), but it
is clear that this use of the modal is disappearing. Jacobsson (1974) surmised that: “[...] observers on
both sides of the Atlantic are agreed that in the spoken language catenative need is gaining ground at
the expense of the auxiliary, which is often felt to be bookish and is sometimes described as a decaying
modal” (ibid., p. 63). The decay of auxiliary need was complete in spoken English by the end of the
twentieth century (Leech, 2003), whereas need to has shown a remarkable rise in frequency (ibid., p.
230). A number of studies have converged on the conclusion that need to is replacing auxiliary need in
all contexts in present day American English as well as in British and Australian English (Smith 2003,
248ff., Loureiro-Porto 2009, 8).

157

guistically in the various configurations they appear in. In addition, positing such lexical
ambiguity is not an explanatory move,14 and it presents challenges for learnability (a classic subset problem, since the modal meanings allowed in one configuration are a subset of
those allowed in another).
One unfulfilled expectation of a blind lexical ambiguity account is that there would
be languages with versatile modals in which the pairing between meaning and form is
exactly the opposite of what we found for English need. That is, there should be languages
with modals that express a larger variety of (say, root) modalities when they take nominal
complements, and a subset of these modalities when complemented by an infinitival. An
initial survey I have conducted on versatile necessity modals in other languages (HindiUrdu, Indic; Hebrew, Semitic; Czech, Slavic, see below) has instead revealed a pattern that
closely resembles the pattern in English. In Hebrew, the pattern extends beyond the lexical
item ţariX ‘need’ to other versatile necessity modals. One of them, Xayav ‘must, have
to,’ derives from a root that typically contributes deontic meanings of debt, obligation, and
requirement. Nonetheless, it is exclusively teleological in (+content/-preferences) scenarios
when it takes nominal complements.
Hindi-Urdu The modal word caahiye in Hindi-Urdu subsumes the meanings of ‘want,
need, should.’ It is morphologically related to the verb caah ‘want.’ -iye is an archaic
participle with ‘want,’ but is productively used to make polite imperatives elsewhere in the
language (e.g., aa-iye ‘come!’, a polite imperative; Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.)
There are a number of syntactic configurations in which caahiye can appear. When it
takes noun phrase complements, caahiye gives rise to the dative-nominative case marking
pattern. In terms of Davison’s (2004) classification of Hindi-Urdu polyvalent verbs, this
modal/attitude verb belongs to Class C: the class of primarily psychological verbs that
14

Echoing Hacquard’s (2010) concern with respect to the epistemic-root polysemy of modal auxiliaries,
“these solutions, which rely on separate, interpretation-specific entries, ultimately fail to explain why,
crosslinguistically, epistemics and roots are expressed by the same lexical items” (p. 81).
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mark their subjects with dative case and their direct object with nominative case (ibid., pp.
201-202). An example of an experiencer verb belonging to Class C is (132).15
(132)

mujhe ek upaay

suujh-aa.

I-Dat one means.M.SG.Nom see-Pfv.M.SG
‘A solution came to my mind, I saw a solution.’
(Davison, 2004, 207, quoted from Bahri, 1992)
Modal caahiye gives rise to different interpretations depending on its syntactic configuration.16 Consider the scenario in (133).
(133) Water drinking. Ram is participating in an educational game designed to encourage kids to drink water in summer instead of soft drinks. In this game, the winner
of a round is required to drink a glass of water. Ram has been winning many rounds
and consequently drinking lots of water. Oh, no! He just won another round . . .
a. ram-ko

ek cup aur

pii-naa

caahiye.

Ram-Dat a cup more drink-Inf should
‘Ram needs to drink another cup.’
b. ram-ko

ek cup aur

caahiye.

Ram-Dat a cup more should
‘Ram needs/wants another cup.’ (deontic impossible)
Matching the judgments about their English translations, a difference in truth values
emerges between the sentences in this scenario. (133a) is true under a deontic interpretation
(because of the rules of the game). (133b) is judged false and an odd thing to say (because
Ram will suffer from additional liquid intake and doesn’t want to drink any more).17 Thus,
15

I have slightly adapted the transcription of certain vowels in Davison’s examples to fit the convention
used elsewhere in this section. Also, note that in (132), suujhaa would be better glossed as an inflected
form of ‘strike’ (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.)

16

Judgments about the Hindi-Urdu data presented below are due to Rajesh Bhatt unless noted otherwise.

17

Caahiye can also be interpreted as a desire verb meaning ‘want’ in the dative-nominative construction.
To form a desire statement with a verbal complement, the verb caah ‘want ’ must be used:
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when caahiye has a (dative) subject and a (nominative) nominal complement, its modal
potential is restricted in comparison to when its complement is an infinitive. (133b) can be
teleological but not deontic in this configuration.
The (+content/-preferences) scenario in (134) shows the same contrast. Caahiye-IP in
(134a) is judged true, referring to the order issued in the context. It contrasts sharply with
caahiye in the nominal complement construction (134b), which is judged false in the same
context. The latter cannot receive the deontic interpretation that makes the former true.
(These judgments hold for the English translations as well.)
(134) A day off cut short. Ram is a school teacher whose classes are off on a field trip.
He took the day off and was having a great time resting, until a phone call from
the principal ruined it all a few minutes ago. Ram was told to show up at school
in an hour for a meeting with the school gardener. He couldn’t care less about this
meeting, but the principal explicitly ordered him to come.
a. ram-ko

maalii-se

mil le-naa caahiye.

Ram-Dat gardner-with meet take-Inf should
‘Ram needs to meet with the gardener.’
b. ram-ko

maalii-ke

saath meeting caahiye.

Ram-Dat gardener-Gen with meeting should
‘Ram wants/needs a meeting with the gardener.’
Hebrew Contemporary Israeli Hebrew provides further insights concerning grammatical
constraints on the interpretation of modals. It has three versatile necessity modals (ţariX
‘need,’ muXraX ‘obliged, must,’ and Xayav ‘must, have to’), and we will see that all three

(i) ram ek cup aur pii-naa caah-taa hai
Ram a cup more drink-Inf want-Hab is
‘Ram wants to drink another cup.’
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are restricted to teleological modality with nominal complements.18 The inability of Xayav
to express deontic modality with noun phrase complements is particularly interesting. The
Xayav-DP construction is a recent innovation in Hebrew, and one that is considered colloquial speech (Choueka et al. 1997, s.v. Xayav, adj., sense 6). Given that the modal is
homomorphic with an adjective that means ‘owe,’ one might have expected that deontic
modality would be its default interpretation. Instead, it emerges as a teleological necessity
modal in the nominal complement construction.
Semantic versatility of ţariX ‘need’ is demonstrated by the full range of modality types
expressed when the modal takes verbal complements. The need expressed in (135a) is
oriented to the goal of winning a soccer match (a teleological interpretation). (135b) is a
deontic example: the necessity follows from what is decreed in a legal document (the road
map). Finally, (135c) is an example of circumstantial or logical modality: the prejacent describes a conclusion necessitated by the application of a mathematical formula (calculating
the average height of a population).
(135)

a. le-da’at-i

kol

eXad me-ha-saXkan-im ţariX latet

’et misXak

to-mind-1.SG every one of-the-player-PL need give.Inf Acc game.CS
Xaya-v

be-yom Sabat

biSvil Se-neţe

life-3.M.SG in-day Saturday so

’im niţaXon

that-leave.Fut.1.PL with victory

mi-tedi
from-Tedi
‘[...] I think that each player needs to play the game of his life on Saturday so
that we leave Tedi Stadium victorious.’19
18

Other necessity modals in the language are not versatile according to my criteria (either syntactically or
semantically, see p. 138). Ambar (1989) provides a detailed overview of Hebrew modal expressions,
and see Sima’an et al. (2001) and Netzer et al. (2007) for categorizations of Hebrew modals from a
computational point of view.

19

Forum for soccer fans, 4everblue.co.il, November 2006. Last accessed on September 22, 2009.
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b. lefi

mapa-t ha-draX-im hayi-ta

ţariX la’asot b-a-faza

according to map-CS the-road-PL be.Past-2.M.SG need do.Inf in-the-phase
ha-riSon-a

’et ha-davar ha-ba

the-first-F.SG Acc the-thing the-next
‘According to the road map, you should have done the next thing in the first
phase.’20
c. ze ’omer Se-ha-memuţa be-dor

ha-ţe’ir-im

ţariX lihyot 1.80

this says that-the-average in-generation.CS the-young-PL need be.Inf 1.80
‘This means that the average height in the younger generation must be 1.80
(meters).’21
Nominal complements are grammatical with ţariX (as well as with muXraX and Xayav),
but taking such complements limits the adjective’s modal potential.22 The (+content/preferences) scenario of water drinking shows that in Hebrew too, verbal complements allow the modal to receive a deontic interpretation (136a). (136b) is judged false, since Sam’s
wellbeing is a priority that is presupposed to be collectively committed, taking precedence
over a priority like winning the game. A nominal complement thus forces a teleological
interpretation of the modal.23
(136)

[Drinking too much water, as in (133).]
a. sem ţariX/Xayav liStot

od

kos.

Sam need/must drink.Inf another cup
‘Sam must drink another cup.’
20

Parliamentary discussion in the 16th Knesset about the peace process, January 2004. Accessed through
the MILA corpora (Itai and Wintner, 2008).

21

http://sc.tapuz.co.il/shirshurCommuna-12108-10828438.htm, May 2006. Last accessed on
July 24, 2012.

22

Judgments about Hebrew data that are reported in this section are my own.

23

This is the case for the adjective ţariX as well as the verbal√modal yiţtareX ‘need’ that is derived from
the same root (yiţtareX is the future form of the root ţ.r.X NEED conjugated in the hitpael binyan).
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b. sem ţariX/Xayav od

kos.

Sam need/must another cup
‘Sam needs another cup.’
The same pattern emerges in sentences that do not have overt subjects, showing that
the overt presence of a subject does not determine ţariX’s modal potential (this point is
taken up in Section 4.5.2). Recall the fences scenario described in (129). This scenario
is “+content,” because there is a law that mandates a certain action (putting up a fence).
It is also a “-preferences” scenario, since the action is dispreferred: it goes against the
presupposed commitments of the participants in the conversation. When the modal takes
a verbal complement, as in (137a), it can express the deontic interpretation just described,
but in (137b) it cannot. The second sentence is judged false in the fences scenario. (It
should be noted, however, that the complement to the modal is a small clause in (137b),
not a noun phrase. Small Clauses have been proposed to be the underlying structure of
intensional transitive need by several researchers, as I discuss in Section 4.5.1.)
(137)

[The fences scenario of (129).]
a. ţariX/Xayav-im

livnot

kan gader.

need.M.SG/must-M.PL build.Inf here fence
‘A fence needs to be built here.’
b. ţariX/Xayav-im

kan gader.

need.M.SG/must-M.PL here fence
‘We need a fence here.’
A variant of (137a) with an existential prejacent, (138), shows that ‘need’ can also receive an epistemic interpretation when it is in construction with an infinitival. For example,
(138) can be used to communicate the results of a survey about fence locations in town.
(137b) cannot be used in this way. Note that in contrast to (137a), a modal with an exis-

163

tential prejacent agrees in number and gender with the single noun phrase in the existential
prejacent (the noun ‘fence’ is grammatically feminine).24
(138) ţr@X-a/Xayev-et

lihyot kan gader.

need-F.SG/must-F.SG be.Inf here fence(F.SG)
‘There needs to be a fence here.’
“Weather predicates” are useful for testing how a versatile modal like ‘need’ expresses
epistemic necessities. The drought scenario in (139) invites discussion of both teleological and epistemic possibilities. However, only a verbal complement allows the epistemic,
forecast-based interpretation to emerge. (139b) has a reading similar to that of It will probably rain in English, where the modal reports on what the weather is expected to be like.25
The absence of this interpretation is truly striking in (139a) (and in the corresponding example where the modal’s complement is a future-marked clause; see Section 4.4). The
modal in (139a) can only be interpreted teleologically: the sentence is judged true because
in order for the drought to end, there must be rain.
(139) Drought. After a prolonged drought, there are finally forecasts of rain.
a. ţariX geSem.
need rain
‘Rain is needed.’
24

Agreement with a plural form of the noun is shown in (i). Agreement is obligatory, as evidenced by the
ungrammaticality of the non-agreeing or partially agreeing forms in (ii). See Section 4.5.2 for additional
discussion of the non-inflecting form of ‘need’ in (137a).
(i) ţr@X-ot/Xayav-ot
lihyot kan gder-ot.
need-F.PL/must-F.PL be.Inf here fence-F.PL
‘There need to be fences here.’
(ii) *ţr@X-a/*Xayev-et/*ţariX/*Xayav-im
lihyot kan gder-ot.
need-F.SG/must-F.SG/need.M.SG/must-M.PL be.Inf here fence-F.PL

25

Note that the more similar word-by-word counterpart of the Hebrew, It needs to rain, seems incompatible with such an epistemic forecast-based reading. This points to there being subtle differences in the
restrictions placed by English need and Hebrew ţariX on their domains of quantification.
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b. ţariX laredet geSem.
need fall.Inf rain
‘It should rain.’
Czech In Czech, the modal muset ‘must’ is a versatile modal that takes both infinitival
and Prepositional Phrase (PP) complements (marginally also nominal complements, see
below). It allows both epistemic and root interpretations in its infinitival construction, as
shown in (140). Like other modals in the language, muset ‘must’ is ungrammatical with
clausal complements (Kyncl, 2008, 122).
(140)

Jan musı́

být

v knihovně.

Jan must.3.SG.Pres be.Inf in library
‘It must be true that Jan is in the library.’ (epistemic)
‘Jan is obliged to be in the library.’ (deontic)
(Kyncl, 2008, 260)
Example (141), from Kyncl (2008), is suggestive that the modal muset resists deontic interpretations with a nominal complement (‘hamburger’ below). Kyncl glosses the
meaning of the modal as ‘liking’ and notes explicitly that a (deontic) ‘is required to’ interpretation is not allowed.
(141)

Jan musı́

hamburgr

každý den.

Jan must.3.SG hamburger.Acc every day
‘Jan likes a hamburger every day.’ (‘is required to’ impossible)
(Kyncl, 2008, 185(fn. 125))
Since the sentence is presented out of context, however, it is difficult to judge exactly
what its modal potential is.26 The translation using ‘like’ also raises the question of whether
26

The Czech possibility modal moci ‘can’ presents further complications. Kyncl (2008) cites examples
such as (i) as exemplifying a deontic interpretation of the modal in the same configuration as (141).
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the modal allows a teleological, ‘need’-type, meaning in this configuration in Czech in
addition to, or in place of, the ‘want’-type desire meaning that like has in English. What is
crucial in the context of the present discussion is the fact that a deontic interpretation is not
available.
Variability in modal potential was found when the modal was given PP complements
instead of infinitivals. The scenario in (142) was used to test the range of interpretations
that muset can receive in these syntactic configurations. In this scenario, two priorities are
pitted against each other: a priority for a home delivery, and a priority for monetary support.
Due to the legal situation described, these two priorities are in conflict, but only the first
priority is presupposed to be collectively committed to in the context (we assume that
the interlocutors in this conversation would both defend the mother’s preferences). What
we find is that muset has a wider range of possible (teleological) interpretations when its
complement is verbal. The sentence in (142a), with an infinitive, is true in the scenario
(based on the necessity of going to the hospital for claiming the stimulus money). On the
other hand, (142b) is false, because it is sensitive to the priority that Sarah give birth at
home.27
(142) Birthing stimulus. There is a law in Israel that only recognizes deliveries completed in hospitals as eligible for a governmental birthing stimulus, as opposed to
deliveries completed at home. Sarah strongly prefers to give birth in the comfort of
her home, and she made all the necessary arrangements to do so. An hour ago the
delivery started as planned at home, and everything seems to be going smoothly.

(i) Jan může hamburgr
každý den.
Jan can3.SG hamburger.Acc every day
‘Jan likes a hamburger every day.’ or ‘Jan is allowed hamburger every day.’
(Kyncl, 2008, 184(fn. 125))

27

The judgments I report are due to Radek Šimı́k.

166

a. musı́

jet

do nemocnice

must.3.SG.Pres go.Inf to hospital
‘She needs to get to the hospital (to receive the benefit).’
b. musı́

do nemocnice

must.3.SG.Pres to hospital
‘She needs (to get to) the hospital.’
This means that the modal can access certain priorities but not others when its complement is a PP, and that it is less restricted when its complement is a verbal. Note that (142b)
becomes true if there is a change of circumstances, for instance, if there start being complications in the delivery and Sarah needs to reach the hospital for treatment. This accords
with muset-PP’s depending on the primary priorities, since staying alive in the case of complications is a priority that is assumed (implicitly) to take precedence over any subsidiary
considerations of comfort.
Although these data are preliminary and inconclusive regarding the deontic/teleological
divide, it is tempting to tentatively conclude that Czech muset is a versatile necessity modal
that has a limited modal potential when its complement is a PP (and perhaps also a noun
phrase, as suggested by (141)). The nature of this restriction is the same as is found in the
nominal complement configurations of versatile necessity modals in the other languages in
our sample.
Kyncl (2008) concludes in light of the contrast between (140) and (141) that Czech
‘must’ is lexically ambiguous.28 I believe that the crosslinguistic emergence of goaloriented modality as a default in the nominal complement construction does not have the
mark of a lexical ambiguity, and that it calls for a principled grammatical explanation.
28

See ibid. §5.3.4, “Explanation using ‘double lexical entries’.”
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English English itself provides some evidence that the restriction to teleological modality
is not a property specific just to need (and necessary, as we will see again below). Consider
the meanings contributed by the verb require in the two sentences in (143).
(143)

a. The dentist required her assistant to do a new filling.
b. The dentist required a new filling.

Require is a verb that very naturally expresses deontic necessity, as in (143a). But in
(143b), the verb has primarily a teleological interpretation, whereby getting a new filling is
described as necessary in order to better the dentist’s situation. The dentist is the patient, not
the one giving orders in the relevant interpretation of (143b). The teleological interpretation
(143b), and only this interpretation, can be paraphrased by substituting need for require in
the sentence.
Additional examples are given in (144), exhibiting the teleological interpretation of
require in what looks like a nominal complement construction. In (144a), the priority that
gives the verb its teleological flavor is expressed in an accompanying purpose clause (to
open door). These examples cannot receive deontic interpretations. For instance, (144a)
cannot be used to report on the content of a new regulation about door knobs.
(144)

a. Ergonomically Designed Door Knob of the Future Requires Only 1/2in Movement to Open Door.29
b. A lie requires a fresh coat of paint often.30

4.4

Full CPs pattern with nominals

The versatile necessity modals of Hindi-Urdu and Hebrew are grammatical not only
with noun phrase complements, but also with certain Complementizer Phrases (CPs). In
29

http://blog.smarthome.com, March 2012. Last accessed on July 24, 2012.

30

http://www.politicaltruthandfact.com, Letters to the editor, August 2009. Last accessed on
July 24, 2012.
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this section, we will see that modals in this configuration are restricted in terms of their
modal potential in exactly the same way that they are when complemented by a DP. English facts about necessary follow the same pattern. Thus, clausal complements pattern as
nominals in forcing a teleological interpretation of a modal they are in construction with,
showing that teleological modality is not just the modality of “small” modal complements.
Hindi-Urdu Caahiye ‘want, need, should’ is complemented by a subjunctive CP in the
sentence in (145). The prominent interpretation of the modal/attitude verb is ‘want’ in such
examples, but it is possible to show that a teleological ‘need’-type interpretation is possible
as well.31 The scenario in (145) is useful for this purpose, since it is incompatible with a
bouletic/desire interpretation of caahiye. The subject’s desires are described as conflicting
with the need to increase the family income. The sentence is nevertheless judged true,
under a teleological interpretation that is oriented toward fulfillment of the salient economic
priority.
(145) Sending daughters to work. Ram doesn’t want his daughters to be out of the
house working. He has conservative views about such things. The problem is that
he needs the extra money that their work will bring in.
ram-ko

caahiye [ki us-kii

beTiyaaN kaam kar-eN].

Ram-Dat should that he-Gen.F daughters work do-Sbjn.3.PL
‘Ram wants that his daughters work.’ or ‘Ram needs his daughters to work.’
The above scenario contrasts desires with teleological needs, but it does not address
the question of whether or not a deontic interpretation of the modal is possible in the CP
complement configuration. To answer this question, we need to consider a (+content/preferences) scenario, like (146).
31

I thank Rajesh Bhatt for discussion and for the judgments reported in this section.
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(146) Work required by law. Ram is a very wealthy businessman who emigrated with
his family to a new country for political reasons. He doesn’t want his daughters to
be out of the house working (he has conservative views about such things), and the
family’s economic situation is wonderful without anyone else getting a job. But the
community that accepted the family in the new country has very strict rules about
employment: every adult must get a job, and this applies to Ram’s daughters as
well.
Getting a job is presented as a legal obligation in this scenario (hence, “+content”),
but one that runs counter to the accepted preferences of the individuals involved (hence,
“-preferences”). The sentence in (145) is judged false in this scenario, the reason being
that neither Ram’s desires nor his needs dictate that his daughters get a job.32 I take this as
evidence that caahiye-CP cannot receive a deontic interpretation in the context of (146).
For completeness, is should be noted that not every subjunctive CP complement correlates with a teleological interpretation of the modal (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.). If the embedded
subject is nominative, it has to be different from the matrix subject for teleological modality
to be imposed (as in (145)). Otherwise, when the subject of the embedded subjunctive CP is
marked with nominative case and is also co-indexed with the matrix subject, caahiye contributes the meaning of a necessity modal like ‘should.’ We see this in (147), which should
be evaluated in the context of the day-off scenario of (134). Caahiye-CP can receive a
deontic interpretation in this scenario: (147a) is judged to be true, and is comparable to
the infinitival construction in (147b). This particular CP complement construction notably
diverges from the DP complement construction exemplified by (134b).
(147)

[A day off cut short, see (134) above.]
a. ram-ko

(yeh) caahiye [ki vo waqt-pe school pahunc jaa-e].

Rami -Dat this should that hei time-on school reach go-Sbjn.3.SG

32

“The daughters are required to work by law but this is not Ram’s need/desire” (speaker’s comment).
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‘Ram should reach school on time.’
b. ram-ko

waqt-pe school pahunc jaa-naa caahiye.

Ram-Dat time-on school reach go-Inf should
‘Ram should reach school on time.’
Finally, subjunctive CP complements with dative subjects pattern like (145). In this
configuration, exemplified in (148), caahiye is restricted exclusively to teleological modality. (148) is true on a ‘need’ (or ‘want’) interpretation in the depressed artist scenario: the
sentence is true from the perspective of cheering Ram up, although even his best of friends
would admit that Ram doesn’t deserve a medal and shouldn’t get one. The same sentence
is false in a scenario like (149), which only supports the existence of a deontic necessity,
not a teleological or a bouletic one.
(148) Depressed artist. Ram is a so-so artist who doesn’t deserve a medal for his artistic
achievements. He has been depressed recently and getting a medal is sure to cheer
him up. A close friend of Ram’s says the following to a mutual acquaintance, out
of concern:
ram-ko

caahiye [ki us-ko

medal mil-e].

Rami -Dat should that hei -Dat medal receive-Sbjn.3.SG
‘Ram wants to get a medal.’ or ‘Ram needs a medal.’
(149) Arrogant artist. Ram is a highly acclaimed award winning artist. He is so tired
of winning prizes for his work, in fact, that he has developed an aversion to any
form of public appreciation. Last week he was notified that he won the prestigious
Padma Vibhushan medallion. His mother made it clear that she won’t forgive him
if he doesn’t accept this particular prize. She told a friend: “Out of respect for me,
Ram-ko caahiye ki us-ko medal mil-e!”
Accounting for the full range of the semantic and morphosyntactic facts we find in
Hindi–Urdu is beyond the scope of this chapter. The constructions I will focus on are those
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in which the versatile modal is complemented by a CP (like in (145) and (148)) that is in a
sense “different enough” from a simple infinitival.
Hebrew Hebrew modals ţariX ‘need,’ muXraX ‘obliged, must,’ and Xayav ‘must, have to’
are grammatical with verbal and nominal complements, as we saw in Section 4.3. A third
type of complement they allow is a full clausal complement, specifically, a Complementizer
Phrase with obligatory future inflection.
Landau (2004) argues that the future marking in CP complements of ţariX ‘need’ is
actually the realization of subjunctive mood (pp. 820, 859-860). This makes the Hebrew
need-CP construction and the corresponding Hindi-Urdu construction similar in their grammatical makeup.33
The interpretation of the modals in construction with a future marked CP is exclusively
teleological. Thus, in the same scenarios used above to argue for a difference in the interpretation of need-DP and need-IP constructions, CP complements patterns with nominal
DP complements and not with infinitivals. (150) is false in the water drinking scenario,
(151) is false in the fences scenario, and (152) in the drought scenario is exclusively teleological and cannot be interpreted as a forecast about the likelihood of rain.
(150)

[Drinking too much water, see (136) above.]
sem ţariX/Xayav [Se-yitnu

l-o

liStot

od

kos].

Sam need/must that-give.Fut.3.PL to-him drink.Inf another cup
‘Sam needs that he be given another cup to drink.’
(151)

[Fences, see (137) above.]
ţariX/Xayav-im

[Se-tihye

kan gader].

need.M.SG/must-M.PL that-be.Fut.F.SG here fence

33

‘Need’ and related predicates select the subjunctive mood in Spanish as well (Villalta 2008, 519, and
see Chapter 3).
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‘A fence is needed here.’
(152)

[Drought, see (139) above.]
ţariX [Se-yered

geSem].

need that-fall.Fut rain
‘Rain is needed.’
English In Chapter 3, I documented the teleological interpretation of the modal adjective
necessary when it is complemented by (tenseless) that-clauses and (for)-to-infinitives (both
CPs). Integrating these facts into the present discussion, I will show that the modal in
these nominal configurations contrasts has a more limited modal potential than when it
is complemented by a to-infinitive. Intuitions are not crystal clear, but they point in the
expected direction: a CP complement forces a teleological interpretation of necessary more
strongly than a to-infinitive does.
Consider the trial scenario is (153). This is a (+content/-preferences) type scenario: the
law requires deporting a certain witness, but the witness is absolutely critical for putting
the villain behind bars. (153a) with a CP complement is false in this scenario. In contrast,
(153b) can, marginally, receive a deontic interpretation and be judged true.34

34

Essential and crucial are less flexible than necessary in this respect. (ia) is false just like (ib) in the trial
scenario, contrasting with deontic need to in (ic).
(i)

a.

False It

is essential (/crucial) to deport the only remaining witness.

b.

False It

is essential that the only remaining witness be deported.

c.

True The

only remaining witness needs to be deported.

I thus disagree with Van linden et al.’s (2008) claim that essential can express deontic modality (ibid.
§2.3). Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the (teleological) example these authors use to motivate their
conclusion that this interpretation is possible is one in which the modal’s complement is a to-infinitive.
(ii) The Anglo-Catholics consider it essential to be ordained by bishops receiving their appointment
in regular succession from the apostles. (OED 1842)
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(153) Mobster trial. In a big trial against the head mobster, all the witnesses on the side
of the prosecution have slowly been lost. Some mysteriously disappeared. Others
fled the country. There is now only one remaining witness that can testify. But his
status is highly problematic since his visa expires in 24 hours. The law requires that
he be deported if he stays in the country after that time. The prosecutor summarizes
the situation to her assistant:

a. It is necessary that the only remaining witness be deported.
b. It is necessary to deport the only remaining witness.
As with need, AcI complements do not pattern with to-infinitives. Rather, like thatclause complements, their modal potential is limited to teleological interpretations.35
(154) Layoffs. A new round of layoffs is taking place at a certain company, with employees being called individually and discreetly into the boss’s office to receive the
bad news. Somehow, a secretary hears that her friend Kate is next on the boss’s
list. She knows Kate will be devastated when she gets the call. The secretary calls
a mutual friend immediately with the news. She says, “You won’t believe what’s
happening here, . . .

35

a.

False It

b.

True Kate

c.

False It

is necessary for Kate to go in now.
must go in now.

is necessary that Kate go in now.”

The layoffs scenario was designed to show that must and necessary are different in terms of their modal
potential, and that the conclusion suggested by Palmer’s (2001) discussion of necessary – namely, that
the modal can express deontic modality in the configuration in (154a) – is incorrect.
(i) Kate must come in now. ≈ It is necessary for Kate to come in now.
(Palmer, 2001, 7)
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4.5

Descriptive generalizations: subject orientation or complement
types?

How should the generalizations about “deontic-friendly” and “deontic-averse” configurations of versatile modals be stated? In the languages we looked at in sections 4.3 and
4.4, infinitival complements were found in the “deontic-friendly” configurations, while
nominal (DP and CP) complements were found in “deontic-averse” configurations. Thus,
descriptively, the ability of versatile necessity modals to express deontic modality seems
to correlate with their complement being a verbal infinitival clause. The goal of this section is to try and tease apart two factors that may be relevant for the expression of priority
modality, thereby settling on a clearer descriptive generalization of the data.
I start with a review of the syntax of need in English (Section 4.5.1). While need to is a
raising predicate (Harves 2008), need with noun phrase complements and complements that
are (for)-to-infinitives, is not. In terms of syntactic types, (for)-to-infinitives are analyzed
as CPs (Pesetsky 1991, following Bresnan 1972). Thus, there are two factors that must be
considered when describing the modal potential of need: the syntactic type of the modal’s
complement, and whether or not the modal is thematically related to its subject.
These two factors can be teased apart on syntactic as well as semantic grounds (Section 4.5.2). The first argument comes from subjectless examples of the nominal complement construction of ‘need’ and ‘must’ in Hebrew. The modals are subject to the constraint
on modal potential in this configuration despite not being thematically related to a subject. This fact argues against tying the teleological interpretation of versatile modals to the
presence of an overt subject. Second, it can be shown that even when a modal is thematically related to an overt subject, it does not depend on the subject as a source for its modal
backgrounds, in the sense that the relevant priorities the modal is sensitive to need not be
“priorities of the subject.”
Section 4.5.3 concludes with a statement of the constraint on the expression of deontic
modality based on the type of complement in construction with a versatile modal.
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4.5.1

The syntax of need

What do we know about the syntactic properties of the constructions need appears in?
One thing that is clear is that the facts are complex. Standard diagnostics suggest a split
in the syntactic properties of constructions with need, depending on the particular type
of nonfinite complement the modal combines with. The relevant contrast is between toinfinitives and (for)-to-infinitives, and the key distinction (or a correlate thereof) is whether
or not phrases from the nonfinite clause can raise into the matrix clause. With to-infinitives,
there is evidence that the matrix subject originates from within the infinitive. In contrast,
in construction with (for)-to-infinitives, the matrix clause does not contain phrases of foreign origin. Finally, it is hard to tell these two options apart in the nominal complement
construction, and indeed both options have been proposed.
Harves (2008) provides three arguments that need behaves like a raising verb when
its complement is a to-infinitive, contrasting in this respect with the desire verb want (p.
213).36 First, need with a verbal complement can appear with expletive subjects (155d),
patterning with the canonical raising verb seem (155b) and contrasting with want (155f).
(155)

a. An adult seems to be in every car.
b. There seems to be an adult in every car.
c. An adult needs to be in every car.
d. There needs to be an adult in every car.
e. An adult wants to be in every car.
f. *There wants to be an adult in every car.
(Harves, 2008, 213)

36

Cormack and Smith (2002, 141) also state that need+to is a raising verb (along with have+to), but they
do not provide arguments for this position. Brennan (1993) identifies as raising predicates those semimodals that appear with expletive subjects and tensed clausal complements (e.g., It has to be true/the
case that asbestos is dangerous) in addition to taking verbal complements and having lexical subjects
(e.g., Asbestos has to be dangerous). She further assumes that semi-modals that only appear in the latter
type of configuration are control predicates (p. 88, footnote 20). This criterion identifies need to as a
raising predicate.
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Second, need to behaves like the raising predicate seem when the verb in its embedded
clause is passivized. In comparing need and want, only need maintains the interpretation it
has in (156c) under passivization (156d).37
(156)

a. The doctor seemed to examine every patient.
b. Every patient seemed to be examined by the doctor.
c. The doctor needs/wants to examine every patient.
d. Every patient needs/wants to be examined by the doctor. (Meaning shift for
want)
(Harves, 2008, 213)

A third argument for the raising properties of need to comes from semantic considerations of scope. It has been observed that quantificational subjects interact with the quantificational component of a raising predicate in a way that suggests that they originate in
a non-surface, lower position in the tree. Parallel interpretations are not found in control
constructions. In the case of control, a quantificational subject may only take surface, wide
scope with respect to the matrix predicate (May 1977, 1985, and see Wurmbrand 1999 with
respect to raising properties of modal auxiliaries). (157) exemplifies this contrast between
the raising predicate likely and the control verbs try and promise.
(157)

a. Someone from New York is likely to win in the lottery.
(Someone > likely, likely > Someone)
b. Someone from New York tried/promised to win in the lottery.
(Someone > tried/promised, *tried/*promised > Someone)
(Wurmbrand, 1999, 606)

37

On the “passive = active” test for raising predicates, see e.g., Bresnan (1972, 118ff.), Postal (1974).
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Harves (2008) observes that need (but not want) behaves like a raising predicate on this
test.38
(158)

Someone needs/wants to be home when the kids get back.
a. need/*want > Someone
b. Someone > need/want
(Harves, 2008, 213)

The judgments in (158) diagnose a difference between need and want, although it is not
clear that what is diagnosed is a syntax of raising versus a syntax of control. First, one could
imagine syntactic operations that would create the crucial scope order (“need > Someone”)
from an underlying control structure, simply by moving the main predicate above the base
position of the subject (Wurmbrand, 1999, 608). In addition, it is not clear that failure to
show narrow scope readings of the subject in fact implies control in the case of want, try
and other predicates. Despite the behavior of try in (157b), for example, recent research
has challenged the traditional classification of this verb as a control predicate, suggesting
instead that it is an aspectual head that instantiates a raising structure (Cinque, 2006).39 For
evidence from Italian that ‘want’ itself can instantiate a monoclausal (more “raising like”)
structure, see Hacquard (2006, 2008).
It is clear, in summary, that despite the conceptual similarity between goals and desires (i.e., what we need to and want to do), need and want behave differently syntactically
when complemented by to-infinitives. Only need exhibits properties of a raising verb in
this configuration.40 A diachronic perspective provides a final bit of supporting evidence
38

The infinitive can also contain an eventive predicate (e.g., Someone needs to cook dinner, interpreted as
expressing a need that someone – but not anyone in particular – make dinner). This seems problematic
for the view that eventive, future oriented infinitives correlate with a syntax of control (Stowell 1982,
Bošković 1997, Martin 1996). For discussion of the temporal approach to raising versus control, see
Wurmbrand (2006), Moulton (2009), and references cited therein.

39

See Grano (2011) for a proposal about what the updated semantics of ‘try’ might look like under these
assumptions.

40

This conclusion contradicts certain statements in the literature, for instance:
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for this conclusion. Higgins (1990) notes in passing that need may belong to a small class
of historically object control verbs in English that have developed into raising verbs. Higgins’s main claim is about the verb happen, and seem, likely, and need are mentioned as
potentially belonging to the class as well (ibid., p. 23).
To make things more interesting, need and want do pattern alike in the Accusativus cum
Infinitivo (AcI) construction we encountered in Section 4.2. From the work of Bresnan
(1972), we know that the superficial similarity between (159a) and (159b) does not entail
that their syntactic structures are the same. When we run through Bresnan’s diagnostics
(ibid., pp. 153ff.), we find that need patterns with want and not with believe in sentences
with AcI complements.41
(159)

a. We need/want him to be in Amherst.
b. We believe him to be in Amherst.

First, the clause that is the complement of need can begin with for (seen clearly when
this unit is displaced, as in (160b)).42 Second, the subject of the infinitive cannot be promoted to the subject position in the matrix clause when need is passivized. (Note that the
ungrammatical sentences in (161) become grammatical if the embedding verb is believe.)

[. . . ] need behaves like a true (necessity) modal when it selects a bare VP complement,
having only an uninflected nonfinite form, though it also occurs as a regular control verb
taking a to-infinitive complement.
(Stowell, 2004, 621)

41

Bresnan cites Aijmer (1972) as observing many of the same facts.

42

Pesetsky (1991) observes that need, unlike want, seems to allow for outright. In contrast, want is odd
with an overt for unless the verb is not in an AcI environment (ibid., p. 49):
(i) Bill wants (? for) Sue to leave.
(ii)

a. Bill wants very much *(for) Sue to leave.
b. *(For) Sue to leave is wanted by all of us.
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Third, the subject of need’s verbal complement may not be a reflexive pronoun ((162), again
contrasting with believe, e.g., The presenters believe themselves to be speaking clearly).
(160)

a. He needs for his generalization to be robust.
b. What he needs is for his generalization to be robust.

(161)

a. *The generalization is{needed/wanted/desired/preferred . . . } to be robust.
b. *There is {needed/wanted/desired/preferred . . . } to be a robust generalization.

(162)

*The presenters need themselves to speak clearly.

A fourth difference Bresnan (1972) mentions is the possibility of “Equi-NP deletion”
with want type AcI, but not with believe type AcI. Although both need and want take
simple to-infinitives as complements (in addition to AcI complements), we have already
seen that need behaves like a raising verb in this configuration, unlike want which behaves
like a control verb (Harves, 2008).
Bresnan (1972) argues that the properties of the two types of AcI reflect two distinct
syntactic structures. Want type verbs, she proposes, take clausal complements that include
a complementizer (pronounced as for when overt), whereas believe type verbs take complements which are smaller sentential phrases (“the bare S,” p. 170). Pesetsky (1991)
accepts the view that overt for is a complementizer, and further argues that for has a null
counterpart, 0/ for , in sentences like (159a).43
The mixed behavior of need poses a challenge to the neat classification of modal and
attitude verbs as belonging to the “believe type” or the “want type.” Need behaves like
want in its AcI configuration, but unlike want when the infinitival it combines with is a
subjectless string. A summary of the syntactic facts reviewed here suggests a non-uniform
analysis, as in Table 4.4.
43

Ibid., pp. 48ff. and §3.2.10. For a recent analysis of the syntax and semantics of believe type AcI, see
Moulton (2009, 182ff.).
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I.
II.

Abei needs [IP ti to leave ]
IP complement with raising
Abe needs [CP for/0/ for Sue to leave ] CP complement

Table 4.4: Syntactic structures for need with nonfinite complements.

Of course, need also takes simple nominal complements. A sizable portion of the literature on intensional transitive verbs deals with the syntactic and semantic properties of
the need-DP construction, but consensus regarding its analysis has not yet been reached.44
The more recent studies argue that need’s complement is not a full concealed clause in this
configuration (contra McCawley 1974 and Larson et al. 1997). The two alternative structures they propose are shown in (163). The first option is that need takes a small clause
(SC) complement with some covert material (Harley 2004, Schwarz 2006 for a subset of
cases, Harves 2008).45 The second option, due to Schwarz (2006), is that the modal takes
a simple noun phrase complement in certain cases, and the semantics is burdened with the
task of deriving a proposition out of this nominal complement.
(163)

a. Abei needs [SC ti /PROi HAVE/GET the car ].
b. Abe needs [∃ the car ].

A small clause analysis of the need-DP construction, with raising, fits with the verb’s
raising behavior when complemented by a to-infinitive (case I in Table 4.4). A control
syntax and a simple syntax as in (163b), both characterized by need being thematically
related to a matrix subject, fit with the diagnosis that the modal takes a “closed” clausal
complement in the AcI construction (case II in the table).
44

See McCawley (1974), Partee (1974), Ross (1976), Zimmermann (1993), Pustejovsky (1995), Larson
et al. (1997), Moltmann (1997), Fodor and Lepore (1998), Richards (2001), Harley (2004), van Geenhoven and McNally (2005), Schwarz (2006), Harves (2008), Harves and Kayne (2012).

45

Note that the proposals mentioned differ in details relating to the decomposition of the embedded predicates in the small clause (see Harley 2004) as well as the composition of verbal need itself (see Harves
2008, Harves and Kayne 2012). I gloss over these details here.
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In principle, the two analyses make different predictions about the ability of the subject
to take scope under the modal in sentences like Someone needs the car. The analysis in
(163b), but not those in (163a), directly predicts that a subject quantifier would obligatorily
take scope over the modal. And in fact, (164) shows that surface scope is the only option
in the need-DP construction, unlike what we saw for need to in (158) above.
(164)

Someone needs/wants the car.
a. *need/*want > Someone
b. Someone > need/want

What makes it difficult to distinguish between these options, however, is the very assumption that the embedded clause in the analysis in (163a) is a small clause. Williams
(1983) observed that subjects of small clauses contrast with subjects of bigger to-infinitives
in their ability to scope under an embedding predicate. This is shown with respect to seem
in (165) (an example from Johnson and Tomioka 1998).46 In recent work, Moulton (2012,
forthcoming) proposes that these facts be given an analysis that does not rule out raising
from within the SC. (See also Lechner 2007 for discussion in the context of need.)
(165)

a. Someone seems to be angry at the Federal Government.
(wide scope and embedded scope for someone)
b. Someone seems angry at the Federal Government.
(only wide scope for someone)
(Johnson and Tomioka, 1998)

I do not have new arguments that will help decide the question of what the need-DP
construction looks like syntactically. The strategy I will pursue in describing the variable
modal potential of need is thus to focus on those cases where the properties of the structure
are relatively uncontroversial (i.e., the need-IP and need-CP constructions). Once we have
46

Johnson and Tomioka (1998) defend the existence of small clauses, contra Williams (1983).
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a handle on what could be behind the restriction in those cases, it should be possible to go
back and evaluate the different analyses of the need-DP construction.

4.5.2

Subjectless constructions and the source of priorities

The need-IP construction is the only “deontic-friendly” construction of modals like
‘need.’ It is characterized by the lack of a thematic relation between the modal and the
sentence’s syntactic subject. The need-CP construction, in contrast, is characterized by
the presence of a thematic relation between the modal and the subject, and it is crucially
“deontic-averse.” These facts are consistent with the hypothesis that a thematic relation to
a subject is sufficient and necessary for limiting the modal potential of versatile modals that
take nominal complements.
In this section, I raise two issues for this hypothesis. The first is syntactic and is based
on subjectless sentences in the need-CP (and need-DP) construction. As we saw, these
sentences are limited in their modal potential just like corresponding sentences with overt
subjects. Thus, in order to maintain the hypothesis that a thematic relation is responsible
for the limited modal potential of priority modals, one would have to argue that the relevant
thematic relation exists even when there is no overt subject. The second concern is semantic
in nature. In reviewing how thematic relations to subjects have traditionally been used to
explain constraints on the interpretation of modals, I will argue that “subject orientation” as
it is usually understood cannot be the explanation of the teleological interpretation of ‘need’
in the relevant constructions. The point here is simply that the modal’s thematic subject is
not always the source for the priorities that teleological need is evaluated with respect to.
Thus, in order to maintain the hypothesis, a new way of thinking about subject orientation
would have to be filled in. In addition, the new definition would have to distinguish between
priorities of various kinds, in order to explain why deontic modality cannot be expressed
when the modal is thematically related to a subject (but teleological modality can).
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I begin with some background on how the notion of “subject orientation” has been
applied in the literature to explain the interpretation of priority modals.
An early intuition in the literature was that root modals are thematically related to their
subject, in contrast to epistemics (Hofmann 1976, Ross 1969, Perlmutter 1970, 1971, Jackendoff 1972). This thematic relation was proposed, most notably by Brennan (1993), to be
responsible for the range of modality types these modals allow. The idea was that when a
modal is thematically related to a subject, it is forced to be “about” the individual denoted
by that subject (ibid., p. 181).47 To capture this idea theoretically, Brennan (1993) proposed
that root modals use property-level conversational backgrounds to determine their quantification domains, and that these conversational backgrounds consist of relevant properties of
the individual denoted by the modal’s subject. On this analysis, the modal backgrounds of
may in (166), for example, consist of two properties of Joan’s: having registered to vote,
and living in Racine. The deontic statement is true if and only if Joan votes in Racine’s
mayoral elections in at least one accessible world (maximally close to an ideal) in which
she has these two relevant properties (Brennan, 1993, 182-185).
(166)

Joan lives in Racine and is registered to vote. She may [has the right to] vote in
Racine’s mayoral elections.
(Brennan, 1993, 181)

The property-level approach that was developed in Brennan’s work was designed to
account for “ought to do” deontics of the kind exemplified by (166). It is insightful, but
out-of-the-box it fails to distinguish between deontic and teleological modalities. Both varieties seem to be “about” an individual in the intuitive sense, and both display grammatical
properties associated with root modals, and not with epistemics.
47

In the context of historical change, see Bybee et al. (1994) on “agent oriented modality.”
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More recently, responding to criticisms of the traditional approach to subject orientation
and aiming to provide a unified analysis of epistemic and root modals,48 Hacquard (2006,
2010) has argued that the linguistic factor that is responsible for the expression of root
modality is relativity to the event described by the VP embedded under the modal.
The correct generalization seems to be that root modality is centered around
the event described by the VP and its participants. In most cases, the main participant is the subject, and hence properties of the subject are highlighted. In
other cases, however, the location or properties of other participants of the
event are more relevant[.]
(Hacquard, 2010, 92)
This characterization is proposed to apply to “ought to do” deontics, teleological modals,
and other root modals. Since we are primarily concerned with the expression of teleological
modality (as in the nominal complement constructions of ‘need’), let us focus on this type.
In the teleological interpretation of have to in (167), for example, the modality would be
centered around an event of Mary’s taking a train to Paris last night. The fact that Mary, the
subject, had a need to go to Paris is responsible for the teleological flavor of the modality.49
More generally, goal-orientation seems to depend on some participant in the embedded
event having the priorities that the modal claim is based on.
(167)

(Last night) Mary had to take the train (to go to Paris).
(Hacquard, 2010, 110)

However, when we consider examples like (168), it becomes clear that this interpretation of event relativity is problematic. First, even when the subject is the main participant
in the embedded event, it is often not the case that their own preferences line up with the
relevant goal. (168a) provides such an example. Individuals other than the subject (here,
48

Challenges for the traditional analysis of root modals as two-place (control) predicates were raised by
Bhatt (1998), Hackl (1998), and Wurmbrand (1999).

49

Since the event that anchors the modality may be non-actual, one has to worry how it is identified in the
general case. When the modal statement is generic, Hacquard (2010) proposes that the relevant event is
“a train-taking by Mary in all generic worlds” (p. 110).
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the boss in charge of the construction) are responsible for defining the relevant priorities
and preferences. In examples like (168b), it is the speaker whose preferences matter for
the teleological claim.50 The sentences in (168c)-(168d) are examples with VP participants
that clearly do not have any preferences or priorities of their own. A head of lettuce does
not have a preference for keeping long after it has been picked; an orchid does not prefer to
thrive (in the sense of comparing the possibility of thriving to the possibility of not thriving
and preferring the former over the latter). It seems impossible, finally, to access the relevant priorities through the locations of the VP events described. These priorities are not
centered around the construction site in (168a), the whereabouts of the worker in (168b),
the fridge in (168c), or the location of the plant in (168d).
(168)

a. In order to finish the construction ahead of schedule, the poor workers need to
work 12-hour shifts.
b. [A worker’s visa is about to expire. The worker wants to leave his current boss.]
Boss: I like that worker, but he needs a new visa (in order to stay with us).
c. The lettuce needs to be dry (in order for it to keep longer).
d. An orchid needs bright light and moderate humidity (in order to survive and
thrive).

This discussion highlights the need for a new understanding of subject orientation, if
some notion of this kind is to provide an insight into the interpretation of priority modals.
50

Portner (2009) makes a similar point. In discussing what he classifies as a teleological counterpart of
Feldman’s (1986) “ought to do”/“ought to be” split among deontics, Portner notes a difference in the
interpretation of (i) and (ii) below. On one natural interpretation of (ib), the modal implicitly references
the subject’s goals, Mary in this case. Example (ia) is different: it is not subject oriented when it admits
a paraphrase like, ‘It is necessary, given our goal to get all the students to their destination, that at least
two of them take the subway.’ The modal can take “wide scope” with respect to the subject, referencing
goals of the discourse participants (you and me, for example), not the goals of any two or more students.
(i)

a. At least two of the students should take the subway.
b. Mary should take the subway.
(Portner, 2009, 186)
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Whether or not the thematic subject of a versatile modal is part of what semantically (i.e.,
grammatically) prevents it from receiving deontic interpretations is still to be determined.
This brings us to the second worry about using subject orientation as an explanation for
a grammatical split among the priority modalities. Recall that in the Hebrew nominal complement construction, versatile modals are restricted to teleological modality even when
they are not related to a subject overtly. The relevant contrast is between examples like
(169a), which can receive a deontic interpretation, and (169b), which cannot.
(169)

[Fences, repeated from (137) and (with elaboration) from (151).]
a. ţariX/Xayav-im

livnot

kan gader.

need.M.SG/must-M.PL build.Inf here fence
‘A fence needs to be built here.’
b. ţariX/Xayav-im

Se-tihye/tibane

kan gader.

need.M.SG/must-M.PL that-be.Fut.F.SG/built.Fut.F.SG here fence
‘A fence is needed here.’ (only pseudo-deontic possible)
The form of the modal ‘must’ in these examples, Xayav-im, has masculine plural agreement which is characteristic of predicates in impersonal subjectless constructions in Hebrew. In contrast, the form of the modal ‘need,’ ţariX, exhibits masculine singular agree-
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ment which is characteristic of predicates with expletive null subjects (Berman 1980, Borer
1981, 1989, Hazout 1994, Ritter 1995).51,52,53
The modal noun Xova ‘obligation’ shows a similar contrast in modal potential, although
the contrast is somewhat more subtle: (170b) with a CP complement seems less open to
receiving a deontic interpretation than (170a) is, with an infinitival complement. The important point about this example is that the noun ‘obligation’ is never associated with a
thematic subject in the language. It is primarily teleological when its complement is a CP,
and it is this type of complement that correlates with an obligatory teleological interpretation of the other necessity modals as well.
(170)

[In the fences scenario:]
a. Xova

lehakim

kan gader.

obligation construct.Inf here fence
‘A fence needs to be constructed here.’
b. Xova

kan gader.

Se-tukam

obligation that-constructed.Fut.F.SG here fence
‘A fence needs to be constructed here.’
51

See also Rosén (1977, 220ff.) on the Xg”m (an acronym in Hebrew for ‘lacking person-number’), and
further discussion by Kuzar (1992, 1996).

52

Modals contrast with other predicates with sentential complements in that an expletive can be realized
overtly only with the latter. The variant of (169b) with ‘need’ in (i) is ungrammatical, and contrasts
with the example with ‘clear’ in (ii). As noted by Berman (1980, 767), the expletive is optional in the
construction in (ii).
(i) *ze ţariX Se-tihye
kan gader.
it need that-be.Fut.F.SG here fence
(ii) ze barur Se-tihye
kan gader.
it clear that-be.Fut.F.SG here fence
‘It is clear that there will be a fence here.’

53

Expletive ze is homophonous to a demonstrative pronoun and a pronominal copula. See Heller (1999,
2002), Sichel (2008), Greenberg (2008), Danon (2012) for recent work on its copular use.
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Berman (1980) notes that subjectless constructions of modals differ “in meaning and
pragmatic import” from the constructions in which an overt subject is realized. She characterizes the difference in terms that are reminiscent of the traditional intuition regarding
subject orientation of root modals.
In the subject-modal sentences, some modality is attributed to the subjects’
relation to the predications: ‘you must’, ‘Dan can’ do something or be affected in some way by an event. In the predicate-complement constructions,
the modality is attributed to an event or situation. What is being asserted is that
a certain circumstance is possible (likely, mandatory etc.)
(Berman, 1980, 769)
The problem raised by the sentences in (169) is that they both exemplify the subjectless complement construction of a modal, yet the modal has a different range of possible
interpretations in each case. If we were to key the modality in both cases to a situation –
perhaps a situation in which the relevant rule or priority is salient or has been expressed –
it would be difficult to explain why certain sub-varieties of priority modality are impossible as backgrounds only in (169b). On a theory that derives the content of ordering sources
from priorities that are salient in a situation, rules as well as priorities would make their way
into an ordering source if salient in context. An analysis along these lines would leave the
constraint against deontic modality in the nominal complement constructions unexplained.

4.5.3

Conclusion

The generalization about the modal potential of versatile strong necessity modals will
be stated with reference to syntactic categories of the modal’s complement, as follows.
(171)

(The puzzle of priority modal flavors)
When a versatile strong necessity modal takes a nominal complement (a DP, a
subjunctive CP, a for-CP), it can be interpreted teleologically (based on the primary
priorities in the context), but it cannot be interpreted deontically (based on some
salient deontic content).
With a verbal complement, the modal can receive both interpretations.
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The theoretical basis for the phenomenon described in this chapter has not been attempted here and will be the topic of forthcoming work.
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APPENDIX A
A KRATZERIAN CONTEXT DEPENDENT POSSIBLE WORLDS
SEMANTICS FOR MODALS

Every journey in the formal semantics of modality starts with possible worlds (Kripke
1959, 1963, Lewis 1973, 1986, Kratzer 1977, 1981, 1991). For our purposes, it will not
be necessary to commit to a particular position about the metaphysical reality of possible
worlds. As entities in our semantic ontology, possible worlds represent all the possible
ways things could be (without committing to whether or not these possibilities actually exist
alongside the one world we live in; see e.g., Lewis 1973, §4.1, for the realist’s approach
to possibilia). A world contains a complete record of the history, present, and future of
the individuals that inhabit it. With the modal realist, we will assume that individuals are
world-bound. You and I live in the actual world. When we talk about how things could
have been different for some individual, we necessarily make a claim about counterparts
of that individual in different possible worlds (Lewis, 1968, 1973, 1986).
Modal expressions are linguistic devices for exploring the space of possibilities. They
draw attention to contextually relevant subsets of possible worlds and allow us to say something about what happens in them.1 Specifically, we assume that modals are quantifiers
over possible words, lexically specified for force (as universal or existential quantifiers)
and relativized to two contextual parameters called conversational backgrounds (Kratzer,
1981, 1991, 2012). Each time a modal is uttered, the conversational backgrounds determine anew which worlds it quantifies over. This setup allows for a uniform semantics for
1

See von Fintel and Heim (2009) for an introduction to intensional semantics and modality that includes
excellent references, historical notes, and exercises. Portner (2009) is a rigorous introductory text that
also offers a comprehensive survey of various theoretical approaches to the topic.
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modal expressions. The fact that many modal words boast a wide range of interpretations
(epistemic, deontic, teleological, and so forth) is usually explained by their dependency on
contextually supplied conversational backgrounds.2
According to Kratzer (1981, 1991, 2012), zooming in on the relevant possible worlds
is a process that proceeds in two steps. The first step involves a conversational background
known as a modal base. Modal bases are functions from worlds to sets of propositions.
These propositions may correspond to available pieces of evidence in that world or relevant circumstances that hold in it. (Phrases like In view of such-and-such information . . .
can be used to make the nature of the modal base explicit.) The second step involves a
conversational background called an ordering source. Ordering sources also map worlds to
sets of propositions. These propositions are of a normative nature; they encompass bodies
of laws, desires, goals, and other types of ideals. As their name suggests, ordering sources
are used for ordering or ranking possible worlds. The relevant subset of possible worlds
for any given modal claim is thus identified by first finding all the worlds in which all the
propositions in the modal base are true and subsequently ranking these worlds according
to how close they come to the ideal determined by the ordering source.
The binary relation /g(w) between possible worlds that is induced by an ordering source
g(w) is defined as in (172). If we take g(w) to represent some kind of ideal in a world of
evaluation w (how politicians should behave, what we would like to do over the weekend,
etc.), we say that one possible world comes at least as close to the ideal as another just in
case the set of propositions in g(w) that are true in the first world is a superset of the set of
propositions in g(w) that are true in the second. If the superset is a proper superset, we say

2

Kratzer’s focus was on modal expressions in German and English. In recent years, researchers have
uncovered languages with modals that do not vary in the type of modality they express (van der Auwera
et al. 2005, Matthewson et al. 2006). German-type languages also have modal words that are restricted
lexically to particular modality types (see Kratzer 1981, §6). See Nauze (2008, §2.7.5) for a typological
summary.
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that the first world is better than the second according to the ordering source. Let’s write
Jg(w) to indicate the relation “better in terms of an ordering” between possible worlds.3
(172)

For all worlds v and z in W and a set of propositions A:
v /A z iff {p ∈ A : p(z)} ⊆ {p ∈ A : p(v)}.
(Kratzer, 1981, 298)

Let’s step through an example to illustrate the working of this definition. Suppose we
are on a roadtrip and we need to decide where to go next. Our agenda in terms of tourist
attractions and general preferences is given in (173). Suppose further that given our current
location and the time we would spend in each place, we cannot visit both Amherst and
Hartford today.
(173)

•

Visit the Emily Dickinson Homestead in Amherst.

•

Visit the Mark Twain House in Hartford.

•

Be positive and in a good mood.

The worlds we are concerned with are those in which relevant facts about our trip hold:
we are at our present location, the distance to Amherst and Hartford is what it is, the
opening hours of the Homestead and the House are as they are, and so forth. There are
eight relevant (classes of) possible worlds to consider. These include worlds in which we
happily go to Amherst and visit the Homestead (w1 represents these), worlds in which we
get to Amherst in a bad mood but manage to visit the Homestead (w2 ), and worlds in which
we have a cheery positive drive but get to Amherst after the Homestead has closed (w3 ).
There are also worlds in which the worst of the worst happens: we have a miserable drive
to Amherst and arrive there after the Homestead has closed (w4 ). Similar characterizations
apply to the worlds in which we go to Hartford (these are represented by worlds w5 through
3

For all worlds v and z in W and a set of propositions A: v JA z if and only if v /A z and it is not the
case that z /A v. The notation I use here differs from that in Kratzer (1981, 1991), but the content of the
definitions is the same.
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w8 ). The preferences in (173) correspond to the following propositions (as sets of possible
worlds).
(174)

•

p1 = {w ∈ W | we visit the Dickinson Homestead in w} = {w1 , w2 }.

•

p2 = {w ∈ W | we visit the Twain House in w} = {w5 , w6 }.

•

p3 = {w ∈ W | we are in a good mood in w} = {w1 , w3 , w5 , w7 }.

Now, which ordering source(s) represent the preferences that we have in this scenario?
Premise Semantics does not determine an answer to this question. The ordering source
could be the set consisting of the three basic propositions in (174), but it could also contain
propositions derived by conjoining and disjoining these basic propositions (among other
options; see Kratzer 1979, 1981, 1989, Lewis 1981, and also Kratzer 2012 for discussion).
To illustrate some of the issues involved in this choice, let’s see what happens if we assume
that the ordering source is simply the set of propositions {p1 , p2 , p3 }. Call this ordering
source g1 (w).
It follows from (172) that w1 /g1 (w) w2 , since w1 is a member of all the propositions
that w2 is a member of (p1 ), and one more (p3 ). Similarly, w1 /g1 (w) w3 . Note that w2 and
w3 themselves are incomparable according to the ordering. (There is no subset relation
between the sets of propositions they are members of, namely {p2 } for w2 and {p3 } for
w3 .)
Formally, the binary relations induced by ordering sources have the properties of a
preorder: a transitive and reflexive relation which is not necessarily antisymmetric and not
necessarily complete. This means that there may be worlds in the modal base that tie with
respect to how close they come to an ideal (e.g., for w3 and w7 in our example, w3 /g1 (w) w7
and w7 /g1 (w) w3 ). There may also be worlds that are not comparable at all. (For instance,
w2 and w3 are incomparable because neither stands in the /g1 (w) relation to the other.)
Figure A.1 shows part of the ordering induced by g1 (w) in the roadtrip scenario. An
arrow in the graph connects two worlds u and v if and only if u /g1 (w) v (but note that arrows
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that can be inferred from transitivity have been suppressed). Bidirectional arrows designate
ties.
w5

w1

w2

w3

w7

w4

w8

w6

Figure A.1: Ordering worlds with a single unstructured ordering source. Depicted is the
ordering induced on w1 through w8 by the propositions in (174) (with pairs that can be
inferred from transitivity suppressed). Amherst-worlds are colored red, Hartford-worlds
are colored blue.

Given the preferences in (173), the sentence in (175) is intuitively false.
(175)

In light of our preferences, we have to go to Amherst today.

Kratzer’s definition of necessity relativized to a modal base and an ordering source
(what she calls human necessity) correctly predicts the sentence to be false.
(176)

A proposition p is a human necessity in a world w with respect to a modal base f
and an ordering source g iff
∀u ∈

T

f (w).∃v ∈

T

f (w).(v /g(w) u & (∀z ∈

T

f (w).z /g(w) v → z ∈ p)).

(Kratzer, 1981, 298, notation adapted)
Sentence (175) comes out false according to (176), since there are Hartford-going
worlds that are unordered with respect to the Amherst-going worlds. In particular, no
Amherst-going world in

T

f (w) is at least as good in terms of the ordering as w5 , so w5

prevents the condition in (176) from being satisfied.
Now suppose we add a new preference to our list in (173), a preference which makes the
Amherst-worlds more attractive than the Hartford-worlds. Perhaps we want to use as little
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gas as possible, and Amherst happens to be closer to our current location than Hartford. If
we add this preference to g1 (w), the result would be a new ordering source (call it g2 (w))
that induces the ordering shown in Figure A.2. With p4 added to the ordering, the tie
between w4 and w8 is broken such that w4 Jg2 (w) w8 . If going to Amherst means saving
gas, then going there is better than going to Hartford, even if the trip is unfruitful and
annoying. Similarly, w3 Jg2 (w) w7 according to g2 (w).
(177)

•

p1 = {w ∈ W | we visit the Dickinson Homestead in w} = {w1 , w2 }.

•

p2 = {w ∈ W | we visit the Twain House in w} = {w5 , w6 }.

•

p3 = {w ∈ W | we are in a good mood in w} = {w1 , w3 , w5 , w7 }.

•

p4 = {w ∈ W | we use little gas in w} = {w1 , w2 , w3 , w4 }.

w1

w5

w3

w2

w7

w4

w6

w8
Figure A.2: Ordering worlds with a single unstructured ordering source (continued). The
figure depicts the effect of adding p4 to g1 (w) as an independent proposition.

Note that given the new set of preferences, (175) is intuitively a true statement. However, since w5 is still unordered with respect to any Amherst-going world, the condition for
necessity in (176) is not fulfilled.
There are a number of possible responses to this result. The obvious response from the
perspective of Premise Semantics would be to blame the problematic result on the particular
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choice of ordering sources in the examples. Concretely, instead of using {p1 , p2 , p3 } as an
ordering at the outset, we could have also used an ordering source that is more “structured.”
An ordering source like { (p1 ∩ p3 ) ∪ (p2 ∩ p3 ), p1 ∪ p2 ∪ p3 }, for example, reflects
the intuition that the preference for being in a good mood is secondary to the preference for
visiting one of the museums. An interesting question would then be how, in general, basic
“unlumped” preferences are structured into a single ordering source to represent cascaded
preferences (see Katz et al. to appear for relevant discussion).
Another idea would be to keep p4 separate from the original set of preferences, {p1 ,
p2 , p3 }, and to use it to refine the ordering they induce (in particular, allowing comparison
of worlds that are incomparable in the original ordering). This is the intuition behind von
Fintel and Iatridou’s (2008) analysis of weak necessity modals, and have to in (175) would
be an example of a strong necessity modal that makes use of the same machinery. This
example would support Kratzer’s original idea that modals in general may be sensitive to
more than a single ordering source.
Actually, it is a simplification to assume that there is never more than one
ordering source involved in modal reasoning. Suppose I draw conclusions
which involve established facts, the Encyclopedia Britannica, the local newspaper and the gossip I picked up at the corner. And suppose further that the
established facts have priority over the Encyclopedia Britannica, the Encyclopedia Britannica has priority over the local newspaper and the local newspaper
has priority over the gossip I picked up at the corner. How do we reason in
such a case?
I think that the semantics of modals which I have presented so far can be extended in a straightforward way to handle these cases. The interpretation of
a modal expression would have to depend on a modal base f and a finite sequence of ordering sources g1 , . . . , gn . For any world w, g1 (w) would induce
T
an ordering on f(w) in the usual way. g2 (w) would – if necessary – refine
this ordering in undoing the ‘ties’ left by its predecessor, and so on for every
successive member in the sequence.
Probably, we can’t assume that the different ordering sources form a natural sequence with respect to having priority over each other. There may be ordering
sources which have equal priority. This all sounds as if it were the beginning
of my next paper.
(Kratzer, 1981, 321)

197

APPENDIX B
TRIPLE RELATIVITY: NEGOTIABLE NORMS,
NON-NEGOTIABLE NORMS, AND FACTS

A unified conversational background Mw is a set of sets of propositions. It is initialized with the value of { f (w)}, for some contextually determined Kratzerian modal base f .
Primary ordering sources, representing non-negotiable norms, are merged into the unified
conversational background via the operation of repeatable compatibility restricted union,
which invokes Frank’s (1996) “compatibility restricted union” for conversational backgrounds (ibid. p. 42). The set of accessible worlds forms the domain of quantification
for modals like must and can. It is retrieved from the unified conversational background
after the n-th primary ordering source has been added to it. Secondary ordering sources,
representing negotiable norms, may order the set of accessible worlds in the usual way,
following Kratzer (1981, 298).
Unified Conversational Background For a Kratzerian modal base f , a sequence of primary ordering sources < g1 , g2 , . . . , gn >, and a world of evaluation w, we define the
unified conversational background Mw :
Mw = Mw
n , where:
Mw
0 = { f (w)},
w
Mw
i = Mi−1 + gi (w), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.

Repeatable Compatibility Restricted Union For a set of sets of propositions M and a
finite set of propositions A:
M + A = {M ∪ X : M ∈ M, X ⊆ A, M ∪ X is consistent, ∀Y ⊆ A if X ⊂ Y then M ∪Y
198

is inconsistent}.
(Following Frank 1996)
Accessible Worlds The set of worlds accessible from a world w given the unified conversational background Mw :
{m : m =

S

T

M for some M ∈ Mw }.
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